ERNEST D. DUNN AND KATHLEEN DUNN, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
BRUCE SCHURGA AND YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF ST. PETERSBURG, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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Ernest Dunn was struck by a fourth vehicle while inspecting damage from an initial collision caused by defendant Schurga's cab. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants based on an independent intervening cause doctrine, but the appellate court reversed, holding that foreseeability of the intervening cause is a question of fact for the jury.
The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that foreseeability of an intervening cause is a question of fact for the trier of fact, not a matter of law. The case is distinguishable from Department of Transportation v. Anglin and more closely aligned with Gibson v. Avis and Zwinge v. Hettinger.
[1] The foreseeability of an intervening cause is a question of fact for the trier of fact.
[2] A subsequent negligent act may be an intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation if it is not foreseeable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the negligence of the driver of the fourth car was ruled to have been, as a matter of law, an independent, efficient intervening cause of Dunn's injuries which broke the chain of causation between the defendants' alleged negligence and those injuries”
Describes the trial court's basis for granting summary judgment using the intervening cause doctrine
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Ernest Dunn's car was struck from behind by defendant Schurga's cab at a red light. Dunn exited his car to inspect damage. A fourth vehicle …
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LEHAN, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal a final summary judgment for defendants in a personal injury action arising from a multiple vehicle automobile accident. Notwithstanding the well presented argument on behalf of defendants, we reverse.
Plaintiff Ernest Dunn was in his car stopped at a red light at an intersection when his car was struck from behind by a cab driven by defendant Bruce Schurga and owned by defendant Yellow Cab Company of St. Petersburg. As Schurga moved his cab out of the street, Dunn got out of his car to inspect the damage. Meanwhile, a third car stopped behind Dunn’s ear. Before Dunn could get back into his car, a fourth ear collided with the third car, bounced off the third car, and struck Dunn, causing the injuries to him alleged in this suit. That collision also caused the third car to hit, first, Dunn’s car and, then, the cab. The speed limit on the road, which afforded to approaching motorists an unobstructed view of the intersection, was 35 m.p.h.
Plaintiffs instituted this suit against the above-named defendants for personal injuries sustained when Dunn was struck by the fourth car. (Their suit against the driver and owner of that car was settled.) Schurga and Yellow Cab moved for summary judgment which the trial court granted and which is the subject of this appeal. The apparent basis for the summary judgment was that the negligence of the driver of the fourth car was ruled to have been, as a matter of law, an independent, efficient intervening cause of Dunn’s injuries which broke the chain of causation between the defendants’ alleged negligence and those injuries, as in Department of Transportation v. Anglin, 502 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1987), which the trial court cited.
We agree with appellants’ argument on appeal that the facts of this case appear more closely aligned with Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla.1980), in which it was concluded that the foreseeability of an intervening cause was a question of fact for the trier of fact.
The facts of this case appear even more closely aligned with Zwinge v. Hettinger, 530 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), which reached a result like that in Gibson. For recitations of facts of Anglin, Gibson, and Zwinge, see Zwinge, 530 So. 2d at 319-23. See Zwinge also for a particular difference between the facts of Anglin as compared to those of Gibson, Zwinge and the case at hand as to lack of foreseeability as a matter of law. 530 So. 2d at 322.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
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To Pyo CHO v. MacKey, 567 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)….g., Gibson at 522; Matthews v. Williford, 318 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). The harm that occurred was within the scope of danger attributable to the original actor’s negligence. This factual question is reserved for the jury. See Dunn v. Schurga, 533 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Here, the action of Mackey in rear-ending Cho’s vehicle was not remote. In fact, rear-end collisions are a common occurrence where cars ahead have reason to decrease their speed. Accordingly, it was for the jury to determine whe…
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McCOY v. Harsco Corp., 616 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…se and proximate cause based on conflicting evidence are questions which must be determined by the trier of fact and not by court on a motion for directed verdict. See Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla.1980); Dunn v. Schurga, 533 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Zwinge v. Hettinger, 530 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Martinez v. Clark Equip. Co., 382 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Further, “in considering a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must review the evidence in the ligh…
Authorities Cited
- Gibson v. AVIS Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980)
- Dep't OF Transp. v. Cleopatra Gayle Anglin, 502 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1987)
- Zwinge v. Hettinger, 530 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)