I. FRED FREDEL, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
JO ELLEN FREDEL, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this family law dissolution case, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's determination that a husband's stock holdings were non-marital property, holding that the appreciation in value resulting from his active trading efforts during the marriage constituted marital assets subject to equitable distribution. The court affirmed the award of permanent periodic alimony but reversed the provision requiring alimony to continue after the husband's death.
The court held that the increased value of assets solely owned by one spouse prior to marriage must be considered marital assets subject to equitable distribution to the extent the increase resulted from either spouse's work efforts or expenditure of marital funds. The alimony award was affirmed, but the provision requiring alimony to continue after the husband's death was reversed as erroneous.
[1] The increased value of assets solely owned by one spouse prior to marriage is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution to the extent the increase resulted from t…
[2] A trial court errs as a matter of law in finding an enhancement to pre-marital stock holdings to be non-marital property when the increase in value resulted from marital…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Marital assets are those assets acquired by the parties during the marriage which are created or produced by their work efforts, services or earnings. The increased value of assets solely owned by one spouse prior to the marriage should be considered marital assets subject to equitable distribution to the extent their increased value was the result of either or both spouses' work efforts, or the expenditure of marital funds or earnings of the parties.”
Establishes the legal standard for determining when pre-marital asset appreciation becomes marital property subject to equitable distribution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties married in 1967 when the husband owned securities valued at $57,700. By the time of dissolution in 1987, his stock holdings had grown to $…
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FERGUSON, Judge.
The former husband appeals from that part of the final judgment of dissolution that awards permanent periodic alimony to the former wife. The former wife cross appeals the distribution of property.
The evidence shows that when the parties married in 1967, Mr. Fredel owned securities valued at $57,700. Twenty years later, at the time of the dissolution, the parties stipulated that Mr. Fredel owned stock valued at $1,193,671. At trial, Mr. Fredel argued that his stock holdings were not marital assets because they were either acquired by him prior to the marriage or grew in value as a result of stock splits or dividend reinvestment and that any increase was a result of passive appreciation rather than marital funds or marital effort. After a presentation of evidence at a nonju-ry trial the court ruled that the stockhold-ings were not marital assets and therefore not subject to equitable distribution. We disagree.
It is undisputed that the majority of stock owned by Mr. Fredel at the time of the marriage in early 1967 was sold during the parties’ first year of marriage and that new stocks were acquired and actively traded. Through this labor of active trading, during the course of the marriage, Mr. Fredel increased the value of the securities from $57,700 in 1967 to $1,193,671 in 1987.
The Fifth District recently addressed this issue in Keller v. Keller, 521 So. 2d 273, 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), holding:
Marital assets are those assets acquired by the parties during the marriage which are created or produced by their work efforts, services or earnings. The increased value of assets solely owned by one spouse prior to the marriage should be considered marital assets subject to equitable distribution to the extent their increased value was the result of either or both spouses’ work efforts, or the expenditure of marital funds or earnings of the parties.
(Citations omitted.)
Because the increase in the stock value was a result of work effort during the marriage, the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding the enhancement non-marital property, and thus not subject to equitable distribution. See also Crapps v. Crapps, 501 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA) (where husband devoted time to cultivating timber — time he otherwise would have devoted to domestic or other material pursuits — income from timber was marital asset), rev. denied, 511 So. 2d 297 (Fla.1987).
We find no abuse of discretion in the award of permanent periodic alimony to the former wife. De Cenzo v. De Cenzo, 433 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The former wife concedes, however, that the judge erred in ordering the alimony payments to continue after the husband’s death. O’Malley v. Pan Am. Bank of Orlando, 384 So. 2d 1258 (Fla.1980). Requiring Mr. Fredel to pay a portion of the former wife’s attorney’s fees was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. Hall v. Hall, 363 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 459 (Fla.1979).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for further consistent proceedings.
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
PER CURIAM.
We briefly address two points raised in the initial briefs which the wife claims should be clarified in order to avoid misinterpretation on remand. First, we reject the trial court’s finding that the wife’s pension plan in the amount of $248,000 is the same as the husband's pension plan of $1.4 million when “time adjusted.” For the purpose of adjusting the distribution of marital property on remand, both plans should be considered at their present values. Second, the enhancement to stock-holdings, which we hold is marital property subject to equitable distribution, applies also to the increase in value of partnership contributions.
In all other respects we adhere to the original opinion.
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Adkins v. Adkins, 650 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…thout any instructions from the husband as to what or when to buy or sell. The appreciation in such funds can therefore not be considered, as urged, a marital asset. See Wright v. Wright, 505 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); compare Fredel v. Fredel, 531 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). B The wife also argues that the trial court erred in excluding 51 acres owned by the husband in Leon County as marital property. We cannot agree, as there was sufficient evidence adduced below to support this finding. The husba…
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Griffiths v. Griffiths, 563 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…thereon, are marital property. As a corollary, the pension plan balance prior to the marriage, and accumulations thereon, are the separate property of the employee. See Zaborowski v. Zaborowski, 547 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Fredel v. Fredel, 531 So. 2d 981, 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review denied, 542 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1989). The trial court therefore erred in treating all accumulations during the marriage as being marital property since a portion of the accumulations during the marriage were attributable…
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Sizemore v. Sizemore, 767 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…ons she took exception to them. These facts are susceptible of only one conclusion: both parties actively managed the CMA account, contributing marital labor and efforts. Accordingly, pursuant to section 61.075(5)(a)2., Pagano and Fredel v. Fredel, 531 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1989), the increased value of the CMA account was a marital asset which should have been distributed under section 61.075. Had the roles been reversed, this case would be easy to decide. Given th…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- DE Cenzo v. de Cenzo, 433 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Iva C. O'Malley v. PAN Am. Bank OF Orlando, 384 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1980)
- Crapps v. P.C. Crapps, III, 501 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Keller v. Keller, 521 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Hall v. Hall, 363 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)