HALL
v.
MEROLA
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The court held that the nature of a sexual battery conviction is not admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a) because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Plaintiff sought reconsideration of an order allowing impeachment evidence of his prior felony convictions. Specifically, he argued that the nature of…
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This case is scheduled for trial on October 26, 2020. At the October 6, 2020 pretrial conference, Plaintiff’s counsel moved the Court to reconsider part of its September 22, 2020 Order on Plaintiff’s motion in limine (Doc. 211; Order on Motion in Limine). In that Order, in pertinent part, the Court ruled that Defendant may “elicit testimony that Plaintiff is a convicted felon for purposes of impeachment under Rule 609(a), but Defendant must limit the scope of examination to the number, date, and nature of prior convictions,” including the “title” of the crime. See Order on Motion in Limine at 4. Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its Order with respect to the “nature” or “title” of his prior convictions for sexual battery.1 He argues such evidence is properly excluded under Rule
The Court afforded Defendant an opportunity to offer authority in opposition to Plaintiff’s ore tenus motion. See Order (Doc. 218). Defendant has not submitted anything for the Court’s consideration, and the time to do so has passed. The Court has reviewed the McCorvey case and finds it persuasive. And the Court’s independent research reveals other cases that have similarly concluded evidence of a witness’s prior conviction for sexual assault/battery or rape is properly excluded because of its potential to inflame the jury. See, e.g., Thomas v. Leifeld, No. 913CV321MADTWD, 2018 WL 3387690, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2018) (ruling the name and nature of the plaintiff’s rape, attempted rape, and sexual abuse convictions were not admissible because they were prejudicial and not highly probative of credibility); Dykes v. Cleveland Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., No. 4:15- CV-76-DMB-JMV, 2018 WL 2703135, at *1 (N.D. Miss. June 5, 2018) (permitting into evidence that the witness was convicted of a felony but not the nature of the felony—statutory rape). In light of the above and given Defendant has offered no authority opposing Plaintiff’s requested relief, the Court is persuaded to adopt the reasoning of the McCorvey, Thomas, and Dykes cases. A sexual battery conviction says little about a witness’s credibility, and the potential for unfair prejudice is great. The Federal Rules of Evidence and Eleventh Circuity authority authorize such a limitation on the introduction of prior conviction evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Burston, 159 F. 3d 1328, 1336 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that, by its incorporation of Rule 403, Rule 609(a)(1) implicitly assumes the probative value of prior conviction evidence “is likely to vary depending on the number and type of convictions”). Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s ore tenus motion. while Defendant may elicit that Plaintiff is a convicted felon for purposes of impeachment under Rule 609(a), Defendant may not reference by title Plaintiff’s convictions for sexual battery. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 22nd day of October 2020.
; af J. DAVIS United States District Judge
Jax-6 Cc: Counsel of Record