MARIO D'OLEO-VALDEZ, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a trial court's failure to appoint a second expert to evaluate a defendant's mental competency to stand trial is not fundamental error and is waived if not objected to at trial. The Court resolved a conflict between appellate district decisions on this procedural issue.
The failure to appoint a second expert to examine mental competency is not fundamental error. It is procedural in nature and does not go to the foundation of the case or merits of the cause of action, and therefore is waived by failure to object at trial.
[1] Failure to object to the trial court's failure to appoint a second expert to examine a defendant's mental competency to stand trial constitutes a waiver of appellate revi…
[2] The failure to appoint a second expert for a mental competency examination is not fundamental error and does not amount to a denial of due process.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) provides: If before or during the trial the court of its own motion, or upon motion of counsel for the defendant or for the State, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to stand trial, the court shall immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's mental condition, which shall be held no later than 20 days after the date of the filing of the motion, and shall order the defendant to be examined by no more than three nor fewer than two experts prior to the date of said hearing.”
Establishes the clear procedural rule requiring two to three expert evaluations that the trial court violated
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceD'Oleo-Valdez was charged with trafficking in cocaine. The trial court appointed one psychiatrist to examine his mental competency, who reported that …
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GRIMES, Justice.
We have accepted jurisdiction to review D’Oleo-Valdez v. State, 516 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), because of apparent conflict with Graydon v. State, 502 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. D’Oleo-Valdez was charged with trafficking in cocaine. The court appointed a psychiatrist to examine his mental competency to stand trial. Following the examination, the psychiatrist reported that D’Oleo-Valdez was competent to stand trial. Defense counsel raised no objection regarding the report. D’Oleo-Valdez was convicted as charged.
On appeal, D’Oleo-Valdez argued that the failure to appoint a second expert to examine his mental competency was reversible error. The Third District Court of Appeal held that the error had been waived by the failure to object.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) provides:
If before or during the trial the court of its own motion, or upon motion of counsel for the defendant or for the State, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to stand trial, the court shall immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant’s mental condition, which shall be held no later than 20 days after the date of the filing of the motion, and shall order the defendant to be examined by no more than three nor fewer than two experts prior to the date of said hearing.
Thus, there is no doubt that the trial judge erred in failing to appoint at least two experts.
Normally, the failure to object to error, even constitutional error, results in a waiver of appellate review. Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1970). The exception is fundamental error, or error that “goes to the foundation of the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action.” Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331, 333 (Fla.1978). Moreover, “for error to be so fundamental that it may be urged on appeal, though not properly presented below, the error must amount to a denial of due process.” Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla.1981).
While it is true that due process demands that a criminal defendant be psy-chiatrically evaluated if there is reason to doubt his competency, Scott v. State, 420 So. 2d 595 (Fla.1982), there is no constitutional right to two evaluations. In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), a statute requiring only one expert psychiatric evaluation was declared “constitutionally adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried while legally incompetent.” Id. at 173, 95 S.Ct. at 904.
We hold that the failure to appoint a second expert to examine the defendant’s mental competency to stand trial is not fundamental error. It is procedural in nature and does not go to the foundation of the case or to the merits of the cause of action.
Conflict was predicated upon the decision in Graydon that failure to appoint a second expert to determine the defendant’s competency to stand trial was reversible error. This proposition is true, as far as it goes, but the opinion is silent as to whether defense counsel objected. We disapprove of Graydon only to the extent that it may be inconsistent with this opinion. We approve the decision of the court below.
It is so ordered. EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (24 total)
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State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)…ised on appeal, we concluded that, for an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process. D’Oleo-Valdez v. State, 531 So. 2d 1347 (Fla.1988); Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla.1981). A review of the chapter law at issue reflects that it affects a quantifiable determinant of the length of sentence that may be imposed on a defendant. Section 775.-084 allows a court to impose a…
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Grissett v. State, 594 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…issue goes to the foundation of the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action. That constitutes error so fundamental that it may be considered for the first time on appeal. Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1970); D’Oleo-Valdez v. State, 531 So. 2d 1347 (Fla.1988). As the supreme court said in Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla.1981): This Court has indicated that for error to be so fundamental that it may be urged on appeal, though not presented below, the error must amount to a denial of due…
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Bertram OCE v. State, 742 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…On this basis, we conclude that the trial court’s error in not complying with section 775.21(5) should have been brought to the trial court’s attention by an objection in order to preserve the issue for appellate review. See D’Oleo-Valdez v. State, 531 So. 2d 1347 (Fla.1988)(for an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review [*466] and equivalent to a denial of due process); Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla.1981)…
Previewing 3 of 24 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (U.S. 1975)
- Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978)
- RAY v. State, 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1981)
- Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1970)
- Scott v. State, 420 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1982)
- City OF Miami v. Cosgrove, 516 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- D'Oleo-Valdez v. State, 516 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Graydon v. State, 502 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)