DODD
v.
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
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A motion to recuse a judge based on disagreement with judicial rulings is denied, as such disagreement does not demonstrate personal bias.
Plaintiff filed a motion to recuse the judge, citing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and alleging bias. The motion was based on the plaintiff's disagreement with t…
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Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Brian Dodd’s Motion to Recuse Judge Tuite [pursuant to] 28 U.S.C. 455(a). (Doc. 9).1 The statutory provision which Dodd cites in his motion—section 455(a)—states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The purpose of this provision is “to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process” and “to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859-60, 865 (1988) (citations omitted).
Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F. 3d 1270, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also Bolin, 225 F. 3d at 1239 (noting that “the allegation of bias must show that ‘the bias is personal as distinguished from judicial in nature’”) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 664 F. 2d 971, 1002 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)). Instead, “[t]he general rule is that bias sufficient to disqualify a judge must stem from extrajudicial sources.” Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F. 3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The only “exception to this rule is when a judge’s remarks in a judicial context demonstrate such pervasive bias and prejudice that it constitutes bias against a party.” Id.
Dodd’s allegations that the undersigned (or a member of his staff) is biased against him are wholly unfounded and would fail to convince any reasonable person that bias exists. While is it obvious that Dodd disagrees with the reasoning and recommendations set forth in the undersigned’s June 16, 2020, Report and Recommendation, such dissatisfaction is “judicial in nature,” Bolin, 225 F. 3d at 1239, and does not provide a valid basis to question the undersigned’s impartiality. Accordingly, Dodd’s Motion to Recuse Judge Tuite [pursuant to] 28 U.S.C. 455(a) (Doc. 9) is denied. DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 24th day of June 2020.
Orse elu Pp A. as KX
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. TUITE
United States Magistrate Judge Copies to: Pro se Plaintiff
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981)
- Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (U.S. 1988)
- Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000)
- Hank R. McWHORTER v. City OF Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1990)
- Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004)
- Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2002)