BELL

v.

MIEDEMA

This automobile case is before the Court on Defendant Wesley Miedema’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 12), to which Plaintiffs Roscoe Bell and Nicol Bell responded in opposition, (Doc. 13). Miedema’s motion contends that the Bells lack standing and that a Georgia statute of limitations bars their personal injury claims. (Doc. 12 at 2–3).

I. BACKGROUND1

The Bells’ Complaint alleges that on March 25, 2017, Miedema, a resident of Vermont, and Roscoe Bell, a resident of Florida, were travelling in their respective motor vehicles on a highway in the state of Georgia. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3–5). While Roscoe Bell was driving on the interstate, Miedema rear-ended Roscoe

II. ANALYSIS

Miedema seeks dismissal of the Bells’ claims asserting that: Georgia law applies to the claims; that the Bells lack standing because Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions precludes the Bells’ claims; and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims because the

a. Proving Article III Standing The “‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements: the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, the defendant must have caused that injury, and a favorable decision must be likely to redress it.”

Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F. 3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). The party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court bears the burden of establishing these elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. At the motion to dismiss stage, courts must evaluate standing based on the facts alleged in the complaint, Shotz v. Cates, 256 F. 3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001), and a party’s burden is satisfied if it has alleged facts that plausibly establish standing, Trichell, 964 F. 3d at 996; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“[O]n a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”). Miedema argues that the Bells have not sufficiently proven that they have standing because the facts as alleged in the Complaint demonstrate that the Bells’ action is time-barred under Georgia’s statute of limitations governing personal injury claims. (Doc. 12 at 2–3). Miedema implies that as part of their burden to prove standing, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the statute of limitations relevant to their claims have not expired. However, “[a] statute of limitations bar is ‘an affirmative defense, and . . . plaintiff[s] [are] not required to negate an affirmative defense in [their] complaint.’” La Grasta v. First Union Securities, Inc., 358 F. 3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004). Simply put, a potential statute of limitations defense does not negate a plaintiff’s standing to bring a personal injury claim. And, Plaintiffs’ complaint otherwise sufficiently alleges standing. b. Dismissal on Statute of Limitation Grounds Courts generally treat a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds “as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), as opposed to under Rule 12(b)(1).” Nghiem v. U.S. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 451 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see, e.g., Pendarvis v. Helms, No. 8:04-cv-2261-T-27TGW, 2006 WL 2724901, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2006) (“Rule 12(b)(6) is the appropriate mechanism by which to dispose of a case on statute of limitations grounds.”). “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is ‘apparent from the face of the complaint’ that the claim is time-barred.” La Grasta, 358 F. 3d at 845. In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F. 3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, at least three states—Florida, where Plaintiffs reside, Georgia, where the collision took place, and Vermont, where Defendant allegedly resides³—may have a legitimate interest in the facts underlying this litigation, and these states’ statutes of limitations for tort claims differ. Georgia’s statute of limitations is two years for personal injury claims. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33 (2015). Florida’s statute of limitations for negligence actions is four years. FLA

STAT. § 95.11(3)(a) (2018); see also Elkins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2014). Vermont’s statute of limitations for personal injury is three years. VT. STAT. § 512(4) (2020). If Georgia law is applicable, Roscoe Bell’s personal injury claims would be time-barred; but if

Florida or Vermont law is applicable, the claims would be timely filed. It is, therefore, necessary to undertake a choice-of-law analysis.4 A federal district court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. Jeffers v. Kerzner Int’l Hotels Ltd., 319 F. Supp. 3d

1267, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (citing Trumpet Vine Inv., N.V. v. Union Capital Partners I, Inc., 92 F. 3d 1110, 1115 (11th Cir. 1996)). Here, Florida is the forum

Additionally, the Complaint does not reveal any prior contact or relationship between the parties up to, and until, their motor vehicles collided in Georgia. Id. The Court, however, is reluctant to rule on this potentially dispositive issue in the context of a motion to dismiss. It would be more appropriate for the Court to reach a conclusion as to whether Roscoe Bell’s personal injury claim is timebarred after further development of the record; additional information could shift the balance of the choice-of-law analysis. Cf. AXA Pacific Ins. Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. Irrevocable Trust, No. 15-24792-cv-King/Torres, 2017 WL

1439936, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2017) (determining that it would be inappropriate to issue a definitive ruling on a motion to apply Canadian law because the Court was lacking information that could be outcomedeterminative in the Court’s choice-of-law analysis). Thus, the Court will convert the motion to dismiss Roscoe Bell’s personal injury claim on statute of limitations grounds into a motion for summary judgment, grant the parties an opportunity to undertake limited discovery on the statute of limitations issue, and then engage in summary judgment practice.⁵ See, e.g., McEvoy v. Apollo Glob. Mgmt., LLC, No. 3:17-cv-891-J-32MCR, 2020 WL 60132, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2020). Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: 1. Defendant Miedema’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is DENIED as to

standing. Pursuant to Rule 12(d), the Court will convert the Motion to Dismiss as to the statute of limitations issue to a motion for summary judgment. In the summary judgment practice, the parties should also address whether Nicol Bell’s loss of consortium claim would remain

actionable, even if Roscoe Bell’s claims are barred by the Georgia statute of limitations. The parties may undertake limited discovery on the statute of limitations issue. Discovery shall be completed by November 6, 2020.

2. No later than November 25, 2020, Defendant shall file a fully- documented motion for summary judgment on whether the personal injury claims are time-barred.

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

United States District Judge tn Copies: Counsel of record