BUTLER

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

The Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of his claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

I.

The Plaintiff was born in 1961, has a tenth-grade education, and has past relevant work experience as a painter. (R. 44, 550). In April 2013, the Plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB, alleging disability as of July 2011 due to problems with his hips, ankles, feet, and left leg. (R. 70–77, 78–87). The Social Security Administration (SSA)

In a decision issued in January 2019, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff: (1) had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date in July 2011; (2) had the severe impairments of gout, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, diabetes mellitus, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines, and osteoarthritis/degenerative changes in the hips and knees; (3) did not, however, have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any of the listed impairments; (4) had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a restricted range of light work; (5) based on the VE’s testimony,

could not engage in his past relevant work but was capable through mid-April 2016 of making a successful adjustment to other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy; and (6) advanced to an older age category in mid-April 2016 and became disabled as of that date. (R. 507–15, 517). The Appeals Council denied the Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. 492–95). Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. II. The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).² A physical or mental impairment under the Act “results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security Regulations (Regulations) prescribe “a five-step, sequential evaluation process.” Carter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 726 F. App’x 737, 739 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)).³ Under this process, an ALJ must assess whether the claimant: (1) is performing substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has a severe

Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 906 F. 3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F. 3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001)). A claimant who does not prevail at the administrative level may seek judicial review in federal court provided the Commissioner has issued a final decision on the matter after a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Id.; Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 883 F. 3d 1302, 1305 n.2 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In evaluating whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, the

Court “may not decide the facts anew, make credibility determinations, or re-weigh the evidence.” Carter, 726 F. App’x at 739 (citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F. 3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)). While courts will defer to the Commissioner’s factual findings, they afford no such deference to her legal conclusions. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F. 3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

III.

The Plaintiff raises three main claims on appeal: (1) the ALJ did not properly evaluate certain medical opinions of record; (2) the ALJ erred in his assessment of a portion of the Plaintiff’s alleged disability period—known as a “closed period;” and (3) the ALJ failed to credit the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms. (Doc. 19 at 15–30, 30–38). The Commissioner counters that the ALJ correctly followed the governing law and that his decision is adequately supported. Upon careful review of the parties’ submissions and the pertinent portions of the record, the Court finds the Plaintiff’s claims to be without merit.

A. At step four of the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC and his ability to perform his past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545. To do so, an ALJ must decide what a claimant can do in a work setting despite any physical or mental limitations caused by the claimant’s impairments and related symptoms. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). In making this finding, an ALJ “must consider all medical opinions in a claimant’s case record, together with other relevant evidence.” McClurkin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 625 F. App’x 960, 962 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b)). Medical opinions are statements from physicians or other acceptable medical sources “‘that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s), including [his] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [he] can still do despite [his] impairment(s), and [his] physical or mental restrictions.’” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F. 3d 1176, 1178–79 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). An ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to a medical opinion and the reasons therefor. Lawton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 431 F. App’x 830, 834 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F. 2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). In rendering this assessment, an ALJ must take into account: (1) whether the provider at issue has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of the provider’s relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the provider’s opinion; (4) the degree to which the provider’s opinion is consistent with the record as a whole; and (5) the provider’s area of specialization. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). While an ALJ must balance each of these factors,

he is not obligated to address them explicitly in his decision. Lawton, 431 F. App’x at 833. Medical opinions are divided into three tiers: (1) treating physicians; (2) non-

treating, examining physicians; and (3) non-treating, non-examining physicians. Himes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App’x 758, 762 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Treating physicians’ opinions are typically accorded the most deference because there is a greater likelihood that these providers will “be able to give a more complete picture of the [claimant’s] health history.” Schink v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 935 F. 3d 1245, 1259 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). As a result, the ALJ must give the opinion of a treating physician substantial or considerable weight unless the ALJ clearly articulates reasons—buttressed by substantial evidence—that establish “good cause” for discounting that opinion. Hargress, 883 F. 3d at 1305–06; Phillips, 357 F. 3d at 1241. “Good cause exists when (1) the treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, (2) the evidence supported a contrary finding, or (3) the treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with his or her own medical records.” Schink, 935 F. 3d at 1259 (citations omitted). Unlike a treating physician, the opinion of a non-treating, examining physician

