HEAVEN
v.
CAUWENBERGHS
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The court held that the plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief under the PLRA and is dismissed.
Plaintiff, an inmate, alleged civil rights violations including threats, property misappropriation, and poisoned food. He had previously filed a simil…
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Before the Court for screening is an amended complaint for the violation of civil rights (Doc. 4; Am. Compl.) filed by Plaintiff, Terrence Heaven, an inmate of the Florida penal system who is proceeding pro se. Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee or moved to proceed as a pauper.1 Plaintiff names six Defendants: Lieutenant D. Cauwenberghs; Sergeant T. Alexander; Warden of Florida State Prison (FSP), Donald Davis; Assistant Warden of FSP, Jeffrey McClellan; Head of Classification, Krissy Stanford; and the Head of Security, who is unnamed. Am. Compl. at 2-4. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 3. He contends he was “threatened around the clock” and “terrorized” and
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a district court to dismiss a complaint if the court determines the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1). With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F. 3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Alba v. Montford, 517 F. 3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F. 3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F. 2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981)). In reviewing a complaint, a court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se,
but need not accept as true legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Unlike Rule 12(b)(6), the PLRA “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). Examples of “clearly baseless” contentions are those that can be described as “fantastic or delusional.” Id.
This is not the first time Plaintiff has filed a complaint in this Court asserting these allegations. He initiated an action on July 19, 2021, against some of the same Defendants contending he had been terrorized between August 2019 and April 2020, and his personal property went missing. See Case
No. 3:21-cv-710-MMH-MCR. The Court dismissed his action under the PLRA because he failed to state a plausible claim for relief. See Order (Doc. 2), Case No. 3:21-cv-710-MMH-MCR. With respect to Plaintiff’s assertion that his personal property was missing, the Court noted, “the Due Process Clause is not offended when a state employee intentionally deprives an individual of his property if the State provides him with a meaningful post-deprivation remedy.” Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). With respect to Plaintiff’s assertion that he was verbally abused and suffered mental and emotional injuries, the Court noted such allegations “do not state a claim of federal constitutional dimension.” Id. (citing Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008); Paylan v. Dirks, 847 F. App’x 595, 601 (11th Cir. 2021)).
For similar reasons, Plaintiff’s amended complaint here is subject to dismissal under the PLRA because he fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that “a person” acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
While Plaintiff identifies six Defendants in his amended complaint, he mentions only two in setting forth his factual allegations: Cauwenberghs and
Alexander. But he does not allege these two individuals engaged in conduct that can be interpreted as a constitutional violation. Even if Defendants Cauwenberghs and Alexander themselves threatened Plaintiff or ordered others to do so, such conduct does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. See Hernandez, 281 F. App’x at 866 (“[V]erbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a constitutional claim.” (citing Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F. 2d 1271, 1274 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989)).2 Moreover, conditions of confinement are sufficiently serious under the Eighth Amendment only if they are so extreme that they expose the prisoner to “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F. 3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Allegations of merely harsh conditions do not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Id. Plaintiff does not describe conditions that were so extreme as to permit the reasonable inference he faced an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety. See id. As to Plaintiff’s suggestion that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, it appears he is referring to the alleged misappropriation
1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 8th day of August 2022.
Zh. NO - A Aram 67am
. BRIAN/I, DAVIS United States District Judge
Jax-6 c: Terrence Heaven
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- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009)
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1989)
- McNamara v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055 (11th Cir. 2022)
- Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir. 1997)
- Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2008)
- Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (U.S. 1992)
- ROE v. Aware Woman Ctr. FOR Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2001)
- Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2004)
- In re Plywood Antitrust Litig. French Quarter Apts., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981)