MIKE IAMAIO, APPELLANT,
v.
HAROLD L. KITE, BURGER QUEEN SYSTEMS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND KREEM CUP, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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Plaintiff appeals a judgment on the pleadings that dismissed his wage claim as barred by a two-year statute of limitations. The court reverses, holding that the compensation at issue constitutes contract payments rather than wages, and therefore the four-year statute of limitations for contract actions applies.
The compensation does not constitute wages within the meaning of section 95.11(4)(c) and therefore the four-year statute of limitations for contract actions applies rather than the two-year limitation for wage claims.
[1] Compensation for services rendered under a contract, involving complex duties such as selecting locations, arranging financing, and locating franchisees, is not considere…
[2] Actions for unpaid compensation that does not qualify as "wages" under the two-year statute of limitations are governed by the four-year statute of limitations applicable…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“wages are often defined in the context of compensation for services by the day or week or as pay given for labor, usually manual or mechanical, at short, stated intervals”
Establishes the court's definition of wages under applicable statute of limitations law, distinguishing wage compensation from other employment compensation
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff was employed by defendants to select restaurant locations, arrange financing, and locate franchisees under a written contract, then re-emplo…
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LEHAN, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals a final judgment on the pleadings finding that his action was barred by section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for unpaid wages. We reverse.
Plaintiff was employed by defendants to do such things as select locations for restaurants, arrange construction financing, and locate franchisees. He was originally employed under a written contract. He then left defendants’ employment and was subsequently re-employed on essentially the same terms as in the written contract. During all of his employment his compensation consisted of a monthly draw against commissions.
During plaintiff’s second period of employment, the parties agreed to defer his compensation and to make a final settlement thereof in February, 1983.
Plaintiff filed this action on July 23, 1986, asking for payment of the compensation allegedly due to him from defendants. Upon motion by defendants, the trial court entered a final judgment on the pleadings finding that the compensation sought by plaintiff consisted of wages within the meaning of section 95.11(4)(c).
On appeal plaintiff contends that this case is controlled by the definition of wages set forth in Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So. 2d 513 (Fla.1970). We agree. In that case the supreme court discussed the difference between salary and wages in the context of section 95.11(7)(b), Florida Statutes (1969), the forerunner to the present section 95.-ll(4)(c). The court noted that wages are often defined in the context of compensation for services by the day or week or as pay given for labor, usually manual or mechanical, at short, stated intervals. The compensation in this case is not wages in that context. Accordingly, we conclude that the two-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(c) does not apply and that the four-year limitation in section 95.-ll(3)(k) for actions on a contract does apply. But cf. Gulf Solar, Inc. v. Westfall, 447 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (wages defined as all remuneration for employment, including commissions, in context of section 448.08 dealing with award of attorney’s fees in an action for unpaid wages).
Defendants contend that in deciding whether the compensation in this case was wages this court should consider Keel v. Brown, 162 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964), and Buenger v. Kennedy, 151 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). However, those cases preceded Broward Builders and, to the extent they conflict with that case, they have been overruled.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Moneyhun v. Vital Indus., Inc., 611 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ically refers to " 'compensation for services by the day or week.’ ” Broward Builders Exch., Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So. 2d 513, 514 (Fla.1970) (quoting Blick v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. of Baltimore, 77 A. 844 (Md.1910)). Accord Iamaio v. Kite, 531 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla.2d DCA1988). The alleged agreement in the case at bar is not contemplated by this definition. .Appellees additionally claim that any action for damages against Donoyan’s individual estate is barred by Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (19…
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Barnes Surgical Specialties, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 549 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…s due. Next, Bradshaw contends that the court erred in holding that the claim against the corporation, Barnes Surgical, was “wages” and thus barred by the two year statute of limitations. We agree. This court addressed this issue in Iamaio v. Kite, 531 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), where based on distinctions the supreme court has made between wages and commissions, we held that compensation in the form of commissions does not fall within the category of wages in the context of section 95.11(4)(c). See Brow…
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Nealon v. Right Human Res. Consultants, Inc., 669 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…(Fla.1991); Barnes Surgical Specialties, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 549 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (concluding that a salesman’s suit for unpaid commissions does not fall within the category of wages for purposes of section 95.11(4)(c)); lamaio v. Kite, 531 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding that an employee who selected locations for restaurants, arranged construction financing and located franchisees and whose compensation consisted of a monthly draw against commission was not time barred by section 95.11(4…
Authorities Cited
- Gulf Solar, Inc. v. Westfall, 447 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Keel v. Brown, 162 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Broward Builders Exch., Inc. v. Lily Goehring, 231 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1970)
- Dinnen v. Lincoln Fin. Co., Inc., 151 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)