“[i]s not entitled to great weight.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F. 3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F. 2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). And the opinion of a non-treating, non-examining physician is generally afforded the least deference. Huntley v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F. App’x 830, 832 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citations omitted). In the end, irrespective of the category of the physician, an ALJ “is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” Id. (citing Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F. 2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)) (emphasis in original). In this case, the Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions of three of the Plaintiff’s providers: (1) Dr. Margo Sardo; (2) Dr. Robin Hughes; and (3) Dr. Edmund Molis. The ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. Sardo’s and Dr. Hughes’s opinions and “some weight” to Dr. Molis’s opinion. (R. 514). The

Plaintiff’s quarrel with each of these determinations will be addressed in turn.

1.

Dr. Margo Sardo was the Plaintiff’s treating physician from December 2012 to May 20154 (Doc. 19 at 4, 8) and, pertinent to the Plaintiff’s arguments here, completed

Multiple Impairment Questionnaires in July 2013 and September 2013 that summarized the Plaintiff’s conditions (R. 363–70, 410–17). In the July 2013 questionnaire, Dr. Sardo diagnosed the Plaintiff with gout, degenerative disc disease in his lumbar spine,5 and bilateral pain in his knees, hips, shoulders, and hands. (R. 4 The ALJ referred to Dr. Sardo as the Plaintiff’s treating physician, and neither party disagrees with that characterization. The Court will therefore do the same. 5 Broadly speaking, the human spine consists of four parts: the cervical spine (i.e., the neck); the thoracic spine (i.e., the upper and/or middle back); the lumbar spine (i.e., the lower back); and the sacral spine (i.e., the lowest part of the spine, which is just above the coccyx). See generally Houston D. Smith, Georgia Soft Tissue Injuries § 3-8 (Supp. Apr. 2021). The location of the vertebrae in the cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral spine are referred to as C¹, 2, 3, etc.; T¹, 2, 3, etc.; L¹, L², L³, etc.; and S¹, 2, 3, etc., respectively. See 4 Roscoe N. Gray, M.D. & Louise J. Gordy, M.D., L.L.N., Attorney’s Textbook of Medicine § 13A.02 (3d ed. 2021). 363, 370). The clinical findings Dr. Sardo referenced in that questionnaire included, among others, knee swelling, an antalgic gait, the Plaintiff’s use of a cane, and a limited range of motion in his shoulders. (R. 363). Dr. Sardo also cited x-rays showing degenerative changes to the discs in the Plaintiff’s lumbar spine at the L2-3 level. (R. 356, 364). In addition, Dr. Sardo noted the Plaintiff’s reported symptoms of insomnia, fatigue, nausea, feet numbness, decreased appetite, mood changes, knee swelling, back pain, and pain in most joints. (R. 364). Dr. Sardo further stated that these symptoms were consistent with the Plaintiff’s documented impairments and that his limitations included not being able to push, pull, kneel, bend, or stoop, as well as having a significantly reduced capacity to perform repetitive reaching, handling, fingering, and lifting due to joint pain in his hands. (R. 364, 366, 369). Finally, Dr. Sardo opined that these restrictions and impairments had been present since December 4, 2012, when she first saw the Plaintiff. (R. 369). Dr. Sardo’s assessments in the September

2013 questionnaire were largely the same as in her July 2013 questionnaire, except that she listed June 2010 as the date on which the Plaintiff’s limitations began and added that the Plaintiff needed to avoid extreme cold temperatures. (R. 416). Dr. Sardo’s treatment notes for the duration of the time she cared for the Plaintiff reflect substantially the same subjective complaints as those described in her two questionnaires. See, e.g., (R. 383). The additional findings she referenced in her notes for 2012 included that the Plaintiff moved slowly and deliberately and appeared to be in pain, and that he had reproducible neck pain with resisted strength testing of the upper extremities, as well as tenderness to palpation over the knees. (R. 381, 384). Dr. Sardo also observed that there was no effusion in the Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal system, that he had a normal gait and stance, and that he used a cane. (R. 381).

