WALTERS
v.
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC
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The court held that severance of claims was appropriate due to substantial factual differences among the plaintiffs' cases, despite the common engine defect.
Forty-one plaintiffs sued BMW alleging damages from excessive oil consumption in their vehicles and failure to honor warranties. The plaintiffs had pr…
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INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS”
This matter is before the Court on Defendant BMW of North America’s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative, Sever the Individual Plaintiffs’ Claims,” filed on March 27, 2019. (Doc. # 34). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition on May1, 2019. (Doc. # 40). The Court conducted a hearing on September 11, 2019. (Doc. # 59).1 Having carefully considered the motion, response, court file, and the record, the Court finds that for reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is granted to the extent that all claims, other than those alleged by the firstnamed Plaintiff, Cheryl Walters, will be severed and dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiffs’ cases appear to have arisen in the Middle District of Florida, and only eight (8) within the Middle District’s Tampa Division. Only one of the forty-one Plaintiffs, Cheryl Walters, paid a filing fee. Each of the forty-one Plaintiffs allege they purchased different vehicle models at different times from various dealerships throughout the United States.3 All of the vehicles in question contained essentially the same allegedly defective N63 engine.
Some Plaintiffs experienced oil issues shortly after purchase, and others experienced
10398671, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2017); Barber v. Am.’s Wholesale Lender, 289 F.R.D. 364, 367 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (“[D]istrict courts enjoy equally broad discretion to sever parties based on misjoinder.”). Analysis After careful consideration, the Court finds that severance in this case is appropriate. Initially, the Court notes there are substantial factual differences among the Plaintiffs’ claims. Each vehicle involved here had the same N63 engine, but that engine was contained in vehicles that differed by model year, make, mileage, oil consumption, maintenance history, and purchase location. As such, even if the fortyone Plaintiffs here satisfy the two-prong test for joinder, the differences between their claims are too numerous to promote judicial economy. Under Rule 21, Fed. R. Civ. P., courts consider the following factors in determining whether to sever claims: “(1) the interest of avoiding prejudice and delay; (2) ensuring judicial economy; (3) safeguarding principles of fundamental fairness; and (4) whether different witnesses and documentary proof would be required for plaintiffs’ claims.” Torres, 2017 WL 10398671, at *2. It is clear that the resolution of each Plaintiff’s claim will require a separate analysis of the year, make, model, mileage, and maintenance history of each vehicle. Moreover, each Plaintiff purchased their respective vehicle from different dealers across the United States on separate occasions, and each Plaintiff had their vehicle serviced at different dealers, at different times and places. As such, each claim would involve different witnesses, located in various places across Florida and the country, and separate documentary proof. Under these factual circumstances, the Court finds that severance, rather than joinder, of Plaintiffs’ claims is necessary to promote judicial efficiency. Because misjoinder of parties is not grounds for dismissal of an action, the Court severs the claims of all parties, except for Ms. Walters. Therefore, the parties with severed claims are dismissed without prejudice and may, if they choose, refile their claims in the appropriate jurisdiction and venue after paying the required filing fees. See In re Seroquel Prod. Liab. Litig., No. (O6MD-1769-ORL-22DAB, 2007 WL 737589, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2007); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-28, 295 F.R.D. 527, 534 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he only economy that litigating these cases as a single action would achieve is an economy to the [p]laintiff—the economy of not having to pay a separate filing fee for each action brought.”). It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED: 1. Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative, Sever the Individual Plaintiffs’ Claims” (Doc. # 34) is HEREBY GRANTED. 2. All claims, other than those alleged by the first-named Plaintiff, Cheryl Walters, are HEREBY SEVERED AND DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and may be commenced in separate individual actions. 3. The statute of limitations for any claim asserted in this case is deemed tolled during the pendency of this action and for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida this 22nd day of November, 2019.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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