DRAGASH

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

Relief against Plaintiff’s Abusive and Vexatious Pattern of Litigation Defendant Chase’s motion to strike or dismiss also seeks an order to show cause why Plaintiff should not be prohibited from further filings against Chase based on previously litigated circumstances unless Plaintiff is represented by counsel and given leave of Court. Chase’s motion catalogs Plaintiff’s pattern of vexatiously relitigating previously decided issues as well as filing papers containing scandalous, impertinent, and disrespectful allegations. Orders and other filings reflecting Plaintiff’s history of litigation include: • Dragash v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 8:15-cv-847-T-TGW, 2016 WL 9632958 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2016) (dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims regarding the validity of 2002 note and mortgage on his property), aff’d, 700 F. App’x 939 (11th Cir. 2017)

• Dragash v. Saucier, No. 8:17-cv-259-T-30AEP, 2017 WL 1426708, at * 3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2017) (dismissing with prejudice claims against opposing counsel and Judge Wilson’s courtroom deputy arising out of events in Case No. 8:15-cv-847-T-TGW), aff’d, No. 17-12031-JJ, 2017 WL 5202252 (11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2017) • Dragash v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., No 2018-CA-3773-NC (Fla. 12th Jud. Cir., Aug. 16, 2019) (dismissing third amended complaint with prejudice) (Doc. 10-2), aff’d, 293 So. 3d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (per curiam)

• JPMorgan Chase Bank., N.A. v. Dragash, No. 2019-CA-00636 (Fla. 12th Jud. Cir.) (counterclaim raising validity of mortgage) (Doc. 10-5)

In the 2018 and 2019 state court actions noted above, Plaintiff filed 11 motions for recusal, sought to take depositions of the trial judge and a judicial assistant, sought to disqualify opposing counsel, and was admonished by the court for improper references to opposing counsel’s ethnicity. See (Doc. 10-6, 10-9, 10-10). Plaintiff has continued this pattern of abuse in this case. See (Docs. 1-1 at 1-4; 24; 31; 32). On July 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed yet another similar action in state court against Chase and others, including federal and state officials, which has been removed to federal court. See Dragash v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 8:21-cv-2080-TPB-CPT, at Doc. 1-1 (suit against Chase, its attorneys, and others, referring to the “CORRUPT FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT, TAMPA” and the “Florida Corrupt Attorney General”). It is very clear that Plaintiff is not proceeding in good faith and is attempting to use the courts for improper purposes. As Judge Moody aptly observed in connection with the suit listed above filed by Plaintiff against Judge Wilson’s courtroom deputy, this is a “baseless lawsuit” filed against individuals “for simply doing their jobs” and designed to “intimidate and heckle those [Plaintiff] imagines have done him wrong.” Dragash v. Saucier, 2017 WL 1426708, at * 3. In cases like this where parties attempt to use the court system for improper purposes, judges have a responsibility to stop it while at the same time always respecting the rights of parties to pursue legitimate claims. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the “All Writs Act” (28 U.S.C. § 1651) empowers federal district courts to enjoin parties from filing actions in judicial forums and otherwise restrict their filings. See Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F. 3d 1277, 1295 n.15, 1298 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Martin-Trinoga v. Shaw, 986 F. 2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed various injunctions – such as pre-filing screening restrictions – against vexatious litigants. See, e.g., Copeland v. Green, 949 F. 2d 390, 391 (11th Cir. 1991); Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 936 F. 2d 512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991).

