DOROTHEA WHITMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM F. WHITMAN, APPELLEE
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Dorothea Whitman sought relief from a 1979 property settlement agreement, alleging her former husband fraudulently induced her to forgo independent legal counsel by misrepresenting that a 'neutral arbitrator' would resolve their dispute, when the arbitrator was actually representing the husband. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal, holding that the alleged facts constitute extrinsic fraud—not merely intrinsic fraud—and therefore support an independent action for relief from judgment.
The alleged facts support an independent action based on extrinsic fraud, not intrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud involves conduct collateral to the issues tried and includes preventing an unsuccessful party from presenting his case through fraud or deception by the adversary. The complaint adequately alleges such conduct where the husband and attorney, through collusion and deception, prevented the wife from fully presenting her case to the court.
[1] Extrinsic fraud, unlike intrinsic fraud, is a ground for relief from judgment after the one-year period provided for in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) has passe…
[2] Extrinsic fraud concerns conduct collateral to the issues tried in a case, while intrinsic fraud involves conduct within a proceeding that pertains to the issues tried or…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Extrinsic fraud, unlike intrinsic fraud, is a ground for relief from judgment after the one-year period provided for in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) has passed.”
Establishes the significance of the extrinsic/intrinsic fraud distinction in determining whether relief is available.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1986, Dorothea Whitman petitioned the court to set aside a property-settlement agreement incorporated into the parties' 1979 final judgment of diss…
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PER CURIAM.
We find merit in one of the three issues raised by the appellant.
Dorothea Whitman petitioned the court in 1986 to set aside, on the basis of extrinsic fraud, a property-settlement agreement which was incorporated into the parties’ 1979 final judgment of dissolution. The first count of Whitman’s complaint alleged that her former husband had fraudulently induced her to forgo obtaining independent legal counsel by convincing her that the property settlement dispute should be resolved by a “neutral arbitrator.” The complaint alleges that the “neutral arbitrator” was actually representing the husband and, as a result, the appellant was deprived of a fair opportunity to present her claims to the court.
The trial court dismissed the count on a finding that the facts pleaded by the appellant constitute, at best, intrinsic fraud. In our view the facts alleged support an independent action based on extrinsic fraud.
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is critical to the case. Extrinsic fraud, unlike intrinsic fraud, is a ground for relief from judgment after the one-year period provided for in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) has passed.1 DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla.1984). See generally Gray, Rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure: In Search of an Equitable Standard for Relief from Fraud, 12 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 851 (1985).
The difference between extrinsic fraud and intrinsic fraud was explained in DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984). Extrinsic fraud concerns “conduct which is collateral to the issues tried in a case” while intrinsic fraud involves conduct within a proceeding that “pertains to the issues in the case that have been tried or could have been tried.” Id. at 377. Extrinsic fraud has been defined as the prevention of an unsuccessful party [from] presenting his case, by fraud or deception practices by his adversary; keeping the opponent away from court; falsely promising a compromise; ignorance of the adversary about the existence of the suit or the acts of the plaintiff; fraudulent representation of a party without his consent and connivance in his defeat; and so on.
DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d at 377 (quoting Fair v. Tampa Elec. Co., 158 Fla. 15, 18, 27 So. 2d 514, 515 (1946)).
The Court’s broad definition of extrinsic fraud in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 66, 25 L.Ed. 93, 95 (1878), included the situation “where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side ... and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial....”
Here, the complaint alleged facts showing that the husband and the attorney, by collusion and deception, prevented the wife from fully presenting her case to the court; such conduct is collateral to the substantive issues in the action, fits the legal description of extrinsic fraud and, if proved, would support appellant’s independent action for relief from judgment.
Accordingly, the order dismissing the appellant’s claim is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
. The "saving clause” of rule 1.540(b) provides: "This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court."
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M.L.B. and J.B. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 559 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…3.-082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987). If so, the actions of HRS would constitute a fraud upon the court; a result obtained by means of extrinsic fraud may be set aside at any time. DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla.1984); Whitman v. Whitman, 532 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami v. George Constr. Corp., 166 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). Calderon v. Torres, 445 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), did not address fraudulent concealment and is therefore not determinative…
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Guerriero v. Schaub, 579 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…g the “business assets” issue — he affirmatively advised the wife that his real estate holdings should not be dealt with or considered in connection with the dissolution proceedings. Although the majority notes that the facts of Whitman v. Whitman, 532 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), can be distinguished from the instant case, I believe that the [*373] same rationale applies. Through the husband’s deceptive behavior, the wife never presented her claims upon the husband’s business to the trial court. As former…1 / 2
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Karlis Guntis Fritsevich v. In re Est. OF Lydia Voss, 590 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…tituting a fraud upon the court, to which the one-year limitation of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), providing for relief from judgment, does not apply. See Arrieta-Gimenez v. Arrieta-Negron, 551 So. 2d 1184 (Fla.1989); Whitman v. Whitman, 532 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Feldan v. Goodman, 460 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); see also DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375, 378-79 (Fla.1984) (no time limitation under Rule 1.540(b) where extrinsic fraud prevents a party from having an opportunity to pr…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (U.S. 1878)
- DeCLAIRE v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984)
- Fair v. Tampa Elec. Co., 158 Fla. 15 (Fla. 1946)