HARRY GROSSMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
BANCO INDUSTRIAL DE VENEZUELA, C.A., MIAMI AGENCY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court affirmed that a maker of a note cannot use parol evidence to escape an unconditional promise to pay based on an oral representation from the payee that payment is not required.
A maker of a note is precluded by the parol evidence rule from contending that an oral representation from the payee relieves him of his unconditional obligation to pay.
[1] A maker of a promissory note is barred by the parol evidence rule from proving an oral representation by the payee that the maker need not pay the note.
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrossman executed a note to Banco Industrial de Venezuela and claimed he was orally told by the payee that he need not pay it.…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Unconditional Promise To Pay cases and more on FLexlaw
SCWARTZ, Chief Judge.
We affirm the judgment below upon the holding that, as a matter of law, the maker of a note is precluded by the parol evidence rule from successfully contending that he may be relieved of his unconditional promise to pay by a directly contrary oral representation of the payee that he need not. Schwartz v. Zaconick, 68 So. 2d 173 (Fla.1954); E.J. Sparks Enters., Inc. v. Christman, 95 Fla. 928, 117 So. 388 (1928); Forbes v. Ft. Lauderdale Mercantile Co., 83 Fla. 66, 90 So. 821 (1922); Bodne v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A., 523 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Can-Am Invs., Inc. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A., 521 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Marlar, 761 F. 2d 1517 (11th Cir.1985), vacated per stipulation, 774 F. 2d 1042 (11th Cir.1985); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Rood, 698 F. 2d 435 (11th Cir.1983).
But cf. Nagelbush v. United Postal Sav. Ass’n, 504 So. 2d 782 (Fla.3d DCA 1987) (fraudulent promise to co-makers that other co-makers will pay joint obligation may be relied upon).
Compare Payne v. Nicholson, 100 Fla. 1459, 131 So. 324 (1930) (collateral fraudulent promise may be relied upon).
AFFIRMED.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Sandoval v. Coll, 561 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Grossman v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, C.A., 534 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).…
-
Intercontinental Inv. Bankers, Inc. v. First Union Nat'l Bank OF Fla., 608 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Grossman v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A., 534 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).…
-
Sunflower Bazaar, Inc. v. Fla. First Int'l Bank, 610 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…[*644] PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Grossman v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, C.A., 534 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d DCA1988); § 687.0304, Fla.Stat. (1991).…
Authorities Cited (12 total)
- Forbes v. The Fort Lauderdale Mercantile Co., 83 Fla. 66 (Fla. 1922)
- Schwartz v. Zaconick, 68 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1953)
- Linear Corp. & S of L Elecs., Inc. v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- E. J. Sparks Enters., Inc. v. Christman, 95 Fla. 928 (Fla. 1928)
- Lundy v. Hettie Hunter Lundy, 100 Fla. 1512 (Fla. 1930)
- Payne v. Nicholson, 100 Fla. 1459 (Fla. 1930)
- Chase Manhattan Bank v. E.B. Rood, 698 F.2d 435 (11th Cir. 1983)
- Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Marlar, 761 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1985)
- Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Marlar, 774 F.2d 1042 (11th Cir. 1985)
- Nagelbush v. Capozzi and Margaret A. Capozzi, 504 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)