MILFORT

v.

RAMBOSK

BEAIRD, JAY LIETZKE, PETER FALISI, MARK VASU, STEPHEN DAY, and BLUE MARTINI NAPLES, LLC,

Defendants. /

OPINION AND ORDER1

This is a civil rights action stemming from a night out at the Blue Martini Lounge in Naples. The action started with a Complaint filed by Jean Milfort against five defendants. (Doc. 1). Motions to dismiss were filed (Docs. 11, 13, 14), and a shotgun pleading argument succeeded. The initial Complaint

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Shotgun pleadings violate Rule 8 because “fail[s]. . . to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests” and “waste[s] scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden[s] the scope of discovery, wreak[s] havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine[s] the public’s respect for the courts.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F. 3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). See also Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins., 748 F. 3d 1117, 1127-28 (11th Cir. 2014) (criticizing district court for not policing shotgun pleadings). The Second Amended Complaint commits “the relatively rare sin of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying” the claims against the defendants. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s

Office, 792 F. 3d 1313, 1324 n.17 (11th Cir. 2015). This is particularly problematic here because Plaintiffs bring claims against both private entities and state actors. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiffs tried to separate claims among the private and public actors by bringing claims under both Florida law and Section 1983. But both categories of claims are sometimes brought against all Defendants. For example, Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants unlawfully restrained Plaintiffs by “restraining, handcuffing, and confining them to jail cells,” but there are no factual allegations that Blue Martini and its employees did so, nor is it plausible to infer that they did so under the facts. (see, e.g., Doc. 29 at ¶ 116). What is more, Plaintiffs sue the Defendants in their individual and official capacities (Doc. 29 at ¶¶ 13, 19-20), but each count fails to specify in what capacity the Plaintiffs are suing. Such pleading is crucial to putting the Defendants on notice of the claims against them. Generally, “plaintiffs have a duty to make plain who they are suing and to do so well before trial.” Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, Fla., 529 F. 3d 1027, 1047 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). In Section 1983 cases, a plaintiff should “state explicitly in what capacity defendants are being sued[.]” Id.

(internal quotation omitted). “The main concern of a court in determining whether a plaintiff is suing defendants in their official or individual capacity is to ensure the defendants in question receive sufficient notice with respect to the capacity in which they are being sued.” Id.

The Court thus dismisses the Second Amended Complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading. The Court, however, will grant Plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint.² “Litigants are entitled to at least one change to remedy the deficiencies that render a complaint an impermissible shotgun pleading.” Blochowicz v. Wilkie, 853 F. App’x 491, 493 (11th Cir. 2021). Arguably, Plaintiffs have been afforded one opportunity to amend after they were put on notice of the shotgun pleading issue when the Court dismissed the initial Complaint. (Doc. 17). But giving Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, since the initial Complaint this case has morphed from a single plaintiff, five defendants, and fifteen claims, to two plaintiffs, fifteen defendants, and twenty claims, compounding the shotgun pleading problems. Given this, the Court will afford Plaintiffs a second opportunity to comply with

If the complaint remains a shotgun pleading after amendment, the Court will dismiss it on this basis alone. See Jackson v. Bank of Am., 898 F. 3d 1348, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that district courts retain the authority to dismiss a shotgun pleading on that basis alone); Weiland, 792 F. 3d at 1320 (explaining that the district court retains “inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits,” including, under proper circumstances, “the power to dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2)”).³

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record