RICHARD PRIMEAUX
v.
PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
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The court held that an expert may testify regarding industry standards and whether an insurer complied with them, but cannot offer opinions on legal standards or conclusions of law.
Plaintiff sued an insurance company for bad faith handling of his claim. The insurer moved to preclude plaintiff's expert from testifying that the ins…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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An expert witness may provide testimony that assists the trier of fact understand evidence or determine factual issues if the testimony is: (1) based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliable to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. In determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Court:
must consider whether: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters [s]he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches [her] conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert1; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. United States v. Frazier, 387 F. 3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).2
DISCUSSION
A. The Adjuster Code of Ethics
Progressive first challenges the admissibility of Ms. Gray’s opinion that “the Adjuster Code of Ethics stands for the proposition that the insurer ‘is required to treat all claimant’s equally’ and that Progressive failed to do so in its handling of the multiple competing claims in this case.” (Doc. 43 at 8 (referencing Doc. 43-1 at 10, 17; Doc. 43-2 at 90).)3 Progressive also notes that no “administrative court [has
B. Industry Standards
Next, Progressive argues that Ms. Gray “should be precluded from offering any opinion that Progressive breached its duties under” the standard articulated in Powell v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 584 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). (Doc. 43 at 12 (referencing Doc. 43-1 at 11; Doc. 43-2 at 24–25).)4
Progressive argues that “Florida law is clear that Progressive did not act in bad faith when it decided not to offer the $10,000 BI policy limits to Primeaux,” and instead pursued a global settlement conference with all claimants. (Doc. 43 at 13.) But like its previous argument, this goes to the weight of Ms. Gray’s opinion, not necessarily its admissibility. Again, while an expert like Ms. Gray “may testify as to [her] opinion on an ultimate issue of fact . . . . the court must be the jury’s only source of law.”
Montgomery, 898 F. 2d at 1541. Ms. Gray thus cannot express an opinion that Progressive acted in bad faith by failing to comply with the standards set forth in Powell; the Court will provide the applicable legal standard(s) to the jury. But she
11279830, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2015).
CONCLUSION
Given that Progressive fails to identify any specific portion of Ms. Gray’s expert report or deposition testimony, the Court is not inclined to “enter [a blanket] Order precluding Kelly Gray, Esq. from offering certain opinions.” (Doc. 43 at 19.) Nor does the Court agree with Progressive that Ms. Gray’s opinions “are unsupported by the facts and/or Florida law.” (Id.) Mr. Primeaux has not alleged an independent cause of action under the Adjuster Code of Ethics and Progressive’s actions viewed within the insurance industry’s customs, practices, and standards will assist a jury in determining whether Progressive acted in bad faith. But Ms. Gray cannot offer any opinion as to the applicable legal standards of this case or the legal implications of Progressive’s actions. See Schultz v. Gov’t. Emps. Ins. Co., No. 1:15cv172-MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 8861701 (Aug. 12, 2016). Accordingly, Progressive’s motion to preclude (Doc. 43) is GRANTED IN PART as set forth in this Order. It is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent it seeks any greater or different relief than this Order grants. ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, on August 8, 2022.
PLSD bhufibeutr
JOHN L. BADALAMENTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Daubert et ux. v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993)
- United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004)
- Boston OLD Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980)
- Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2003)
- Campbell v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1974)
- Montgomery v. The AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1990)
- Lindeerth Powell v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 2004)