In her notes in 2013, Dr. Sardo continued to reference the Plaintiff’s use of a cane but did not mention any joint swelling. (R. 378, 406, 473). A July 2013 x-ray of the Plaintiff’s lumbar spine revealed mild degenerative disc disease at the L2-3 level with mild anterior hypertrophic spurring. (R. 356). Another x-ray in October 2013 showed mild spurring in the hips with no acute bone abnormality, as well as mild osteoarthritis in both knees, moderate effusion on the right knee, and a small effusion on the left knee. (R. 470–71). While Dr. Sardo commented in May 2013 that the Plaintiff’s “pain was out of proportion to [his] exam findings” (R. 406), the Plaintiff’s subsequent visits to her documented no improvement in his alleged pain or other significant changes through May 2015 (R. 449–51, 453–61, 475–91, 714–27). Finally,

in July 2014, the Plaintiff had an x-ray that did not indicate an issue with his shoulder. (R. 1100). In his decision, the ALJ mostly rejected Dr. Sardo’s opinions expressed in the two questionnaires, noting that he “suspect[ed] that [Dr. Sardo’s] assessments . . . were based more so on the [Plaintiff’s] reports to [her], as opposed to any independent” evaluation from Dr. Sardo herself. (R. 511–12). The ALJ also observed, inter alia, that Dr. Sardo “assigned many limitations that fly in the face of [her] treatment notes,” and that she provided conflicting onset dates for the Plaintiff’s limitations as well. Id.

The Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ erred in not affording Dr. Sardo’s opinions controlling weight because he “failed to identify any findings contradicting the opinion[s] from Dr. Sardo that rise to the level of substantial evidence.”6 (Doc. 19 at 20–21). In support of this broad claim, the Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed a number of mistakes in evaluating the record documentation compiled by Dr. Sardo, beginning with the ALJ’s finding that the restrictions imposed by Dr. Sardo “are based solely on [the Plaintiff’s] subjective allegations rather than [on] appropriate clinical and objective evidence.” (Doc. 19 at 17). This argument fails.

To begin, contrary to the Plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ did not find that Dr. Sardo’s limitations were predicated purely on the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Instead, the ALJ provided several justifications for discounting Dr. Sardo’s assessments, including Dr. Sardo’s primary reliance on the Plaintiff’s reported symptoms, various conflicts between her restrictions and her treatment notes, and certain other discrepancies in her opinions. There is nothing improper about the ALJ’s assigning diminished weight to Dr. Sardo’s assessments based on these reasons. See Womble v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 705 F. App’x 923, 926–28 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (upholding the ALJ’s decision to assign little weight to the opinions of treating doctors where those opinions were “not supported by the doctors’ own treatment notes, the objective medical evidence, and appear[ed] to have been based primarily on [the claimant’s] subjective complaints”); Crawford, 363 F. 3d at 1159–60 (affirming the

6 The Court has reordered the Plaintiff’s arguments for purposes of its analysis. ALJ’s decision to discount a treating physician’s opinion which was based primarily on the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, was inconsistent with the physician’s treatment notes, and was unsupported by the medical evidence).

Furthermore, the ALJ’s reasons are supported by substantial evidence. As an example of Dr. Sardo mostly predicating her restrictions on the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, in a September 2013 treatment note, she compared the assessments reflected in her September 2013 questionnaire with those listed in her July 2013 questionnaire, and determined that the Plaintiff “was consistent in the symptoms and limitations he described” in both reports. (R. 467). As the ALJ alluded to in his decision (R. 512), the clear implication of this comment is that Dr. Sardo filled out both forms based on what the Plaintiff said (R. 467). This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the limitations set forth in Dr. Sardo’s September and July 2013 questionnaires conflict with the objective findings listed in her own treatment notes, further indicating that she relied on the Plaintiff’s subjective statements in completing the questionnaires. Id. For instance, as the ALJ observed, Dr. Sardo “identified almost no regular issue with fine/gross manipulation or handling” in her visitation records yet she stated in her questionnaires that the

