CROSBY

v.

CENTURION OF FLORIDA

Plaintiff Otis Crosby, Jr., an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on June 15, 2022, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1). Crosby proceeds on an Amended Complaint (AC; Doc. 8). Crosby names as Defendants (1) Centurion of Florida; (2) Reception and Medical Center (RMC) Sergeant Hollingsworth; (3) RMC Sergeant John Doe¹; (4) RMC Sergeant John Doe²; (5) Dr. R. Bassa, RMC Medical Director; (6) Michelle Schouest, Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) IISC; and (7) the Office of Utilization Management (UM Office). In his AC,¹ Crosby asserts he received inadequate medical care for a stab wound to his left hand that he sustained at Jackson Correctional

2022, until May², 2022. Crosby asserts that Defendants Centurion, Schouest, Dr. Bassa, and the UM Office violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment when they failed to treat him or to provide adequate medical remedies. He also raises breach of duty and breach of contract claims against Defendants Centurion, Sergeant Hollingsworth, Sergeant John Doe¹, and Sergeant John Doe 2. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.² See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F. 3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327, or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims ‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F. 3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.³ Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F. 3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F. 3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F. 3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F. 3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F. 3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F. 2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F. 3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F. 3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F. 3d 1250, 1262- 63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F. 3d at 1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

I. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F. 3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F. 3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit has explained: “To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.” Farrow v. West, 320 F. 3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). To meet the first prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate an “objectively serious medical need”—i.e., “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention,” and, in either instance, “one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (alteration adopted) (quotations omitted). To satisfy the second, subjective prong, the plaintiff must prove that the prison officials “acted with deliberate indifference to [his serious medical] need.” Harper v. Lawrence Cty., 592 F. 3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). “To establish deliberate indifference,” a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prison officials “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) acted with more than gross negligence.” Id. (quotation omitted). An inmate-plaintiff bears the burden to establish both prongs. Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F. 3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).

Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F. 3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). For medical treatment to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the care must be “‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’” Id. at 1271 (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F. 2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F. 2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating “[g]rossly incompetent or inadequate care can constitute deliberate indifference . . . , as can a doctor’s decision to take an easier and less efficacious course of treatment” or fail to respond to a known medical problem).

Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F. 3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). In sum, the Eleventh Circuit has stated:

A prisoner bringing a deliberate-indifference claim has a steep hill to climb. We have held, for instance, that the Constitution doesn’t require that the medical care provided to prisoners be “perfect, the best obtainable, or even very good.” Harris, 941 F. 2d at 1510 (quotation omitted). Rather, “[m]edical treatment violates the [E]ighth [A]mendment only when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1505 (quotation omitted). We have also emphasized—as have our sister circuits—that “a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical staff and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment [fails to] support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.” Id.; accord, e.g., Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F. 3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2018) (“We have consistently held that prison officials do not act with deliberate indifference when they provide medical treatment even if it is subpar or different from what the inmate wants.”); Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F. 3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[The Eighth Amendment] does not impose upon prison administrators a duty to provide care that is ideal, or of the prisoner's choosing.”).

Keohane, 952 F. 3d at 1266. A municipality or other governmental entity may be held liable under § 1983 where that municipality’s policies or customs cause a constitutional

643 F. 3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011); Buckner v. Toro, 116 F. 3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff must prove that the agents of the private medical provider violated his constitutional rights, and its policy or custom was the “moving force behind” the deprivation. See Craig, 643 F. 3d at 1310.

A. Counts Four and Five

As Counts Four and Five, Crosby alleges that Schouest and Dr. Bassa acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs when they denied grievances about the delay and denial of medical treatment for his hand. To the extent Crosby alleges that Schouest and Dr. Bassa mishandled or improperly denied his grievances, such a claim alone does not support a cause of action pursuant to § 1983. See Baker v. Rexroad, 159 F. App’x 61, 62 (11th Cir. 2005)6 (per curiam) (“Because the failure of [the defendants] to take

B. Counts Two, Six, Seven, and Eight

As Count Two, Crosby asserts that Centurion⁸ implemented a policy that that allowed “non-doctors aprn[]s and doctors who are not trained specialist[s] to override the recommendations of a trained specialist.” AC at 10. He contends

Here, Crosby has alleged no facts showing that Centurion violated his constitutional rights or caused a violation of his constitutional rights. His claim is conclusory in nature and lacks specific facts that would allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that Centurion’s policy was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Because Crosby has not presented sufficient allegations to support a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, Count Two is due to be dismissed. In Counts Six through Eight, Crosby avers that the UM Office implemented policies that resulted in the delay or denial of medical treatment for his injury. He contends that a physician recommended Crosby undergo an eight-week course of physical therapy after surgery on his hand. However, due to the UM Office’s cost-saving policy, it only approved a four-week course of physical therapy. He also asserts that the UM Office’s “approval process” delayed his medical appointment. According to Crosby, he required a four-week postoperative appointment so doctors could place his hand in a hard cast. However, Crosby never received a hard cast because the UM Office did not approve his appointment in a timely manner. The Court finds Crosby has failed to state a plausible claim for relief. He does not demonstrate that the UM Office’s cost-saving policy and approval process violated his Eighth Amendment right or caused such a violation. Moreover, he offers no allegations that the missed postoperative appointment or the denial of additional physical therapy presented a substantial risk of serious harm. Accordingly, Grounds Two, Six, Seven, and Eight are due to be dismissed.

II. Counts One and Three

As Count One, Crosby asserts a breach of contract claim against Centurion. He avers that Centurion failed to fulfill its contract to provide medical services to Crosby. Similarly, in Count Three, he asserts RMC Sergeants Hollingsworth, John Doe¹, and John Doe² breached their duty to Crosby and exercised deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs when they did not timely transport him to a medical appointment on January 7,

2020. To the extent Crosby raises pendant state law claims in Counts One and Three, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.⁹ See

1. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20th day of September, 2022.

United States District Judge

Jax-9 9/15 C: Otis Crosby, Jr. #C09771