SLAYTON

v.

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

James Darryl Slayton filed a civil rights complaint (Doc. 1) and motion for protection (Doc. 6). Slayton’s civil rights complaint is dismissed without prejudice to filing an amended complaint, and his motion for protection is denied without prejudice. Slayton is a pre-trial detainee in the Hillsborough County Jail. Slayton filed his civil rights complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and that Court transferred the case to this District. (Doc. 3). As required by law, the Court screened the complaint and has found it lacking. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a district court to screen a complaint in “a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint” if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief”).

I. Factual Background1

On November 12, 2014, Slayton was convicted of false imprisonment and battery in Hillsborough County case number 14-CF-8434. On December 19, 2014, the state court sentenced him to six years in prison followed by four years of probation. Slayton was released from prison on July 18, 2019. On November 11, 2019, Slayton’s probation officer, Defendant Gil, alleged that Slayton violated probation for “dirty urine.” (Doc. 1, p. 10). Slayton states that he was arrested on December 9, 2019, for the violation. (Doc. 1, p. 10). On December 16, 2019, the state court found Slayton in violation of probation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to time served. It appears that Slayton moved to Michigan sometime after that state court proceeding.

The online record for Hillsborough County case number 20-CF-472, which charges Slayton with two counts related to failure to follow sexual offender reporting requirements, shows that an electronic arrest warrant was issued on January 10, 2020, and Slayton was arrested a few days later in Michigan. (Doc. 1, pp. 9-10). Slayton was transported to the Florida Department of Corrections on March 17, 2020, where it appears he remained until he was booked into the Hillsborough County Jail on October

II. Slayton’s Complaint Slayton sues Mark Inch, the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections; the Florida Parole Board Commission; Probation Officer Aaron Gil; the Wayne County Jail; Parole Board Commission Investigator Ashly Nolan; Supervisor of Probation

Dennis Thicklin; Tampa Police Department Detective Louis Walton; Mary Stoll, the manager of a boarding house; and “Jim,” a housing supervisor. Slayton claims that his detention following his January 2020 arrest was based on the same violation of probation resolved by the state court during his 2019 probation revocation hearing. Slayton claims that he “spent nine months in the Dept. of Corr. of Florida . . . for a case that was closed. . . . I’m now being charged a second time for the reason I was violated. Placed in jeopardy twice for the so-called same crime.” (Doc. 1, p. 10). Therefore, the crux of Slayton’s complaint appears to be that he was unconstitutionally detained following his January 2020 arrest.² As an initial matter, a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement is properly raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not in a § 1983 civil rights action. See Preiser

Slayton alleges violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments (see Doc. 1, pp. 6-7), he does not identify and describe the violations with specificity or clearly explain which defendant was responsible for which violation. The Court is also at a loss to know which unenumerated right Slayton alleges was purportedly violated with regards to his Ninth Amendment claim. See U.S. Const. Am. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). If Slayton files an amended complaint, the factual allegations must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must give “the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and provide “more than labels and conclusions [or] a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The Court will not accept as true legal conclusions or other conclusory statements. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In an amended complaint, Slayton must clearly allege relevant facts that support his claims for relief, and he must explain the involvement of each Defendant in the alleged constitutional violations. It appears that Slayton may intend to state a claim for false imprisonment. “A false imprisonment claim under section 1983 is based on the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivations of liberty without due process of law.”

Ortega v. Christian, 85 F. 3d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996). In order to state such a claim, Slayton must present allegations “meet[ing] the elements of common law false imprisonment and establish that the imprisonment resulted in a violation of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.; see also Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F. 3d 835,

840 (11th Cir. 2009). Those elements are “an intent to confine, an act resulting in confinement, and the victim’s awareness of confinement.” Campbell, 586 F. 3d at 840. Further, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause includes the ‘right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.’” Id. (quoting Cannon v. Macon Cnty.,¹ F. 3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993)). To establish a due process violation, Slayton must show that the Defendants “acted with deliberate indifference. . . . This means that [the Defendants] had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by actions beyond mere negligence.” Id. (citing West v. Tillman, 496 F. 3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007)).

Finally, Slayton has neither paid the filing fee nor moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. To proceed on an amended complaint, he must either pay the $402.00 filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis by completing and returning the Prisoner Consent Form and Financial Certificate attached to this Order. III. Motion For Protection In his motion for protection, Slayton claims that staff at the Hillsborough County Jail have subjected him to “a multitude of incidents of harassments, intimidation, degradation, humiliation, provocations, physical threats, and discrimination.” (Doc. 6,

p. 2). Slayton also claims that Deputy Dominic has “become physical when in contact with” him. (Doc. 6, p. 2). Slayton believes such interaction is intended to “provoke” him into defending himself so that Deputy Dominic “can make a false criminal complaint of a[n] assault against him by Mr. Slayton.” (Doc. 6, p. 2). Slayton alleges that on May 14, 2021, Deputy Dominic and two unnamed officers engaged in “a design of physical threat and intimidation” against him while he “was not resisting.” (Doc. 6, p. 2). He believes that the State “intends on [him] not surviving [his] projected time” in jail. (Doc. 6, p. 2). To the extent that Slayton’s motion can be construed as one for a temporary restraining order, he is not entitled to relief. A court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy. See United States v. Lambert, 695 F. 2d 536 (11th Cir. 1983). A party seeking a temporary restraining order must show:¹) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits,²) irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, 3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant, and 4) that the entry of relief would serve the public interest. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F. 3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005). Further, a court may grant temporary injunctive relief without notice to the adverse party only if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant[ ] . . . certifies in writhing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Slayton has not satisfied these standards nor has he complied with the requirements of Local Rule 6.01 (M.D. Fla.) governing the procedure for seeking the imposition of a temporary restraining order in this district. As a consequence, any construed request for temporary injunctive relief is denied. Further, to the extent Slayton may intend to present additional civil rights claims concerning actions of the detention deputies at the Hillsborough County Jail, he must do so through an amended complaint, not a motion labeled as one for protection. The denial of Slayton’s motion for protection is without prejudice to the filing of a new civil rights action in a new case, under a new case number, that raises claims arising from the facts alleged in the motion for protection, which do not appear to be related in any way to the initial complaint’s allegations.

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: 1. Slayton’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to filing an amended complaint on the standard form WITHIN 21 DAYS of the date of this Order. a. To amend the complaint, Slayton should place the case number in this action on a blank civil rights complaint form and mark the form “Amended Complaint.” b. The amended complaint must be re-written in its entirety on the standard

form. The amended complaint will supersede the original complaint. Therefore, the amended complaint must contain all claims for relief. It must not refer to or incorporate the original complaint. Slayton must limit the allegations in his amended complaint to claims related to the claims

asserted in the original complaint. 2. WITHIN 21 DAYS of the date of this Order, Slayton must either pay the $402.00 filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action by

completing and submitting the Prisoner Consent Form and Financial Certificate, which is attached to this Order. 3. Slayton’s motion for protection (Doc. 6) is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

4. Slayton must notify the Court of any change of address. Slayton’s failure to comply with this Order will result in the dismissal of this case without further notice. 5. The CLERK is directed to SEND to Slayton two forms for filing a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on May 27, 2021.

yiY Kimball Mizelle United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

____________ DIVISION