Plaintiff had “significant limitations in doing repetitive reaching, handling, fingering, or lifting” because of pain in his hands. (R. 512); see also (R. 366, 413). With respect to the conflict between Dr. Sardo’s notes and the restrictions she imposed, as the ALJ pointed out, Dr. Sardo opined in the two questionnaires that the

Plaintiff could not push, pull, kneel, bend, or stoop due to pain, yet acknowledged in her own underlying records that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were disproportionate to her exam findings, including the virtual absence of swelling,

effusion, or issues with the Plaintiff’s strength. (R. 369, 416, 512). Other documentation in the record cited by the ALJ also refutes Dr. Sardo’s limitations, such as the negative left shoulder x-ray and the mild nature of the Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis and the disc degeneration in his spine, which—taken together—rebuts Dr. Sardo’s findings as to the Plaintiff’s strength and dexterity. (R. 470–71, 512, 986–1069, 1070–

1101). Finally, as for the matter of Dr. Sardo’s reference to conflicting onset dates, as the ALJ noted, in Dr. Sardo’s July 2013 questionnaire, she found that the earliest date that the Plaintiff’s restrictions applied was December 4, 2012, which was when she first began treating the Plaintiff. (R. 369). Two months later, in her September 2013 questionnaire, however, Dr. Sardo changed her earlier assessment and offered— without explanation—that the Plaintiff’s limitations dated back to June 2010. (R. 416). The ALJ found this inconsistency notable because not only did Dr. Sardo’s differing onset dates conflict with each other, but the latter date did not comport with the Plaintiff’s own claimed onset date of July¹, 2011, and also pre-dated the Plaintiff’s establishment of care with Dr. Sardo by more than two years. (R. 511–12). In an effort to overcome these discrepancies, the Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Sardo’s amended onset date in the September 2013 questionnaire is buttressed by the doctor’s statement in the July 2013 questionnaire that the Plaintiff “reported pain for years.” (R. 369; Doc. 19 at 20). The problem with this argument is that, as the Commissioner observes, Dr. Sardo did not rely on this rationale as a justification for modifying the onset date to June 2010. In fact, as noted, she did not offer any justification at all. Even were that not the case, the Court reviews an ALJ’s decision under the substantial evidence standard to determine if his findings are adequately supported. Hargress, 883 F. 3d at 1305 n.2; Crawford, 363 F. 3d at 1159. One could reasonably conclude from a fair reading of Dr. Sardo’s two opinions that they are contradictory simply because the two dates are different and because there is no record evidence to support Dr. Sardo’s decision to move the onset date back almost two-and-a-half years. Hargress, 883 F. 3d at 1306 (finding that an ALJ’s decision to give a treating physician’s opinion little weight was supported by substantial evidence because it was not bolstered by the record as a whole). The Plaintiff alternatively asserts that, in light of the unexplained inconsistency in the two onset dates, the ALJ should have contacted Dr. Sardo regarding the matter “or at least made his concerns known to counsel for [the] Plaintiff to assist in clarifying the issue.” (Doc. 19 at 20). This assertion fails as well. It is well-established that an ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record. Washington, 906 F. 3d at 1359; Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F. 2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). In accordance with this obligation, an ALJ should recontact a claimant’s treating physician if the evidence in the record is “otherwise inadequate” to determine whether the claimant is disabled. Robinson v. Astrue, 365 F. App’x 993, 999 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 416.912(b).

In evaluating the necessity for remand based on a failure to develop the record, the Court is guided by whether the record reveals evidentiary gaps resulting in “clear prejudice” to the claimant. Brown v. Shalala, 44 F. 3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citation omitted). A court may find clear prejudice where (1) an evidentiary gap exists that the claimant contends supports her allegations of disability, or (2) the claimant can show that the ALJ’s decision would have changed in light of additional information in the record. Mosley v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 633 F. App’x 739, 742 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing Kelley v. Heckler, 761 F. 2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); see also Robinson, 365 F. App’x at 999 (finding that an ALJ’s failure to recontact treating and consultative doctors did not rise to the level of reversible error because the record contained sufficient evidence for the ALJ to determine the claimant’s RFC). Even assuming that the ALJ should have contacted Dr. Sardo regarding the conflicting onset dates, the Plaintiff does not meet his burden of establishing clear prejudice. He does not cite any evidence indicating that the ALJ would have reached a different disability determination had he obtained a clarification from Dr. Sardo about the onset dates given the other evidence he cited in discrediting her opinions.

