POTTER

v.

COASTAL AUTOMOTIVE RECONDITIONING

THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore have an obligation to inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction. See Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F. 3d 1277, 1279-1280 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F. 3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). This obligation exists regardless of whether the parties have challenged the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F. 3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking”). “In a given case, a federal district court must have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron Trading, Corp., 128 F. 3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997). On April 28, 2021, Defendant Coastal Automotive Reconditioning, LLC filed Defendant’s Notice of Removal (Doc. 1; Notice)¹ asserting that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Notice at ¶ 8. Defendant asserts that diversity jurisdiction is proper because “the Lawsuit could have been brought originally before this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, by reason of complete diversity of citizenship between the

Plaintiff and the Defendant and the amount in controversy.” Id. ¶¶ 4-8. In support, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff Kerise Potter is “a resident of Duval County, Florida,” id. at ¶ 5, and Defendant Coastal Automotive Reconditioning, LLC is a single-member LLC whose “sole member, Rhyne Paul Sepcich, is a citizen of the State of Louisiana.” Id. at ¶ 4. Defendant also asserts that “the

For a court to have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), “all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F. 3d at 412. To establish diversity over a natural person, a complaint must include allegations of the person’s citizenship, not where he or she resides. See Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F. 3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994). A natural person’s citizenship is determined by his or her “domicile,” or “the place of his true, fixed, and

[t]he U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida is one of the busiest district courts in the country and its limited resources are precious. Time spent screening cases for jurisdictional defects, issuing orders directing repair of deficiencies, then rescreening the amended filings and responses to show cause orders is time that could and should be devoted to the substantive work of the Court.

Id. at *1 n.4. As such, before filing any future pleadings in federal court, counsel is strongly encouraged to review the applicable authority on federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at *1-2 (bulleting several “hints” on how to allege federal diversity jurisdiction properly). permanent home and principal establishment . . . to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent therefrom.” McCormick v. Aderholt, 293

F. 3d 1254, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted). Because the Notice discloses merely the state of residence for Plaintiff, rather than her domicile or state of citizenship, the Court finds that Defendants have not alleged the facts necessary to establish the Court’s jurisdiction over this case.

“Citizenship, not residence, is the key fact that must be alleged in the complaint to establish diversity for a natural person.” Taylor, 30 F. 3d at 1367 (emphasis supplied); see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) (“‘[d]omicile’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘residence’”).

In addition, where a defendant removes an action from state court to federal court, the defendant “bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists.” See Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 269 F. 3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). In Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., the Supreme Court explained that a defendant’s notice of removal must include “a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., 135 S. Ct. at 554. If the plaintiff contests the allegation, or the court questions it, a defendant must then present evidence establishing that the amount in controversy requirement is met. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B)); see also Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F. 3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2014). Notably, “[a] conclusory allegation in the notice of removal that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied, without setting forth the underlying facts supporting such an assertion, is insufficient to meet the defendant’s burden.” See Williams, 269 F. 3d at 1320. Indeed, the Court may not speculate or guess as to the amount in controversy. See Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F. 3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010). Rather, a removing defendant should make “specific factual allegations establishing jurisdiction” and be prepared to “support them (if challenged by the plaintiff or the court) with evidence combined with reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations.” Id. at 754 (emphasis added). In those circumstances, a court is able to determine the amount in controversy without relying on impermissible “conjecture, speculation, or star gazing.” Id. at 754 (emphasis added).³ The instant case arises out of a slip and fall accident that occurred “on the ground directly outside the premises” where Defendant was “performing auto wash, detailing, and other automotive work.” See Complaint at ¶¶ 4, 7-8.

Complaint, the Court can do no more than speculate regarding the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, “without facts or specific allegations, the amount in controversy [can] be ‘divined [only] by looking at the stars’–only through speculation–and that is impermissible.” Id. at 753-54 (third alteration in original) (quoting Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F. 3d 1184, 1209, 1215 (11th

Cir. 2007)). In light of Plaintiff’s vague allegations of damages, and in the absence of any information regarding the nature of her injuries, or the cost of her subsequent medical care, the Court is unable to determine whether the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied here. Without additional information regarding the citizenship of Plaintiff and the amount in controversy, the allegations presently before the Court are insufficient to invoke the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this action.⁴ Accordingly, it is

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

1¢e28 Copies to: Counsel of Record