DAY
v.
NAPLES COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC.

M.D. Fla. | 2022-08-05
No. 2:21-cv-756
District Court, M.D. Florida (2022)

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Holding

The court held that a joint stipulation for dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is self-executing and requires no further court action for dismissal of Fair Labor Standards Act claims.


Facts & Procedural History

The parties filed a Joint Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice in a Fair Labor Standards Act case. The parties also requested the court strike a J…

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Opinion of the Court

In this Fair Labor Standards Act case, the parties have filed a Joint Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice. (Doc. 28.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action voluntarily if a stipulation of dismissal is signed by all parties who have appeared. The dismissal is effective upon filing and requires no further action by the Court. See Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F. 3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012). The text of the FLSA does not provide, and no Eleventh Circuit decision has ever held, that FLSA claims are exempt from Rule 41. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has reasoned that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply “in actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act no less than in any other case.” Vasconcelo v. Miami Auto Max, Inc., 981 F. 3d 934, 942 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that Rule 68’s cost-shifting provisions trump the FLSA’s costshifting provisions). And there is “no distinction” between the operation of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and Rule 68 in an FLSA action. See Casso-Lopez v. Beach Time Rental Suncoast, LLC, 335 F.R.D. 458, 461-462 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (holding parties may terminate an FLSA case by filing either a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation of dismissal with prejudice or a Rule 68(a) notice of acceptance of an offer of judgment “and the district court is immediately powerless to interfere”); see also Dicomo v. KJIMS Dev. Co., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-327-FtM- 99CM, 2016 WL 6678420, *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2016) (“[T]he parties may dismiss [an FLSA] case in its entirety pursuant to the Joint Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice without further action from the Court as it is unconditional and self-executing.”). The parties’ Rule 41 stipulation also asks the Court to “strike from the docket the Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement.” Because a dismissal under Rule 41 is self-executing, the Court cannot reach back and strike the motion requested. But even if it could, such relief would not be warranted here because there has been no showing to justify striking the document. See Schmidt v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 289 F.R.D. 357, 358 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[A] motion to strike should be granted only if the matter sought to be omitted has no possible relationship to the controversy, may confuse the issues, or otherwise prejudice a party.”). For the reasons above, this action is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment, deny all pending motions, terminate all scheduled events, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida August 5, 2022.

et — Wi Le C.Dudek United States Magistrate Judge Copies: All Parties of Record


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