As a result, remand for further development of the record on this issue is not warranted. Robinson, 365 F. App’x at 999. The Plaintiff’s remaining challenges to the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Sardo’s opinions are likewise unavailing. The first of these is that the ALJ purportedly misconstrued the record by “suggesting that Dr. Sardo opined [the Plaintiff] is wholly precluded from bending or stooping.” (Doc. 19 at 19). The issue with this argument is that Dr. Sardo did, in fact, opine that the Plaintiff can neither bend nor stoop when she responded to the query in the July and September 2013 questionnaires as to whether “there [are] any other limitations that would affect [the Plaintiff’s] ability to work at a regular job on a sustained basis.” (R. 369, 416).7 The Court similarly finds unconvincing the Plaintiff’s other challenge that “even if the ALJ did not err by refusing to give the opinions from Dr. Sardo controlling weight, he still erred by failing to properly assign weight to those opinions based on the relevant factors enumerated in” the Regulations. (Doc. 19 at 20–21) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c)). As discussed previously, however, an ALJ is not required to address each of these factors explicitly in his decision and instead need only “provide ‘good cause’ for rejecting a treating physician’s medical opinions.” Lawton,

7 In referencing Dr. Sardo’s assessment that the Plaintiff could neither bend nor stoop, the ALJ added that such a restriction “invariably beg[ged] the question” that, if it were true, how would the Plaintiff “ever be capable of getting into/out of a seated position.” (R. 512). This gratuitous statement, while perhaps ill-phrased, does not provide grounds for remand because the ALJ provided other adequate support for his decision as previously explained herein. See Donnell v. Astrue, 2012 WL 6106412, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) (finding that an ALJ’s anecdotal observation, even if improper, did not undermine the ALJ’s adequately articulated reasons), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 6106855 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2012). 431 F. App’x at 833. Notwithstanding the varied arguments asserted by the Plaintiff, the ALJ articulated such good cause here and, as explained above, supported his determination with substantial evidence. Schink, 935 F. 3d at 1259.

2.

The Court also finds unpersuasive the Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred in affording little weight to the opinion of Dr. Hughes. (Doc. 19 at 21–22). An occupational medicine specialist, Dr. Hughes examined the Plaintiff once in June 2014. (R. 438–44). As part of that examination, Dr. Hughes reviewed the Plaintiff’s prior treatment records, as well as x-rays of the Plaintiff’s spine, knees, and hips. Id. Dr. Hughes found based on his examination that the Plaintiff could occasionally lift up to five pounds, and could rarely—if ever—grasp, turn, and twist objects, utilize his hands/fingers for fine manipulations, or use his arms for reaching, including over his head. (R. 442–43, 513). Dr. Hughes also concluded that the Plaintiff’s condition was “permanent,” his prognosis “poor,” and his ability to perform full time competitive work non-existent. (R. 439). In his decision, the ALJ largely disregarded these assessments on the grounds that they were inconsistent with the clinical signs/findings discussed throughout his decision. (R. 513). The ALJ also declined to credit Dr. Hughes’s determination that the Plaintiff was unable to engage in full-time work on the basis that it constituted a “legal conclusion” on a matter reserved for the Commissioner. Id.

