MISHIYEV
v.
CIERRA
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The court held that the defendants' counterclaim seeking a declaration of common law rights to use the name 'Short-E' was not redundant and should not be dismissed.
Plaintiffs sued for trademark infringement. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that their use of the name 'Short-E' was permitted u…
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OPINION AND ORDER1
Before the Court is Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, III, and IV of Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Counterclaim (Doc. 42). Erik Mishiyev and Short-E, LLC are the original Plaintiffs. Because Mishiyev filed a bankruptcy action, the Court substituted Chapter 7 Trustee Beth Ann Scharrer for Mishiyev (see Doc. 63) and stayed Counts I, II, and III (see Doc. 66). This Order will address only Count IV of Eliseo Cierra and iHeartMedia’s Counterclaim.
Plaintiffs assert nine counts: (1) federal trademark infringement against Cierra; (2) federal contributory trademark infringement against iHeartMedia; (3) federal unfair competition against both Defendants; (4) Florida statutory trademark infringement against Sierra; (5) Florida contributory statutory trademark infringement against iHeartMedia; (6) Florida statutory deceptive and unfair trade practices against both Defendants; (7) Florida common law trademark infringement against Cierra; (8) vicarious infringement of a federally registered trademark against iHeartMedia; and (9) vicarious infringement of a Florida registered trademark against iHeartMedia. Defendants filed eight counterclaims. The one at issue here—Count IV—seeks a declaration that Cierra’s use of the term “Short-E” is permitted under Florida common law. Plaintiffs seek dismissal of Count IV because it asks a question that will inevitably be answered during resolution of the Complaint—in other words, Count IV is redundant. Defendants argues Count IV seeks relief they cannot obtain from a judgment on the merits of the Complaint—an affirmative declaration that Cierra is entitled to a common-law right to use “Short-E” as an identifier. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint (or counterclaim) as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff (or counter-plaintiff). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Count IV seeks declaratory judgment under the Florida Declaratory Judgment Act. “Under Florida law, whether to grant declaratory judgment ‘remains discretionary with the court, and not the right of a litigant as a matter of course.’” Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Yero, No. 2:18-cv-39-JES-CM, 2018 WL 4931816 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2018) (quoting State, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. V. Garcia, 99 So. 3d 539, 546 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 2011). “When deciding whether to dismiss a counterclaim on the basis that it is redundant, courts consider whether the declaratory judgment serves a useful purpose.” Medmarc Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pineiro & Byrd PLLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1217 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).2 Counterclaim IV serves a useful purpose. It seeks a declaration “that Cierra’s use of the term ‘Short-E’ is permitted as a valid use of a common law right.” (Doc. 40 at 23). Even assuming Defendants successfully defend against
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Authorities Cited
- Medmarc Cas. Ins. v. Pineiro & Byrd PLLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
- State of Fla. Dep't OF Env't Prot. v. Garcia, 99 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)