BAUMANN
v.
MICHAEL
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The court held that a third-party defendant cannot remove an action, and the removal was objectively unreasonable, warranting attorney fees.
A third-party defendant removed a case to federal court, invoking federal question jurisdiction. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing a third-party …
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In the instant action, pro se Third Party Defendant Jonathan Michael (“Michael”) removed the case here, invoking federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff PNC Bank, National Association (“PNC”) moved to remand on the basis that a third party defendant may not remove actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). (Doc. 5.) Finding remand appropriate, the Court granted in part PNC’s motion to remand and gave PNC leave to file documents in support of its request for attorney fees. (Doc. 6.) PNC then moved for attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), arguing Michael lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. (Doc. 17 (“Motion”).) Michael didn’t respond. On referral, U.S. Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick recommends granting the
Motion—not just because it’s unopposed but because Michael’s removal was “wholly improper.” (Doc. 18 (“R&R”).) Michael then objected to the R&R on two grounds: (1) his Objection is timely, so he has responded; and (2) his third-party removal was proper, and he mistakenly referenced the wrong subsection. (Doc. 19 (“Objection”).) PNC countered that: (1) Michael failed to respond to the Motion at issue; rather, he objected to an earlier motion for attorneys’ fees and costs; and (2) the Court has already determined that removal was “wholly improper.” (Doc. 20.) On de novo review, the Court overrules Michael’s Objection.1 The Court will not re-litigate the issue of remand, and the record establishes that Michael’s removal was “wholly improper.” (Doc. 6, p. 1.) This means Michael “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal,” and PNC’s request for attorney’s fees may be granted. See
Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Irick that PNC’s award request is reasonable and appropriate in this case. (Doc. 18, p. 2.) Thus, the Court will adopt the R&R and overrule the Objection.
IV. CONCLUSION
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on August 27, 2019.
we ROY B. DALTON JR: United States District Judge
Copies to: Counsel of Record Pro se party
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Martin et ux. v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (U.S. 2005)
- Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. OF Educ. OF State OF Ga., 896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990)