The Plaintiff now asserts that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Hughes’s opinion predicated on the absence of any clinical or objective evidence is flawed because Dr. Hughes “referred to [the Plaintiff’s] x-rays and lab studies as supporting his assessment.” (Doc. 19 at 21). The Plaintiff also lists other items in the record the ALJ allegedly failed to consider. Id. These contentions are without merit. The record evidence that substantiates the ALJ’s decision includes that supplied by consultative examiner, Dr. Quan Tran. As the ALJ referenced in his decision, Dr. Tran saw the Plaintiff in August 2012 and found that he had intact hand and finger dexterity, as well as full grip strength bilaterally, which contradicted Dr. Hughes’s determinations as to the Plaintiff’s strength and ability to grasp, turn, twist, and use his fingers for fine manipulations. (R. 341, 510–11). As also identified by the ALJ, Dr. Hughes’s findings were additionally inconsistent with Dr. Sardo’s treatment notes throughout 2013 and 2014, which showed—in the ALJ’s words—“nary an indication of a deficit in strength, sensation, upper extremity fine/gross manipulation or handling.” (R. 511); see also (R. 377–82, 390–91, 394–96, 399–402, 405–07, 449–64, 465–69). As for Dr. Hughes’s opinion that the Plaintiff’s limitations would render him

“unable to perform full-time competitive work,” the Court agrees that this conclusory assessment concerns an issue which rests solely within the province of the Commissioner and is therefore not entitled to any special significance. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d); Pate v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 678 F. App’x 833, 834 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that, under the applicable Regulations, “the determination of whether an individual is disabled is reserved to the Commissioner, and no special significance will be given to an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner”).

And, finally, with respect to the Plaintiff’s assertion that there is evidence the ALJ neglected to take into account, this argument essentially invites the Court to “reweigh the importance attributed to the medical evidence” by the ALJ. Lawton, 431 F. App’x at 833 (citation omitted). This the Court cannot do. Only a finding that an ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence is sufficient for a reviewing court to disturb the ALJ’s findings. Crawford, 363 F. 3d at 1159. In sum, the Court finds that the record evidence cited in the ALJ’s decision constitutes sufficient evidence to buttress his assignment of “little weight” to Dr. Hughes’s opinion. As a result, this claim of error provides no grounds for reversal either. 3. The Plaintiff’s disagreement with the ALJ’s determination to partially credit Dr. Molis’s opinion fares no better. A state agency physician, Dr. Molis reviewed the Plaintiff’s records in August 2013 as part of the SSA’s reconsideration of the Plaintiff’s

SSI and DIB claims following their initial denial. (R. 88–107). Based on that review, Dr. Molis found that the Plaintiff could engage in a reduced range of light work. (R. 96, 106).

In his decision, the ALJ afforded “some weight” to Dr. Molis’s assessment. (R. 514). In support of that finding, the ALJ noted that Dr. Molis was familiar with the governing Regulations, rulings, policies, and procedures; that he considered both the medical and nonmedical evidence before him; and that, while there were “voluminous records” that had been compiled since Dr. Molis rendered his opinion, such additional evidence “d[id] not necessarily change the pattern established at the time of the State agency assessment.” Id. The ALJ found it necessary, however, to include additional restrictions beyond those imposed by Dr. Molis. Id.

The Plaintiff now avers that the ALJ erred in granting more deference to Dr. Molis’s opinion than to those of Dr. Sardo and Dr. Hughes because Dr. Molis was “a non-treating, non-examining consultant.” (Doc. 19 at 18–19). This argument does not survive scrutiny.

State agency medical consultants are considered experts in the Social Security disability evaluation process, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 404.1513a(b)(1), 416.927(e), 416.913a(b), and their determinations regarding the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments are accordingly considered expert opinion evidence, id.; accord Alvarez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 848 F. App’x 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (finding no error in ALJ’s reliance on state agency expert’s opinion where claimant did “not point to any record evidence that contradict[ed] the consultant’s opinion”). An ALJ may also credit the opinion of a non-examining, non-treating physician over that of a treating or examining physician if the ALJ has found good cause to discount the treating or examining physician’s opinions. Jarrett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 422 F. App’x 869, 874 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (finding that an ALJ properly discounted the treating physician’s opinion by demonstrating good cause and did not err in granting some weight to the opinions of state agency medical consultants because there was substantial evidence to support the decision). Here, the Court has already concluded that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Sardo and Dr. Hughes’s assessments. As for the timing of Dr. Molis’s opinion relative to the development of subsequent record evidence, the Plaintiff cites Brightmon v. Social

Security Administration, Commissioner, 743 F. App’x 347, 352–53 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). In that case, the court found that the ALJ erred in assigning “great weight” to a state agency medical consultant’s opinion because the medical record was “much more developed regarding [the claimant’s] physical impairments” after the consultant rendered his opinion. Id. At the time of the exam, the only “evidence of note” was an x-ray showing merely mild issues. Id. at 352. After the state agency consultant rendered his determination, however, the claimant was diagnosed with several relevant conditions, and scans and other findings indicated that the claimant’s condition had worsened. Id. at 353.

