ABDULKADIR
v.
HARDIN
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The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding the amended complaint was not a shotgun pleading, claims were not moot, defendants were not entitled to immunity at this stage, and a plausible claim was stated.
Plaintiffs, former immigration detainees, alleged that defendants restricted their religious exercise while held at Glades County Detention Center. Th…
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Institutionalized Persons Act (RLIUPA);4 (2) Violation of the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act (FRFRA);5 and (3) Violation of the First And Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The FAC seeks damages against all
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)
1983. The Court need only briefly address each ground for dismissal sought by the Glades County Defendants.
1. Shotgun Pleading
Defendants argue the FAC is a shotgun pleading and violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and 10(b). A shotgun pleading is one that “fails to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F. 3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Defendants argue that the FAC is deficient because Plaintiffs adopt the antecedent allegations by reference into each count for relief. While the FAC realleges the factual allegations for each count (¶¶ 1-115); the counts are not re-
alleged and re-incorporated into successive counts. The Eleventh Circuit has expressly stated this pleading tactic does not create a shotgun pleading. See Id. at 1324. (“Weiland's re-alleging of paragraphs1 through 49 at the beginning of each count looks, at first glance, like the most common type of shotgun pleading. But it is not.”). The U.S. Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the pleading rules were to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The Court finds the factual allegations in the FAC are clearly stated and well-organized and provide the Glades Defendants with fair notice of Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court finds the FAC is not a shotgun pleading.
2. Mootness & Immunity
Defendants next argue that because Plaintiffs no longer are detained in GCDC their claims under RLUIPA and FRFRA must be dismissed. The FAC seeks no injunctive relief. Thus, that Plaintiffs are no longer detained does not moot Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages. Whether the Glades County Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity turns on whether each of the named defendants (Glades County, Glades Correctional Development
Corporation, David Hardon, John Booher, Sr., and Michelle Summers) was operating as an arm of the state as analyzed by the function test in Manders v. Lee, 338 F. 3d 1304, 1308 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2003)(en banc). See also McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997). At this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds no grounds to conclude that the Glades Defendants were operating as an arm of the state.6 Thus, based upon the pleadings, the Court finds the Glades County
ICE
Defendants have not demonstrated they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity for violations of the RLUIPA or Florida state sovereign immunity for violations of FRFRA. See e.g. Abusaid v. Hillsborough County Bd. Of County
Com’rs, 405 F. 3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2005); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)
3. Failure to State a Claim
Finally, Defendants contend that the FAC does not state a constitutional violation under the First Amendment. The Court disagrees that the FAC does not plausibly state a First Amendment claim. At this stage of the proceedings, the
Court accepts all facts asserted in the FAC as true and limits its consideration to the pleadings and attached exhibits. The Rules do not require the plaintiff to set out in detail the facts upon which his claim rests. Rather, the rules require only “a short and plain statement of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court finds the Plaintiffs sufficiently “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 570. Accordingly, it is now ORDERED: 1. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendants Glades County, Glades Correctional Development Corporation, David Hardon, John Booher, Sr., and Michelle Summers (Doc. 136) is DENIED.
2. Defendants Glades County, Glades Correctional Development
Corporation, David Hardon, John Booher, Sr., and Michelle Summers shall file a response to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint no later than November5, 2020. 3. Because this matter is set for mediation today, the Clerk shall immediately deliver a copy of this Order by email to the mediator, James Nulman, Esquire. DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 15, 2020.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies: All Parties of Record
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (U.S. 1957)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007)
- Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015)
- Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (U.S. 1990)
- McMILLIAN v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781 (U.S. 1997)
- Manders v. Thurman LEE, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003)
- Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs, 405 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2005)