GONZALEZ

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the denial of her claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). As the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision was based on substantial evidence and employed proper legal standards, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

I.

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI (Tr. 301- 14). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s claims both initially and upon reconsideration (Tr. 149-236). Plaintiff then requested an

Plaintiff, who was born in 1971, claimed disability beginning September 28, 2014, which she later amended to October 5, 2017 (Tr. 72, 302, 309). Plaintiff completed the ninth grade, did not obtain a GED, and attended some classes for certified nurse’s assistants (“CNA”) (Tr. 75-76). Plaintiff’s past relevant work experience included work as a CNA and a kennel attendant (Tr. 57-58, 96, 334-36, 344). Plaintiff alleged disability due to bipolar disorder, depression, mania, psychosis, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and panic attacks (Tr. 343). In rendering the administrative decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2019 and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 5, 2017, the amended alleged onset date (Tr. 51). After conducting a hearing and reviewing the evidence of record, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: cervical spine degenerative disc disease, lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, affective disorder, anxiety disorder, and PTSD (Tr. 51). Notwithstanding the noted impairments, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix¹ (Tr. 52). The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, except Plaintiff was limited to occasional postural activity; could never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; could frequently reach overhead bilaterally; could no more than occasionally be exposed to extreme heat, humidity, vibration, and workplace hazards, such as unprotected heights and moving machinery; and was limited to not more than occasional exposure to atmospheric irritants such as dusts, odors, fumes, and gases (Tr. 54). Further, the ALJ found that the work must be unskilled, limited to occupations with a specific vocational preparation of¹ or² only, with performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; must not have more than occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public; must not have more than occasional changes in the general nature of the work setting or the tasks performed; and should not be at production pace, meaning on an assembly line or where Plaintiff is paid by the piece produced (Tr. 54). In formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined that, although the evidence established the presence of underlying impairments that reasonably could be expected to produce the symptoms alleged, Plaintiff’s statements as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence (Tr. 55). Considering Plaintiff’s noted impairments and the assessment of a vocational expert (“VE”), however, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work (Tr. 57). Given Plaintiff’s background and RFC, the VE testified that

Plaintiff could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as a marker/pricer, a mail clerk (private industry), and a produce sorter (Tr. 58-59, 98). Accordingly, based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 59).

II.

To be entitled to benefits, a claimant must be disabled, meaning he or she must be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities, which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3),

1382c(a)(3)(D). The SSA, in order to regularize the adjudicative process, promulgated the detailed regulations currently in effect. These regulations establish a “sequential evaluation process” to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. If an individual is found disabled at any point in the sequential review, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). Under this process, the ALJ must determine, in sequence, the following: whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;

whether the claimant has a severe impairment, i.e., one that significantly limits the ability to perform work-related functions; whether the severe impairment meets or equals the medical criteria of 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P, Appendix¹; and whether the claimant can perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If the claimant cannot perform the tasks required of his or her prior work, step five of the evaluation requires the ALJ to decide if the claimant can do other work in the national economy in view of his or her age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). A claimant is entitled to benefits only if unable to perform other work. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). A determination by the Commissioner that a claimant is not disabled must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F. 3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the court reviews the Commissioner’s decision with deference to the factual findings, no such deference is given to the legal conclusions. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F. 3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even if it finds that the evidence preponderates against the ALJ’s decision. Winschel, 631 F. 3d at 1178 (citations omitted); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F. 2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). The Commissioner’s failure to apply the correct law, or to give the reviewing court sufficient reasoning for determining that he or she has conducted the proper legal analysis, mandates reversal. Ingram, 496 F. 3d at 1260 (citation omitted). The scope of review is thus limited to determining whether the findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F. 3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

III.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider her subjective complaints.² At step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and ability to perform past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545, 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945. To determine a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ makes an assessment based on all the relevant evidence of

16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2. Consideration of a claimant’s symptoms involves a two-step process, wherein the SSA first considers whether an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment exists that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms, such as pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3-9. If the SSA determines that an underlying physical or mental impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms, the SSA evaluates the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit the claimant’s ability to perform work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3-9. When the ALJ discredits the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Wilson, 284 F. 3d at 1225 (citation omitted). A reviewing court will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding regarding a claimant’s subjective complaints supported by substantial evidence in the record. Foote v. Chater, 67 F. 3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Here, the ALJ found that, while the record reflected that Plaintiff expressed both mental and physical subjective complaints, the record did not support the

drowsiness, and restless legs she experienced as side effects from her medications (Tr. 54-55). Specifically, in considering Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ concluded that, although Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms, Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record (Tr. 55). According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s statements regarding her symptoms were inconsistent primarily because the medical evidence of record showed that her physical and mental impairments responded well to conservative treatment (Tr. 55).

Namely, as the ALJ explained, during the period at issue, mental status examinations generally showed intermittent behavior, attitude, and grooming abnormalities but also indicated that Plaintiff was alert with appropriate attire, appropriate eye contact, appropriate language and fund of knowledge, fair memory, fair attention and concentration, normal speech, logical and relevant thought process, intact associations, good insight and judgment, and no delusions, hallucinations, and homicidal or suicidal ideations, and, notably, during several appointments, Plaintiff indicated that she was happier and calmer, doing well, and that her medications were effective and helpful (Tr. 56, 545-52, 650-53, 726-43, 769- 82).4 Further, as the ALJ noted, during that time, Plaintiff also demonstrated gait, station, muscle strength, and muscle tone within normal limits and normal cardiac and musculoskeletal findings upon physical examination (Tr. 56, 536, 625-30, 726-

43, 746-47). In addition, objective testing showed only a disc protrusion at C5-6 but no high-grade canal or neuroforaminal stenosis; only mild to moderate spondylosis at L5-S¹, resulting in mild to moderate left neuroforaminal narrowing; and normal findings from a nerve conduction study and an electromyography of the lower extremity and nerve testing of the left upper extremity (Tr. 763-65, 795-96).

Most importantly, with respect to Plaintiff’s treatment regimen, the ALJ highlighted the fact that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were inconsistent with the type of treatment Plaintiff received, noting that Plaintiff responded well to conservative treatment (Tr. 55-57). As the ALJ correctly stated, Plaintiff’s treatment typically “consisted of smoking cessation, exercise, muscle relaxers, and prescription medications with psychotherapy” (Tr. 55, 536, 545-52, 599, 617-30, 650-53, 769-81). Such conservative treatment for both Plaintiff’s mental and physical impairments supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not as severe as alleged and did not support a finding of disability.

IV.

Accordingly, after consideration, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of the Commissioner and close the case. DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on this 14th day of September, 2021. ae De hl ti ee PW] Te Vv)

ANTHONY E. PORCELLI

United Sfates Magistrate Judge cc: Counsel of Record Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.