SNYDER

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION¹

Chasity Marie Snyder (“Claimant”) appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). Claimant raises one argument challenging the Commissioner’s final decision, and based on that argument, requests that the matter be reversed for an award of benefits, or, in the alternative, remanded for further administrative proceedings. Doc. No. 30, at 9-12, 20-21. The Commissioner asserts that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and should

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 28, 2019, Claimant filed an application for DIB and SSI, alleging a disability onset date of December 19, 2018. R. 24, 195-208. 2 Claimant’s application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration, and she requested a hearing before an ALJ. R. 64-116, 119-45, 146-62. A hearing was held before the ALJ on October 30, 2020. R. 37-52. Claimant and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing. R. 37-52. Claimant was represented by an attorney at the hearing. R. 37. After the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Claimant was not disabled. R. 24-32. Claimant sought review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. R. 1-20. On April⁶, 2021, the Appeals Council denied the request for review. R. 1. Claimant now seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner by this Court. Doc. No. 1.

404.1520(a). R. 24-32.4 The ALJ first found Claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2023. R. 26. The ALJ also concluded that the Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 19, 2018, the alleged onset date. Id. The ALJ found that Claimant suffered from the following severe impairments: “depressive, bipolar and related disorders.” Id.5 The ALJ concluded Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 27-28.

R. 28. The ALJ found that Claimant was unable to perform any past relevant work. R. 31. Taking into consideration Claimant’s age (younger individual), education, work experience, RFC, and testimony of the VE, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Claimant can perform such as: document preparer, data examiner, and calculating machine operator. R. 31-32. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Claimant had not been

[L]ifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from December 19, 2018, through the date of decision. R. 32

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Claimant has exhausted her administrative remedies, the Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

405(g), as adopted by reference in 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). The scope of the Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the Commissioner’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Winschel, 631 F. 3d at 1178. The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is defined as “more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F. 3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). The Court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the Commissioner’s decision, when determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Foote v. Chater, 67 F. 3d

1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). The Court may not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, and, even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, the reviewing court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F. 2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).

IV. ANALYSIS

In the Joint Memorandum, which the Court has reviewed, Claimant raises one assignment of error: that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Claimant’s credibility and subjective complaints. Doc. No. 30, at 9-12. Accordingly, this is the only issue the Court will address. Claimant argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination was “nothing more than boiler plate type language” and that the ALJ failed to articulate explicit and adequate reasons for discounting the Claimant’s complaints. Doc. No. 30, at 10-12.

The Commissioner, on the other hand, argues that the ALJ properly considered Claimant’s subjective complaints and cited to specific evidence supporting his evaluation of Claimant’s subjective complaints. Id., at 14, 19. Upon consideration of the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court agrees with the Commissioner. A claimant may establish disability through his or her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F. 3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). A claimant seeking to establish disability through his or her own testimony must show: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F. 3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). If the ALJ determines that the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably produce the claimant’s alleged pain or other symptoms, the ALJ must then evaluate the extent to which the intensity and persistence of those symptoms limit the claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(1). In doing so, the ALJ considers a variety of evidence, including the claimant’s history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, the claimant’s statements, medical source opinions, and other evidence of how the pain affects the claimant’s daily activities and ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1)-(3); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(1)–(3).

Factors relevant to the ALJ’s consideration regarding a claimant’s allegations of pain include: (1) daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain and other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (5) treatment, other than medication, the claimant receives for pain; (6) measures used for pain relief; and (7) other factors pertaining to functional limitations and restrictions to pain.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i)–(vii). “If the ALJ decides not to credit a claimant’s testimony as to her pain, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.” Foote, 67 F. 3d at 1561–62. The Court will not disturb a clearly articulated finding that is supported by substantial evidence. Id.

at 1562. In considering Claimant’s allegations and testimony, the ALJ made the following statements.

The claimant is alleging disability because of severe anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She described symptoms including crying spells, lack of motivation, decreased appetite, and anxiety attacks. She stated that her anxiety attacks last for 10 to 15 minutes and occur in conjunction with shortness of breath, and hot flashes. Anxiety attack triggers include crowds and yelling.

