EDGAR GEROLD BATIE, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a person convicted of sexual battery of a child eleven years old or younger is ineligible for postconviction bond, despite the Court's prior determination that sexual battery is not a capital crime punishable by death. The Court resolved a conflict between district courts regarding the applicability of the capital crime limitation in Florida's bail rules.
A person convicted of sexual battery under section 794.011(2) is ineligible for postconviction bond. Although sexual battery is not a capital crime punishable by death, the legislature's definition of it as capital in the statute and the Court's rules were enacted with the intent to deny postconviction bail for this offense, and that intent is not altered by the determination that death is not an available penalty.
[1] A person convicted of sexual battery of a person eleven years old or less is ineligible for postconviction bond.
[2] The legislature's definition of a crime as "capital" may be considered to determine legislative intent for other consequences of that crime, even if the death penalty is…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A capital felony is one that is punishable by death. Rusaw v. State, 451 So. 2d 469 (Fla.1984). Sexual battery is not punishable by death. Buford.”
Establishes the legal distinction between the statutory classification of a crime as capital and whether it is actually punishable by death.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBatie was convicted of sexual battery upon a person less than twelve years old by a person eighteen years or older under Florida Statute section 794.0…
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McDonald, justice.
We accepted jurisdiction in this cause because of conflict with Nussdorf v. State, 495 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), review denied, 503 So. 2d 328 (Fla.1987). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The issue is whether a person convicted of sexual battery of a person eleven years old or less is eligible for consideration for postconviction bond. The district court of appeal answered this question in the negative. Batie v. State, 521 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We agree and approve the district court’s decision.
Batie, having been convicted of sexual battery upon a person less than twelve years old by a person eighteen years or older, contrary to subsection 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1985), sought postconviction bond. The trial judge and the district court of appeal held that, because the legislature defined subsection 794.011(2) as a capital crime, and under the express terms of rule 3.691(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Batie was ineligible for release. Batie’s claim to the contrary is predicated on our holding in Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1037, 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982), that death is not a permitted punishment for a conviction of sexual battery because it would be cruel and unusual punishment for the crime. Following Buford, we clearly and succinctly stated in Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122, 123 (Fla.1987):
A capital felony is one that is punishable by death. Rusaw v. State, 451 So. 2d 469 (Fla.1984). Sexual battery is not punishable by death. Buford. Further, we held in Rowe v. State, 417 So. 2d 981 (Fla.1982), that murder in the first-degree is the only existing capital felony in Florida.Sexual battery is not a capital offense, and, therefore, it may be charged by information. See also State v. Hogan, 451 So. 2d 844 (Fla.1984) (sexual battery is not punishable by death, and therefore, it may be tried by a six-member jury).
Notwithstanding our determination that the sexual battery proscribed by subsection 794.011(2) is no longer a capital crime, in Rusaw and Hogan we recognized the legislature’s definition of it as “capital” in determining legislative intent for other consequences of this crime. We view both legis lation and our rules at the time of their enactment to determine legislative and judicial intent. Both the statute and our rules precede Buford. Clearly, it was the -intent of both the legislature and this Court to deny postconviction bail to a person convicted of sexual battery upon a child of the age of eleven years or younger. Our holding in Buford that death is not an available penalty did not change the premise for the legislation or rule in that regard. The trial court and the district court of appeal correctly found Batie ineligible for bail. We therefore approve Batie and disapprove Nussdorf.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. BARKETT, J., dissents with an opinion.
BARKETT, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe that Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1037, 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982), and Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1977), require the quashing of the opinion of the district court. In Reino, this Court stated:
[I]t is apparent that all incidents of capital crimes, substantive as well as procedural, become inapplicable upon abolition of the death penalty. It would be conceptually inconsistent to conclude that the procedural advantages inuring to a defendant in a capital case fall with abolition of the death penalty and then conclude that the substantive disadvantages (limitation on entitlement to bail and unlimited statute of limitations) remain viable.
Id. at 858 (emphasis added).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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State v. Griffith, 561 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1990)…. In State v. Hogan, 451 So. 2d 844 (Fla.1984), we noted that the legislature’s classification of the sexual battery proscribed by § 794.011(2), Fla.Stat. (1985), as a capital crime determined several other consequences of the crime. Batie v. State, 534 So. 2d 694 (Fla.1988). See Rusaw v. State, 451 So. 2d 469 (Fla.1984). . Art. I, § 22, Fla.Const., states that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be…
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State v. Boatwright, 559 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1990)…elony in Florida. His contention that sexual battery upon a child under the age of twelve in violation of section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1985), is no longer a capital felony for any purpose has been rejected by this Court. See Batie v. State, 534 So. 2d 694 (Fla.1988). Subsequent to the holding of this Court in Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1037, 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982), that death is not a permitted punishment for a conviction of sexual battery of a…
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Perez v. State, 545 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1989)…Rusaw v. State, 451 So. 2d 469 (Fla.1984) ] and Hogan [State v. Hogan, 451 So. 2d 844 (Fla.1984) ] we recognized the legislature’s definition of it as “capital” in determining legislative intent for other consequences of this crime." Batie v. State, 534 So. 2d 694 (Fla.1988). . Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (decision abolished the death penalty).…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Fundora, 513 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1987)
- Frederick A.R. Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1987)
- State v. Hogan, 451 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1984)
- Rusaw v. State, 451 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1984)
- Rushing v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1977)
- Bagstad v. Orange Cnty. Transit Dist., 454 U.S. 1163 (U.S. 1982)
- Johns-Manville Corp. v. White, 454 U.S. 1163 (U.S. 1982)
- Renaldo Reino, Sr. v. The State of Fla. & the Honorable Gerald T. Wetherington, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1977)
- Rowe v. State, 417 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1982)