GARCIA

v.

FLAGLER COUNTY, FLORIDA

Plaintiff also alleges the following: officers used excessive force when arresting him on April⁵, 2021,1 id. at 11-12; officers threatened him, mentally abused him, retaliated against him, or filed a false disciplinary report against him, id. at 10-11; and officers “frivolously manufactured” Plaintiff’s bond revocation on May 30, 2021, resulting in his continued illegal detention, id. at

13-14. Plaintiff says he sustained physical injuries related to the 2015 inmate attack. Id. at 17. As relief, he seeks monetary damages and “[e]mergency release” on bond. Id. at 17-18. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a district court to dismiss a complaint if the court determines the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1). With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the

Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F. 3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F. 3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F. 2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981)). In reviewing a complaint, a court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, but need not accept as true legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “a person” acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured under the United

States Constitution or federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA because he fails to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.

The incident giving rise to Plaintiff’s primary claim—that jail staff improperly housed him with a violent inmate, resulting in an attack—occurred on September 15, 2015. Compl. at 7-9, 17. As such, the statute of limitations has run on this claim. While the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense to be raised by a defendant, a district court may dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights complaint under its screening obligation if it “appear[s] beyond doubt from the complaint itself that [the prisoner] can prove no set of facts” showing his claim is timely. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F. 3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F. 3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)) (affirming dismissal of a prisoner’s claim for property deprivation because it was clear from the face of the complaint that it was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations). See also Baker v. City of Hollywood, 391 F. App’x 819, 820 (11th

Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for excessive use of force because it was clear that he filed it after the four-year limitations period had run); Ross v. Mickle, 194 F. App’x 742, 744 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s excessive force claim under the PLRA because it was apparent from the face of the complaint that he filed it beyond the applicable limitations period).

In Florida, a four-year limitations period for personal injuries applies to claims brought under § 1983. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F. 3d 1279, 1283 (11th

Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Such claims accrue on or begin to run from “the date the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Ross, 194 F. App’x at 744 (quoting Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F. 3d

1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003)). An excessive force claim accrues when the alleged force was used. See Baker, 391 F. App’x at 821 (recognizing that the plaintiff’s excessive force claim accrued on the day of the alleged beating). Plaintiff alleges an inmate attacked him on September 15, 2015, because the jail staff were “derelict in the performance of their professional duties.” Compl. at 8.2 Plaintiff did not file his complaint until January 16, 2022, more than four years after the incident occurred. It is clear from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff’s claims accrued on September 15, 2015, and,

therefore, are barred under Florida’s four-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleges he knew of the assault on the day it occurred and knew jail officials

September 15, 2015. Id. at 7-9. He alleges only that the jail facility staff were “derelict in the performance of their professional duties,” and he names the jail and detention facility as Defendants. Id. at 8. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold the jail responsible for the inmate attack or any other alleged incident,

his claims are not cognizable under § 1983.3 In Florida, a sheriff’s office or jail is not a legal entity subject to suit in a civil rights action brought under § 1983. Herrera v. Rambosk, No. 2:17-cv-472-FtM-29MRM, 2019 WL 1254772, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2019) (dismissing the Collier County Jail under §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Monroe v. Jail, No. 2:15-cv-729-FtM-99MRM, 2015 WL 7777521, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec.³, 2015) (citing Chapter 30, Florida Statutes) (“Florida law does not recognize a jail facility as a legal entity separate and apart from the Sheriff charged with its operation and control.”). Plaintiff’s

2-6. Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Flagler County because he alleges no facts showing a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional violation—either related to the inmate attack or any other alleged incident. See Swain v. Junior, 958 F. 3d 1081, 1091 (11th Cir. 2020) (“A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 unless a municipal policy or custom caused [an] injury.”). Similarly, Plaintiff may not proceed against supervisors, such as the sheriff or high-ranking officers, simply because they held supervisory positions at the relevant times. “It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F. 3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610

F. 3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). “The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Id. (alteration in original). Supervisor liability arises only “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F. 3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

While it appears Plaintiff’s main claim relates to the inmate assault on September 15, 2015, Plaintiff also attempts to raise claims based on separate, unrelated incidents: alleged threats and harassment by unidentified Defendants in July and August 2020, see Compl. at 10; alleged excessive force during his arrest on April⁵, 2021, id. at 11-12; alleged improper bond revocation on May 30, 2021, id. at 13; and an alleged false disciplinary report on July 31, 2021, id. at 10. These claims have no logical relationship to one another or to the claims arising out of the September 2015 incident, nor do the separate claims involve questions of law or fact common to all Defendants. As such, they should not be joined together in the complaint, in which Plaintiff seeks relief for injuries he sustained when an inmate attacked him in 2015. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). See also Constr. Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest

Commodities Corp., 147 F. 3d 1334, 1337 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998). Even if these claims were related, however, they would be subject to dismissal. First, Plaintiff’s assertion that “[t]he Defendants listed” harassed him, abused him, retaliated against him, or deprived him of the right to due process is vague and factually unsupported. Compl. at 10. Thus, it amounts to no “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” which does not satisfy the federal pleading standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. See also Tani v. Shelby Cnty., Ala., 511 F. App’x 854, 857 (11th

Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of a complaint that alleged, as labels and conclusions, violations of various constitutional rights with no supporting facts to “explain what actions caused which violations”). Moreover, allegations of threats or intimidation, without more, do not state a claim under § 1983.

Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[V]erbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a constitutional claim.”). Second, with respect to Plaintiff’s arrest, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Capela and Lichty “grabbed [him] by the neck, slammed [his] face into the door,

and then threw [him] to the ground.” Compl. at 12. Plaintiff alleges that, once he was on the ground, Defendant Patel jammed his knee into Plaintiff’s back.

Id. Plaintiff alleges he was having a seizure at the time, though he does not say the officers knew of that fact, nor does he allege the seizure was caused by

Defendants’ conduct. Id. In fact, Plaintiff does not allege he suffered any injuries related to the alleged unlawful use of force. Id. Plaintiff acknowledges EMTs came to the scene to provide medical attention for his seizure. Id. The “reasonableness of a particular [arrest] depends not only on when it is made, but also on how it is carried out.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (emphasis in original). An officer’s right to make an arrest “necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion.” Id. at 396. Whether force used during an arrest is reasonable is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring a court to consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “the application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F. 3d 1253, 1257, 1258 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding an officer did not use excessive force when he grabbed the plaintiff, shoved the plaintiff against a vehicle, pushed the plaintiff’s head against a van, and placed his knee into the plaintiff’s back).

The Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Capela, Lichty, and Patel based on his April⁵, 2021 arrest. Plaintiff does not contend the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. See Compl. at 12. Rather, he takes issue with the manner in which the officers made the arrest. Notably, Plaintiff does not allege the officers caused him injuries. Plaintiff complains that officers used the kind of force the officer in Nolin used, which the Eleventh Circuit held was not excessive. See Nolin, 207 F. 3d at 1258. Moreover, Plaintiff implies he may not have been complying with officers’ commands. For instance, Plaintiff alleges he “said something to [Defendant Capela] that he did not like,” which prompted the use of force. See

Compl. at 12.4 Third, to the extent Plaintiff seeks this Court’s intervention in his pending criminal matter, he is not entitled to such relief. See Lawrence v. Miami-Dade Cnty. State Att’y Off., 272 F. App’x 781 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] federal court may not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings except in the most extraordinary circumstances.” (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971))).

Plaintiff a false disciplinary report. See Compl. at 10. Plaintiff offers no factual detail regarding the alleged false disciplinary report, nor does he allege facts suggesting he was denied due process at a resulting disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff’s allegations that he incurred a false disciplinary report and was deprived of due process are naked assertions devoid of factual explanation. Id. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim related to these alleged incidents. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal without prejudice. If Plaintiff wants to pursue timely, related, cognizable claims, he may file a new complaint.⁵ Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

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BRIAN/J . DAVIS

United States District Judge Jax-6 C: Daniel G. Garcia