DADDONO

v.

KNIGHT

Before the Court is Defendant Sarasota County Sheriff’s motion to dismiss the complaint (Dkt. 37) and Plaintiff’s response (Dkt. 49). After careful review of the allegations of the complaint (Dkt. 1) and the applicable law, the Court concludes the motion should be denied.

ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING SHERIFF OF SARASOTA COUNTY

On November 10, 2018, Sarasota County Sheriff’s officers arrested Stephanie Marie Miller on an outstanding warrant.¹ Dkt. 1 ¶ 3. The Sarasota County jail officials booked Ms. Miller and later transferred her to the Charlotte

Ms. Miller’s personal representative, Drew Daddono, brings this multi-count action against the sheriffs of both Sarasota and Charlotte counties, Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., Corizon Health, Inc. (the two private companies contracting with the counties, respectively, to provide healthcare to jail inmates),

and various medical staff of the two companies. Dkt. 1 ¶ 16–18. Three of the four claims against Sarasota County Sheriff Hoffman² sound in federal civil rights constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment,

and the remaining claim cites Florida statutory law prohibiting the neglect, abuse, and exploitation of a vulnerable adult. Id. at 31–37, 42–46, 67–69, 77–83. Each of these four counts incorporates by reference portions of the common, general allegations: paragraphs¹–35 and 56–66. The allegations pertinent to the four claims for relief set forth the following factual scenario.

“bottles in property.” Id. There is no record that Ms. Miller took either Coumadin or Doxycycline (or appropriate alternatives) on November 11. Id. On November 12 after 9:50 p.m., jail medical staff ordered Doxycycline, but there is no record of Ms. Miller taking it. Dkt. 1 ¶ 32. On November 13, medical staff administered Doxycycline to Ms. Miller for the first time, and again on November 14 at 9:30 a.m. Id. ¶¶ 33, 34. There is no evidence that Coumadin was

Plaintiff alleges it was the policy, practice, custom and/or procedure of the Sarasota County Sheriff, and others who have final decision-making authority, to refuse or delay¹) providing adequate and necessary medical health screening, etc., and care to pre-trial detainees and²) providing necessary prescription medications to pre-trial detainees. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 58, 59. Plaintiff alleges these policies, practices, customs, and procedures were deliberately indifferent to “known serious medical and mental health needs of [Ms. Miller] and other pretrial detainees” in the custody of Sarasota County jail. Id. The policies, practices, customs, and procedures “governing the medical health screening, assessment, evaluation, monitoring, treatment, intervention, referral, and care of pre-trial detainees . . . were deliberately indifferent” to the constitutional due process rights of Ms. Miller and other pre-trial detainees. Id. ¶ 60. The Sarasota County Sheriff “promulgated and maintained a de facto unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice of permitting, ignoring, and condoning and/or encouraging officers, deputies, nurses, physicians, medical personnel, and other employees or agents to fail and/or refuse to provide necessary medical treatment.” Id. ¶ 113.

DISCUSSION

The Sarasota County Sheriff seeks dismissal based on the sole ground the complaint fails to demonstrate that any official policy or custom caused any constitutional injury as required by Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). Dkt. 37 at 2, 3, 8, 9. In ruling on a motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., this Court must accept Plaintiff’s factual allegations, not legal conclusions, as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.⁴ Official policy, custom, practice Defendant first argues that Plaintiff has failed to identify a policy or custom that caused Ms. Miller’s injury. To establish official capacity liability of a sheriff, which is municipal liability, in a § 1983 action, a policy, custom, or practice must have caused the deprivation of civil rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693–94; McDowell v. Brown, 392 F. 3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Liability under Monell requires a

As recited above, the complaint satisfactorily articulates the policy, custom, or practice that allegedly led to Ms. Miller’s death. Specifically, the jail’s practice was to refuse or delay the administration of medicine and treatment, to fail or refuse referral to appropriate healthcare professionals and facilities, and to fail or refuse to take adequate time to properly house and classify inmates. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 58– 60, 72, 113. The Court notes, however, that the alleged facts do not exactly comport with the alleged policy of refusing or failing to give medications. Here,

one of the two requested medications was actually administered at least half the time, albeit somewhat delayed. Causation (proximate cause)

Apart from an articulated policy, Defendant argues the absence of any causal connection between what happened at Sarasota County jail and Ms. Miller’s death four weeks after she left. Dkt. 37 at 6, citing Troupe v. Sarasota Cnty., 419 F. 3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2005). The complaint alleges Ms. Miller did not receive

Doxycycline on November 10, 11, or 12; yet, the last two days, November 13 and 14, she did. Ms. Miller’s transport papers of November 14 noted she was taking Doxycycline but were silent as to Coumadin. According to the complaint, Coumadin was never administered in Sarasota County jail during her four-night stay, nor was it disclosed as a prescribed drug to Charlotte County jail.

