BOYD ALFRED MONSANTO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Boyd Monsanto was convicted of kidnapping and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, with his kidnapping sentence enhanced due to firearm use. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the firearm conviction, holding that the legislature did not intend to permit dual punishment for the same act when a defendant's underlying felony conviction is already enhanced based on weapon use.
The court reversed Monsanto's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the legislature did not intend to impose multiple punishments for the same act. When an accused receives an enhanced sentence on the underlying felony based on firearm use and also receives a separate sentence for carrying the firearm, this constitutes impermissible dual punishment.
[1] A conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony must be vacated when the underlying felony conviction was enhanced due to the use of that same…
[2] When statutory provisions address the same evil and there is no clear evidence of legislative intent to impose multiple punishments, courts should presume against multipl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when an accused is charged under two statutory provisions that manifestly address the same evil and no clear evidence of legislative intent exists, the most reasonable conclusion is that the legislature did not intend to impose multiple punishments for the same act”
Establishes the legal standard from Carawan for determining when dual punishment is impermissible
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMonsanto was charged and convicted under section 787.01 (kidnapping) and section 790.07(2) (possession of a firearm in commission of a felony). Eviden…
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PER CURIAM.
The primary point on appeal is the challenge to defendant’s conviction for the possession and the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, here, a kidnapping. We reverse.
The defendant was convicted of kidnapping, section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1985), as well as possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, section 790.-07(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Because the evidence demonstrated that he employed a weapon in the commission of the kidnapping, that conviction was enhanced under the reclassification statute, section 775.-087(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1985).
Wé must vacate the conviction for possession of a firearm while committing a felony based on the supreme court’s decision in Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1987). Carawan states that when an accused is charged under two statutory provisions that manifestly address the same evil and no clear evidence of legislative intent exists, the most reasonable conclusion is that the legislature did not intend to impose multiple punishments for the same act. Id. at 168. In this case, even though the convictions for the two offenses charged required proof of different facts and thus met the elements of the Block-burger test,1 the court’s inquiry into the legislature’s intent does not end there. According to Carawan, multiple punishments in such cases “are presumed to be authorized in the absence of a contrary legislative intent or any reasonable basis for concluding that a contrary intent existed” Id. at 168 (emphasis in original). In the case at hand, the defendant received an enhanced sentence on his kidnapping conviction because he used a firearm; in addition, he received a second sentence for carrying the firearm. In other words, the same offense was enhanced twice for carrying or displaying the same weapon. Certainly, the legislature did not intend such dual punishment for a single act. See Hall v. State, 517 So. 2d 678 (Fla.1988). For this reason, the defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony must be reversed.
This result also mandates that the defendant’s sentence for armed kidnapping be vacated with directions that he be resen-tenced within the guidelines without including points for conviction of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony.
Reversed and remanded.
. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), codified in § 775.021(4) Fla.Stat. (1987).
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Brown v. State, 538 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…st DCA 1988); Marion v. State, 526 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Pastor v. State, 536 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Hurd v. State, 536 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Anderson v. State, 530 So. 2d 1104 [*118] (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Monsanto v. State, 530 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Perez v. State, 528 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Evans v. State, 528 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Torres v. State, 527 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 536 So. 2d 246 (Fla.1988); Henderson v. State, 526 So. 2d 743…
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Rodriguez v. State, 558 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…ossession of a firearm during the commission of a felony impermissibly duplicates components of the other crimes. Based on the authority of Hall v. State, 517 So. 2d 678 (Fla.1988); Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1987); and Monsanto v. State, 530 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), appellant’s conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony must be vacated. Lastly, appellant contends that he should be resentenced because the trial court departed upward from the guidelines for inval…
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Smith v. State, 548 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…536 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), jurisdiction accepted, 545 So. 2d 869 (Fla.1989); Viera v. State, 532 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 991 (Fla.1989); Anderson v. State, 530 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Monsanto v. State, 530 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Perez v. State, 528 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Evans v. State, 528 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Torres v. State, 527 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 536 So. 2d 246 (Fla.1988); Henderson v. State, 526 So. 2d 743…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932)
- Dion Michael Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987)
- Hall v. State, 517 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1988)