As for her depression symptoms, the claimant stated her depression began in 2018 although there is little evidence of mental health treatment until February 19, 2020 (Ex. 5F). The claimant stated she had crying spells² to³ times per week. Other symptoms include difficulty concentrating and memory deficits. She stated that she requires reminders to take baths.

The claimant lives with her husband and² small children, ages⁶, and 8. She can assist her children in getting ready for school and she can watch them play outside. She stated she could do laundry but she often forgets she has clothes in the washer. As for grocery shopping, the claimant stated she goes to the grocery with her husband but she can stay for only 30 minutes before her anxiety symptoms intensify. The claimant denied a history of Baker Act admission or required mental health hospitalization.

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are only partially consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.

The claimant stated that her mental impairments were the primary barriers which prevented her from working. She stated she experienced panic attacks, and a depressed mood that reduced her concentration and diminished her memory. A mental status examination on February 19, 2020, however, failed to show significant memory or concentration deficits. The examiner noted the claimant was attentive, communicative, friendly and articulate. Her facial expressions and general demeanor did reveal a depressed mood and her thought content was depressed (Ex. 5F/4). The claimant denied having suicidal ideas, homicidal thoughts, hallucinations, and delusions but she did have constricted affect and depressed mood. Diagnoses included PTSD, major depressive disorder, recurrent and moderate and a general anxiety disorder. Her treatment plan included Xanax and Zoloft (Ex. 5F/4).

Follow up examinations noted the claimant could perform abstract and arithmetic calculations. Her judgment appeared fair but there were signs of anxiety and her insight was characterized as fair (Ex. 8F/3). She also reported improvement with her symptoms including decreased crying spells, and improvement with concentration (Ex. 8F/5, 9).

. . .

The undersigned has considered earlier material and relevant evidence to include the previous decision in 2008 to gain a longitudinal perspective of the claimant’s condition. The undersigned finds the claimant has the residual functional capacity as noted in this decision. This conclusion is supported by treatment record and state agency determination. Specifically, mental status examinations reveal the claimant retains adequate attention and memory to take care of her young children, to perform household chores and to go shopping with her husband. While the claimant stated she did not have the motivation to get out of bed, she, in fact, could get out of bed and there is no evidence the claimant is confined to her bed. Additionally, mental status examinations reveal the claimant’s symptoms mostly improve with medications.

R. 29-30.

Claimant ignores the bulk of the ALJ’s detailed analysis and instead focuses on one sentence: “[a]fter careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are only partially consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” Doc. No. 30, at 10 (citing R. 29). Claimant argues that this sentence constitutes “boilerplate language commonly found in Social Security decisions.” Id., at 10-11.7 However, as recited above, the ALJ did far more than just include this one “boilerplate” sentence. The ALJ provided numerous reasons to support his credibility determination, including that: (1) Claimant’s subjective complaints were inconsistent with the medical evidence of record; (2) Claimant reported improvement in her symptoms including decreased crying spells, and improvement with concentration; (3) Claimant can care for her children and perform household chores; and (4) follow up examinations noted that Claimant could perform abstract and arithmetic calculations. R. 29. The ALJ cited various medical evidence of record to support his conclusions, and the Court finds that this evidence does, in fact, support the ALJ’s findings. For

. whether ALJ could have reasonably credited [the claimant’s] testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it.”).⁹

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that:

1. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and CLOSE the case. DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on August 30, 2022.

Woy ar VYVIU

LESLIE NOFFMAN PRICE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record Unrepresented Parties cv-584-FtM-MRM, 2017 WL 4297239, at *7-9 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2017) (the court found that the AL)J’s statements were too general to permit meaningful review, and it was not clear what medical evidence of record the ALJ relied upon); McCloud v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,⁵:20-cv-364-DNF, 2021 WL 4988634, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2021) (reversing ALJ where the boilerplate language was used, and then the AL] merely summarized the medical evidence of record without tying any of that evidence to any reasons for discounting plaintiff's subjective complaints); Crooker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-cv-176-LRH, 2021 WL 1060198, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2021) (finding reversible error where AL] utilized the boilerplate language, failed to identify any specific medical evidence to support the reasons for partially crediting claimant’s statements, and the evidence that was cited was insufficient). In contrast, the ALJ in the present case provided detailed reasons, and cited to specific medical records to support those reasons. R. 29-30.

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