When determining whether to enter an injunction against a pro se litigant, a district court should consider, among other factors: (1) the litigant’s history of litigation, and in particular, whether it involved vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in pursing the litigation, including whether they have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing; (3) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or imposed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (4) whether other sanctions would be appropriate to protect the interests of the courts and other parties. Ray v. Lowder, No. 5:02-cv-316-Oc-10GRJ, 2003 WL 22384806, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2003). Upon consideration of these factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that sanctions are appropriate. Plaintiff has filed multiple proceedings and claims seeking to perpetuate litigation on previously decided claims and issues, and his filings have become filled with frivolous and scandalous allegations manifestly intended to intimidate and harass. He cannot have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing on these claims. With every incomprehensible and scandalous paper he files, Plaintiff is imposing an unnecessary burden on the parties he is suing, and on the courts and their personnel. The filing of frivolous pleadings and other papers such those filed by Plaintiff in this case is abusive because “[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” In re

McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989). Under these circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to enjoin Plaintiff from filing any action, complaint, petition, or other document in the Middle District of Florida without first obtaining leave from the Middle District of Florida or the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. E-Mails Due to the voluminous and unnecessary e-mails Plaintiff has chosen to send to this Court, he is directed to cease using e-mail to communicate with any member of the Court, or any court employee. This Court will not read or respond to these communications. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Plaintiff’s “[Motion for] Recusal / Disqualification of ‘Judges’ Pursuant to 28 United States Code Sec. 455” (Doc. 32) is DENIED.
(2) Plaintiff’s “[Motion to] Remove and Remand Case to 12th Judicial Circuit, Sarasota, Florida” (Doc. 6) is DENIED.

(3) Plaintiff’s “[Motion] for ‘Stay’ of Proceedings, Pending Review of Court’s Order, and Pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 18-1 and 18-2” (Doc. 33) is

DENIED.

(4) “Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,’s Motion to Strike or Dismiss the Complaint, and for Issuance of an Order to Show Cause, and to Enjoin Future Filings by Plaintiff” (Doc. 10) is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED to the extent that the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, and to the extent that Plaintiff is subject to the injunction set forth below. The motion is otherwise DENIED. (5) "Defendant Judge Walker and Judge Roberts’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint” (Doc. 1-1)” (Doc. 20) is GRANTED. (6) “Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice” (Doc. 25) is

GRANTED.

(7) Plaintiff Daniel D. Dragash is a vexatious litigant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and he is ENJOINED and PROHIBITED from filing any new document – including, but not limited to, any action, complaint, petition, or motion – in the Middle District of Florida that (1) relates in any way to the 2002 note and mortgage on his property, (2) relates in any way to prior litigation involving Plaintiff with respect to the 2002 note and mortgage, including the cases referenced on pages 5-6 above, or (3) is brought against any active, senior, or retired Article

III judge, or magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge, or any federal judicial employee, or against any active or retired Florida state court judge, without first obtaining the prior written approval of the senior Magistrate Judge in the division in which the document is sought to be filed. (8) Any motion for leave to file must be captioned “Motion for Leave to File

Pursuant to Court Order,” and Plaintiff must attach to each and any such motion: (1) a copy of any proposed complaint, petition, or other document; (2) a copy of this Order; and (3) a certification – under oath – that there is a good faith basis for filing the complaint, petition, or other document. (9) In the event that the senior Magistrate Judge’s review results in a finding that Plaintiff’s proposed filing is not frivolous, then the

Magistrate Judge shall direct the Clerk to file Plaintiff’s document. If such a nonfrivolous filing commences a new action or proceeding, then the Magistrate Judge shall direct the Clerk to file the case and assign it according to the normal procedures. (10) In the event that the senior Magistrate Judge’s review results in a finding that Plaintiff’s proposed filing is frivolous, the document will not be filed with the Court but instead will be returned to Plaintiff. (11) Should Plaintiff violate this Order and file an action without first seeking leave, the action will be dismissed for failing to comply with this Order. (12) Plaintiff further prohibited from sending e-mails or other correspondence to any judge in the Middle District of Florida unless expressly requested by the Court to do so. All unauthorized e-mails are subject to deletion before having been read. (13) Plaintiff further warned that the continued submission of further frivolous filings or the submission of e-mails or other correspondence to chambers may result in the imposition of additional sanctions, including monetary sanctions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651. (14) Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, without leave to amend. (15) The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions and deadlines and thereafter close this case. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 24th day of September, 2021.

Yh ts "TOMBARBER-SSS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE