CHRISTOFF

v.

INGLESE

derivatively on behalf of Galexa, Inc., a Florida corporation,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:20-cv-546-SPC-NPM

PAUL INGLESE, NORTHSTAR

TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, INC.

and GALEXA, INC.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER1

Before the Court is Defendant Northstar Technologies Group, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 86). Plaintiff Michael Christoff responded (Doc. 104), to which Northstar replied (Doc. 111). Within the briefing, Christoff seeks more discovery before a final response. (Doc. 104 at 12-13, 15). The Court construes this as a request under Rule 56(d). See Snook v. Tr. Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, N.A., 859 F. 2d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 1988) (relaxing the requirement for an attorney to file an affidavit in support).

F. 3d 248, 253 (11th Cir. 1997). So in response to a motion, a party may seek more time to take necessary discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). But those seeking the protection of Rule 56(d) cannot rely on vague assertions that more discovery is needed. City of Miami Gardens v. Wells Fargo & Co., 931 F. 3d

1274, 1287 (11th Cir. 2019). Instead, a party “must specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Reflectone, Inc. v. Farrand Optical Co., 862 F. 2d 841, 843-44 (11th Cir. 1989) (cleaned up). After reviewing the briefing and record, the Court exercises its discretion to deny summary judgment without prejudice. See id. at 844 (reaffirming that Rule 56(d) “is infused with a spirit of liberality” (cleaned up)).

Christoff’s argument on incomplete discovery is well taken. He points to significant outstanding discovery for summary judgment. This includes two motions (and supplemental motion) to compel, depositions of Northstar and Defendant Paul Inglese, along with written discovery. Because potentially

significant discovery is outstanding, Plaintiff does not yet have all the information needed to respond to summary judgment. Compare Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co. Inc., 703 F. 2d 525, 527-28 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining courts can—but are not required to—defer summary judgment in light of a motion to compel), with Dean v. Barber, 951 F. 2d 1210, 1213-14 (11th

Cir. 1992) (holding it was error to rule on summary judgment without first resolving motion to compel).² The issue is particularly pronounced here: with Northstar saying it’s entitled to judgment largely because Christoff failed to present admissible evidence. See generally (Doc. 111).

Discovery does not close until next month and dispositive motions aren’t due until April. So summary judgment is premature, and there is good cause to grant Christoff’s request for more time. See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Classic Yacht Serv., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-153-FtM-99UAM,

2019 WL 1858294, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2019); Mullins-Shurling v. Sch. Bd. of Lee Cnty., No. 2:15-cv-323-FtM-38CM, 2016 WL 3570958, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July¹, 2016). Northstar can simply move again for summary judgment after any necessary discovery takes place.³

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

, Lh platrathe 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record