Brightmon is readily distinguishable. As an initial matter, the ALJ only gave Dr. Molis’s opinion “some weight,” not great weight as the ALJ did in Brightmon, because he recognized—and expressly acknowledged—that “there [we]re voluminous records since Dr. Molis’s opinion.” (R. 514). Further, while the record’s later development in Brightmon evidenced a material change in the claimant’s health which conflicted with the state agency consultant’s earlier findings, the record at the time of Dr. Molis’s evaluation here was fairly consistent with the two-and-a-half years of records compiled after his assessment. See, e.g., (R. 91, 94, 101, 104) (noting, inter alia, that the Plaintiff had “a normal gait,” there was “no swelling or inflammation,” and the Plaintiff used a cane and had “minor degenerative changes” since 2012). Additionally, the ALJ here did not limit his restrictions to those set forth in Dr. Molis’s opinion but accounted for those the Plaintiff later developed as well. (R. 514). Because the record does not conflict with Dr. Molis’s findings and the ALJ accounted for the record’s development, the Plaintiff’s reliance on Brightmon fails. See Jarrett, 422 F. App’x at 874. As a result, the ALJ did not err in assigning “some weight” to Dr. Molis’s opinion.

B.

The Plaintiff’s second claim of error is that the ALJ did not adequately “consider if [he] was disabled during [the twelve-]month period” between July 2011 and July 2012. (Doc. 19 at 32). This so-called “closed period” claim is readily disposed of. It is implicit in the ALJ’s finding here that the Plaintiff was not disabled at any time during the relevant period that he was also not disabled during any twelve-month period within that same time frame. See Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. App’x 767, 772–73 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding that the ALJ did not err in failing to consider a closed period because the ALJ determined the claimant was not disabled at any time during the entire period and that the ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence); McDaniel v. Astrue, 2009 WL 2777716, at *10 (S.D. Ga. July 31, 2009) (“When the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence and he or she determines that a claimant is not disabled for any time during that entire period, the ALJ does not err in failing to consider a claimant’s eligibility for a closed period of disability.”) (citing Jones, 181 F. App’x at 773), report and recommendation adopted, 2009 WL 2905661 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2009). More particularly, because the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff’s period of disability did not commence until mid-April

2016, it follows that he considered the July 2011 to July 2012 time frame as well. See Jones, 181 F. App’x at 773. Even were that not the case, the Plaintiff bears the overall burden of proving he was disabled. Washington, 906 F. 3d at 1359 (citation omitted). If the Plaintiff claims he was disabled from July 2011 to July 2012, he must tender evidence objectively proving his disability during that period. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Soc. Sec. Ruling (SSR) 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *1 (Mar. 16, 2016) (stating that the SSA will not typically “find an individual disabled based on alleged symptoms alone.”). The Plaintiff did not do so. As a result, he cannot claim that the ALJ did not consider that time frame, and his “closed period” argument therefore fails for this reason as well. See Washington, 906 F. 3d at 1359.

C.

The Plaintiff’s final claim of error is that the ALJ did not properly evaluate his subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms for the period after 2012. (Doc. 19 at 30–34). In support of this claim, the Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ failed to provide “good reasons” for discounting the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints made during this time frame; (2) the ALJ wrongly focused on the Plaintiff’s work history when discrediting his reported symptoms; and (3) the ALJ erred by requiring that the Plaintiff’s statements “regarding his limitations in activities of daily living be verified by third-party statements.” (Doc. 19 at 32–34). All of these arguments are meritless.