THE VILLAS OF ST. GEORGE, A FLORIDA JOINT VENTURE, AND VILLAS DEVELOPMENT OF FLORIDA, INCORPORATED, A JOINT VENTURER, APPELLANTS,
v.
ROGER NEWTON, APPELLEE
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The Villas of St. George and a joint venturer appealed an amended final judgment awarding Roger Newton $15,000 plus interest and $5,000 in attorney's fees based on an oral agreement and a promissory note. The court affirmed the $15,000 recovery on the oral agreement but reversed the $5,000 attorney's fee award, finding it unsupported by the record and remanding for recalculation based on minimal time actually spent on the promissory note collection.
The court affirmed the $15,000 recovery on the oral agreement and the $4,714 interest award but reversed the $5,000 attorney's fee award. Appellee is not entitled to attorney's fees for services rendered regarding the oral agreement and may only recover fees based on the minimal amount of time spent on collection of the promissory note, which was satisfied prior to or shortly after filing.
[1] A party is entitled to attorney's fees incurred in the collection of a debt evidenced by a promissory note, but not for services rendered in collecting a separate debt ar…
[2] An attorney's fee award must be supported by the record, and a substantial award is not warranted when the attorney spent only a minimal amount of time on the case prior…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“All parties agree, and the trial judge properly found, that appellee is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred in the collection of the $15,000 due under the oral agreement although he is entitled to an award of fees incurred in regard to the note.”
Establishes the key distinction that attorney's fees are available only for the promissory note collection, not the oral agreement recovery.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants' predecessor made an oral agreement to pay appellee $15,000, and appellants were also indebted to appellee under a promissory note. The tri…
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[*1052] WIGGINTON, Judge.
Appellants appeal and appellee cross-appeals an amended final judgment finding that appellee is entitled to recover $15,000 from appellants pursuant to an oral agreement, plus $4,714 in interest, and $5,000 in attorney’s fees. We affirm except for the attorney’s fee award.
This action arose from a dispute between appellants and appellee over an oral agreement, whereby appellants’ predecessor obligated to pay appellee $15,000, and a promissory note indebting appellants to appel-lee. The amended final judgment allowed appellee recovery only on the $15,000 oral agreement, after making the obvious determination that the obligation on the promissory note had been satisfied prior to or shortly after the filing of this action by appellee. All parties agree, and the trial judge properly found, that appellee is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred in the collection of the $15,000 due under the oral agreement although he is entitled to an award of fees incurred in regard to the note.
The record does not support a $5,000 attorney’s fee award in this case. Appel-lee’s attorney’s time sheets show that although he invested a substantial amount of time prosecuting this suit, he spent only a minimal amount of time on the case prior to the filing of the cause of action. The suit resulted in appellee prevailing in the trial court only on the oral agreement issue and we affirm that result.
Since indisputably appellee is not entitled to an award of an attorney’s fee for services rendered in regard to the oral agreement, the only award of attorney’s fees to which he might be entitled is that minimal amount of time spent by his attorney, according to the record, in obtaining collection on the promissory note which, as determined by the trial court, was achieved prior to or shortly after the filing of this action below. Therefore, we reverse the $5,000 attorney’s fee award and remand to the trial court for the award of an attorney’s fee, if at all, based on that amount of time spent by appellee’s attorney on the collection of the promissory note. See Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JOANOS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
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Miller v. First Am. Bank & Tr., 607 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…-89 (citations omitted). Accord Dalia v. Alvarez, 605 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)6; In re Estate of Simon, 402 [*486] So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)7, appeal after remand, 427 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)8; see also Villas of St. George v. Newton, 531 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Without further belaboring the obvious, we are content to rest our conclusion upon the judgment below9 and Justice Stewart’s famous concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, 804…
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- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)