DAVID L. KENNEDY, JONES MEDICAL INSTRUMENT COMPANY, WILLIAM C. JONES, AND GABRIELLE S. GANG, APPELLANTS,
v.
THOMAS H. REED, APPELLEE
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The Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's order denying appellants' motion to quash service of process and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants under Florida's long arm statute, even though the complaint referenced a contractual jurisdiction clause and alleged that the defendants were agents or principals of a Florida corporation.
Florida courts do not have personal jurisdiction over the appellants. The contractual jurisdiction clause is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over objecting out-of-state defendants who were not parties to the contract. General allegations that defendants were agents or principals of a Florida corporation do not establish jurisdiction over individuals for acts performed in their capacity as agents. The complaint fails to allege specific acts occurring in Florida or sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy constitutional due process requirements.
[1] A plaintiff must plead sufficient material facts to establish a basis for personal jurisdiction under Florida's long arm statute.
[2] A contractual provision submitting parties to Florida jurisdiction is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over objecting out-of-state defendants who are not parties to th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Such a provision alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over objecting out-of-state defendants.”
Establishes that a contractual jurisdiction clause cannot by itself establish jurisdiction over non-signatory out-of-state defendants.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThomas Reed contracted with Datamatic Services Corporation, a Florida corporation, to purchase two medical testing devices (spirometers). Reed's compl…
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THREADGILL, Judge.
This appeal is from a nonfinal order determining that Florida courts have in per-sonam jurisdiction over these out-of-state appellants pursuant to Ch. 48.193, Fla.Stat. (1987), the Florida long arm statute. The appellants, a corporation and several individual officers of various corporations who are among the named defendants, contend that the facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction and that the trial court thus erred in denying their motion to dismiss and quash service of process. We agree and reverse.
The appellee, Thomas Reed, plaintiff below, contracted with Datamatic Services Corporation, a Florida corporation, to purchase two medical testing devices known as spirometers and sold as the Tiffenaire Respiratory Surveillance System. His complaint against Datamatic and other defendants, including the appellants, alleged securities violations, fraud and misrepresentation. The appellants moved to quash service of process and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and filed supporting affidavits. The motions were denied and this interlocutory appeal was timely filed.
In Florida, a plaintiff is required to plead sufficient material facts to establish a basis for personal jurisdiction, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110(b) (1987), and failure to allege a basis for long arm jurisdiction under Ch. 48.193 voids any service of process pursuant to Ch. 48.194. Kimbrough v. Rowe, 479 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Mouzon v. Mouz-on, 458 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). See also Laney v. Laney, 487 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
The only express jurisdictional allegation in the complaint is based on a paragraph in the contract between Reed and Datamatic. This paragraph provided that the contract would be construed and enforced in accord with Florida law and that, by execution of the contract, the parties submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of Florida courts for litigation arising from the contract. Such a provision alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over objecting out-of-state defendants. McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla.1987); Vaughn v. AAA Employment, Inc., 511 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Even were such a provision adequate, reliance on that clause is misplaced in this case because the appellants were not parties to the contract and are thus not bound by its terms.
Personal jurisdiction must, therefore, be based on other allegations in the complaint. Florida’s long arm statute, Ch. 48.193, grants jurisdiction over those who commit any of the acts specified in the statute. We agree with the appellants’ contention that the complaint does not allege specific acts that occurred in Florida which tie the appellants to Florida. Nor do we find any allegations that these appellants had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida such that they should reasonably anticipate being sued in Florida. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The complaint alleges damages in Florida, but this alone does not confer jurisdiction. Phillips v. Orange Co., Inc., 522 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
In the complaint, the appellee alleged generally that all defendants were either agents or principals of each other. Appellee now contends that jurisdiction over Datamatic, with whom he contracted, confers jurisdiction over all agents and principals of Datamatic, including the appellants. This argument fails because jurisdiction will not lie over an individual because of acts performed in his capacity as agent for another. Bloom v. A.H. Pond Company, 519 F.Supp. 1162 (S.D.Fla.1981). See also Turner v. Lawton, 473 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
In summary, we find that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to bring appellants within the ambit of the long arm statute and, therefore, reverse.
REVERSED.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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DOE v. Jere William Thompson, 620 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1993)…distinction between a corporate officer acting on one’s own and a corporate officer acting on behalf of one’s corporation is set out clearly in Bloom v. A.H. Pond Co., 519 F.Supp. 1162, 1170-71 (S.D.Fla.1981) (cited with approval in Kennedy v. Reed, 533 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA1988)). This distinction is recognized in many other jurisdictions; it is referred to as the “corporate shield” or “fiduciary shield” doctrine. See Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 529 A. 2d 956 (1987) and cases cited there (act…
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Wiggins v. Tigrent, Inc., 147 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…So. 2d 1004, 1006 n. 1 (Fla.1993), it is well settled that the acts of a corporate employee performed in a corporate capacity do not form the basis for personal jurisdiction over that employee, Thompson, 620 So. 2d at 1006. See also Kennedy v. Reed, 533 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (“[J]urisdiction will not lie over an individual because of acts performed in his capacity as agent for another.”); Bloom v. A.H. [*88] Pond Co., 519 F.Supp. 1162, 1170-71 (S.D.Fla.1981) (“[Ujnless the agents transact busine…
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Pool v. Brewer, 602 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1992)…h respect to investigation, adjustment, compromise, and settlement of covered claims.” Ga.Code Ann. § 33-36-13 (Michie 1990). Jurisdiction over the principal (Allied), however, does not confer jurisdiction over the agent (GIIP). See Kennedy v. Reed, 533 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). . We choose not to follow the rationale in Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., 954 F. 2d 1553 (11th Cir.1992), wherein the Eleventh Circuit recently reviewed a similar situation and held that the statutory insurance guaranty associ…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Int'l Shoe Co. v. State OF Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (U.S. 1945)
- C.R. McRAE v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987)
- Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Bloom v. AH Pond Co., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
- Kimbrough v. Rowe, 479 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Phillips v. Orange Co., Inc., 522 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Laney v. Laney, 487 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Vaughn v. AAA Emp., Inc., 511 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Turner v. Lawton, 473 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)