DONNELLY

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Before the Court is the Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 35). For the reasons discussed below, the Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

I.

The Plaintiff initiated this action in March 2020, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (Doc. 1). In February 2021, the Commissioner moved for the entry of a judgment in the Plaintiff’s favor and asked that the action be remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 26). The Court

(Doc. 34). As a result of the subsequent proceedings on remand, the Plaintiff was granted past-due benefits. (Doc. 35-2). According to the award letter, the Social Security Administration (SSA) withheld $18,889.50 of this past-due amount for a possible future award of attorneys’ fees. Id. at 4.2 This figure equates to less than twenty-five

percent of the Plaintiff’s past-due benefits, which is the statutory limit for such fee awards. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). By way of the instant motion, the Plaintiff now asks that the Court enter an order pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) approving fees in the amount of $18,889.50

for the services her attorneys rendered in this action. (Docs. 35 at 5, 35-1). This sum does not conflict with the Plaintiff’s fee agreement, which provides for a contingency fee of up to twenty-five percent of her past-due benefits. Id. According to the Plaintiff, her lawyers are aware of their obligation to refund to the Plaintiff the previous EAJA fee award of $7,483.27 in the event the Court grants the Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. 35

at 3). The Plaintiff also represents that the Commissioner consents to the proposed fee figure. Id. at 5.

II.

Section 406(b) of Title 42, United States Code, governs the authorization of attorney’s fees in Social Security cases where, as here, a district court remands the case

to the Commissioner for further proceedings, and the Commissioner subsequently grants the claimant past-due benefits. Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F. 3d 1273, 1276–78 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).³ Under such circumstances, the claimant may return to the district court—as the Plaintiff has done here—and seek fees not exceeding twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A);

Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 517, 522 (2019). The fee amount authorized, however, must be reasonable. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002); Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601 F. 3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010). To ensure this is the case, section 406(b) mandates that courts

conduct an independent review of counsels’ fee arrangements with their clients. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. As part of its oversight role, courts may direct that an attorney provide “a record of the hours spent representing the claimant and a statement of the lawyer’s normal hourly billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases.” Id. at 808. Courts may also require that the approved fee amount be offset by any previous fee

and section 406 must refund “to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A lawyer may do so either by deducting an earlier EAJA award from a later section 406(b) award or by refunding the smaller EAJA fee and accepting the section 406(b) payment in full. Jackson, 601 F. 3d at 1274.

In this action, the Plaintiff’s sought-after fee amount of $18,889.50 is based on 36.2 hours expended by her counsel on this appeal during 2020 and 2021. (Doc. 30 at 2; Doc. 35 at 3). This monetary sum encompasses all the work the Plaintiff’s lawyers performed before the Court and is not inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s contingency fee

agreement, as the requested fee award equates to less than twenty-five percent of the total past-due benefits granted the Plaintiff. (Doc. 35-1). In light of these facts, as well as the nature of the legal services provided, the positive results achieved, and the Commissioner’s non-opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds that the proposed fee figure is reasonable.

III.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED: 1. The Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 35) is granted, and the Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $18,889.50 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). This sum shall be paid to Plaintiff's attorneys from the past-due benefits currently being withheld by the Commissioner. 2. Upon receipt of these funds, Plaintiff's attorneys shall promptly refund to the Plaintiff the previously authorized EAJA fee award of $7,483.27.

3. This action shall be closed and shall remain closed.

SO ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 16th day of August 2022. Chileon Fe dict.

HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. TUITE

United States Magistrate Judge Copies to: Counsel of record