PATRICK A. STAFFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Patrick Stafford appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence discovered during a vehicle stop. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial stop was lawful based on the officer's observation that the vehicle was obstructing a traffic area.
The officer lawfully ordered appellant to move the vehicle based on the belief that it was obstructing the traffic area, and was entitled to request production of driver's license and vehicle registration in connection with that request. The subsequent observation of contraband in the vehicle during retrieval of the registration was lawful, and the motion to suppress was properly denied.
[1] A law enforcement officer may request a driver's license and vehicle registration when the driver is asked to move a vehicle obstructing traffic, even if no other traffic…
[2] An officer's observation of contraband in plain view while lawfully present outside a vehicle, as the driver retrieves registration, provides probable cause for arrest an…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The officer was entitled to ask appellant to move the vehicle and, in connection therewith, to request production of a driver's license and vehicle registration.”
Establishes that the initial stop was lawful and the officer had authority to request identification documents
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was occupying a vehicle around which a crowd of 10-12 people gathered in a paved area between two apartment buildings used for parking and t…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of a judgment of conviction and sentence for the offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, contending that the court should have granted appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence. We find that the motion was properly denied, and we affirm the judgment and sentence.
Testimony at the suppression hearing established that appellant was the occupant of a vehicle around which a crowd of ten to twelve individuals were gathered, in a paved area between two apartment buildings. These buildings were described as extending for the length of a block, with the paved area between them used for parking, vehicular access, and through traffic. A law enforcement officer drove into the area, which he noted is a high crime location known for drug transactions. Upon observing the officer the individuals around appellant’s vehicle immediately departed, some walking and others running. Appellant then exited his vehicle and also began walking away.
The officer approached appellant and requested that he move the vehicle. Although the pavement contained no markings regarding parking or driving lanes, and there was no other traffic at the moment, the officer indicated that appellant’s vehicle was obstructing the area normally used for access and through traffic. After appellant moved his vehicle to the usual parking area, and again exited the vehicle, the officer requested appellant’s driver’s license and vehicle registration. Appellant produced his driver’s license and went to the vehicle to retrieve the registration. When appellant opened the glove compartment for this purpose the officer, standing outside the vehicle, observed several rounds of ammunition and a small white packet which appeared to contain cocaine. The officer arrested appellant and searched the vehicle, discovering additional physical evidence.
Appellant argues that the evidence was discovered as the result of an unlawful stop, relying on Kearse v. State, 384 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). However, the present case involves factors not found in Kearse, including the circumstance that appellant was attempting to leave his vehicle parked in a manner which the officer felt would obstruct traffic. The officer was entitled to ask appellant to move the vehicle and, in connection therewith, to request production of a driver’s license and vehicle registration. In this regard the officer noted that he not only desired to ascertain appellant’s identity and ownership of the vehicle, but was also contemplating issuing a citation for improper parking. The subsequent observation of contraband within appellant’s vehicle, as appellant purported to obtain his registration, entitled the officer to arrest appellant and conduct a further search of the vehicle. See Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1981). The evidence was thus lawfully ob tained/ and appellant’s motion to suppress was properly denied.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Watson v. State, 689 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…officer, after stopping Watson for the traffic infraction, could properly request to see the vehicle registration even after returning the driver’s license and even without Watson’s statement as to the ownership of the vehicle. In Stafford v. State, 532 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), the court upheld the arrest of a motorist when cocaine was discovered while the motorist was retrieving his registration. The court observed: The officer was entitled to ask appellant to move the vehicle and, in connectio…
Authorities Cited
- Elton E. Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1981)
- Newman v. State, 384 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)