LA FONDRA ALLEN, APPELLANT,
v.
BURNESS SHOWS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
La Fondra Allen sued truck owner Burness Shows for injuries caused by the truck driver. The trial court granted summary judgment for the truck owner, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the owner cannot be held vicariously liable because the driver was operating the truck without the owner's consent and against his express orders.
The court held that vicarious liability of a truck owner requires either express or implied consent from the owner, and because the truck was being driven without defendant's consent and contrary to his specific orders, both forms of consent were lacking. Summary judgment was properly entered because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing adequate discovery time before ruling.
[1] A truck owner is not vicariously liable for injuries caused by the driver if the driver was operating the truck without the owner's express or implied consent and contrar…
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for summary judgment based on prematurity when the plaintiff has had ample opportunity to conduct discover…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“at the time of the accident the truck was being driven without defendant's consent and, in fact, contrary to his specific orders. Thus, contrary to plaintiff's contention, both express and implied consent of an owner, either of which is required in this kind of case for vicarious liability of the owner, are lacking.”
Establishes the legal requirement for vicarious liability and why it was not satisfied
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAt the time of the accident, the truck was being driven without the defendant owner's consent and contrary to his specific orders. The plaintiff had t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Express Consent cases and more on FLexlaw
LEHAN, Judge.
We affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant truck owner in this suit for injuries which had allegedly been caused to plaintiff by the driver of the truck.
The record before the trial court at the summary judgment hearing established that at the time of the accident the truck was being driven without defendant’s consent and, in fact, contrary to his specific orders. Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, both express and implied consent of an owner, either of which is required in this kind of case for vicarious liability of the owner, are lacking. See Pearson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 187 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).
Plaintiff also contends that a determination of defendant’s summary judgment motion was premature because plaintiff had not had an adequate opportunity to depose the driver. We disagree. The record shows that the trial judge deferred ruling on the summary judgment for nearly two months to permit such a deposition. He thereafter apparently deferred his ruling on plaintiffs motion for rehearing of the summary judgment to allow plaintiff an additional month to schedule that deposition. Plaintiff never deposed the driver although plaintiff had had the driver’s address for two months prior to the final ruling. Plaintiff engaged in no discovery from the time the complaint was filed in November 1986 until defendant’s deposition in August 1987. Under these circumstances there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court entering' the summary judgment. See DeMesme v. Stephenson, 498 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Southern California Funding, Inc. v. Hutto, 438 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), rev. den., 449 So. 2d 265 (1984).
AFFIRMED.
RYDER, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Cong. Park Off. Condos II, LLC v. First-Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 105 So. 3d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…t did not abuse its discretion in entering summary judgment, despite the pendency of discovery, because the defendant “had not been diligent in seeking discovery.” Id. at 431-32. The facts in this case more closely resemble those in Allen v. Shows, 532 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Allen held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment, despite the pendency of discovery, where it had given the non-moving party sufficient time to pursue discovery, but the party failed to do…
-
Lottie Mae Marshall and Anthony Marshall v. Gawel, 696 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…aterial fact as to Kathleen’s ownership. We also believe a genuine issue of material fact remains as to consent. In a case of vicarious liability, an owner’s express or implied consent for another to drive the vehicle must be shown. Allen v. Shows, 532 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Here, the affidavits rebut any claim of express consent. There remains, however, an issue as to whether Thomas Gawel had Kathleen Gaw-el’s implied consent to use the vehicle. The essential consent at issue is simply consent to th…
-
Virgilio Duarte v. Wetzel, 682 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…So. 2d 666 (Fla.1985). Where a person operates a vehicle without the express consent of the owner and contrary to specific instructions of the owner, there is no implied consent. Martinez v. Hart, 270 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Allen v. Shows, 532 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). We find these cases controlling. The uncontroverted facts are that Wagner was specifically told not to drive the car without permission and without Wetzel in the car. At no time was Wagner permitted to take the car out alone, an…
Authorities Cited
- Pearson v. ST. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 187 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Darius DeMESME v. Sam E. Stephenson, Jr., M.D., 498 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- S. Cal. Funding, Inc. v. Hutto, 438 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)