Although not articulated by either party, the timeline poses a hurdle for Plaintiff. The relatively short time Plaintiff spent in Sarasota County (four nights), the particular drugs given and not given while there (Doxycycline given twice,

Coumadin none), and the passage of time between her treatment and her death (four weeks) may very well destroy causation. Causation under § 1983 requires proof of connection between the application of the unconstitutional policy and the constitutional deprivation. Buckman v. Halsey, No. 3:18-cv-435-TJC-MCR, 2020

WL 5076695, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2020) (citing LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F. 2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993)). The policy or custom must be more than a mere contributing factor to Ms. Miller’s demise; it must be the legal, proximate cause, the “moving force.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F. 3d 1156, 1168 n.16 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing in the context of § 1983 traditional tort causation principles and reasonable foreseeability); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (holding policy must be “moving force” causing constitutional violation); Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F. 3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (same). The Court refrains, however, from deciding this issue on a motion to dismiss and instead will leave the determination of causation, including intervening causes, for resolution after further factual development. See Hunt v. Gualtieri, No. 8:16-cv-509-VMC-AAS, 2016 WL 7034412, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. Dec.², 2016) (permitting complaint to proceed to summary judgment against sheriff because policy or custom is generally fact-based). Other considerations Defendant recognizes that more than a single, isolated incident of unconstitutional conduct is required to establish liability. Dkt. 37 at 6, citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–824 (1985). To establish liability based on a single incident of unconstitutional actions, the plaintiff must show the final policymaker either ratified the unconstitutional conduct or delegated policymaking authority to a subordinate whose decisions are not subject to further review. Andrews v. Marshall, No. 19-12293, 2021 WL 387442, at *6 (11th Cir. Feb.³, 2021) (citing Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F. 3d 1271, 1279–81 (11th Cir. 2016) and Mandel v. Doe, 888 F. 2d 783, 792–94 (11th Cir. 1989)). The complaint does not reference ratification or delegation. Plaintiff contends, however, that the complaint alleges more than a single, unconstitutional injury. Even so, similar events must be shown to substantiate the existence of the policy or custom. See Hunt, 2016 WL 7034412, at *4 (citing Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F. 3d 1152, 1162 (11th Cir. 2005)). In this respect, the complaint alleges the policy or custom violated the constitutional rights of Ms. Miller “and other pre-trial detainees.” Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 58, 59, 60. In Hunt, the district court found sufficient the allegations of the alleged policy as “not uncommon” and “happened numerous times” prior to the plaintiff’s death. Id. As in Hunt, this Court will permit the case to move forward but cautions Plaintiff that proof of a “widespread” and “persistent” policy is required. Id. Finally, Defendant argues the allegations establish liability based on a theory of respondeat superior, which is not permitted under § 1983. See Dkt. 37 at 6, citing Patrick v. Floyd Med. Ctr., 201 F. 3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). Specifically, Defendant takes issue with the allegation that the sheriff is “responsible for the administration, operation, and supervision of the Sarasota County Jail/detention system.” See Dkt. 1 ¶ 20. This allegation, however, does not foreclose Monell liability; it simply designates the sheriff as one of the final policymakers for purposes of Monell. Dkt. 49 at 5; see Thomas ex rel. v. Roberts, 261 F. 3d 1160,

1172 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting Monell liability may be imposed for single decision made by official who is final policymaker), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Thomas v. Roberts, 536 U.S. 953 (2002), opinion reinstated, 323 F. 3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, Defendant Sarasota County Sheriff’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 37) is denied with the exception of the claims for punitive damages.⁵ All references to punitive damages against this Defendant are deemed stricken.

WILLIAM F. a²

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record