BLOCKER
v.
SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
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In a Social Security benefits case, the district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommendation granting plaintiff's unopposed motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), awarding $3,617.79 in fees representing 25% of past-due benefits after deducting previously awarded EAJA fees.
The court granted plaintiff's unopposed motion and awarded $3,617.79 in attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), representing 25% of past-due benefits after deducting previously awarded EAJA fees, as the fee was found to be reasonable.
[1] A district court must conduct a de novo review of a magistrate judge's findings when a party files a proper, specific objection to a factual finding.
[2] When a party has not properly objected to a magistrate judge's findings, the district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the recor…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation”
Establishes the standard of review when a party has not properly objected to a magistrate judge's findings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Brandon Blocker sought authorization to charge a reasonable attorney's fee in a Social Security benefits case. The magistrate judge found th…
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THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Plaintiff Brandon Blocker's (“Plaintiff") Unopposed Request for Authorization to Charge a Reasonable Fee and Memorandum on Reasonable Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (“Motion” or “Mot.”) (ECF No. 24). The Motion was referred to the Honorable Lauren F. Louis, United States Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 25) who issued a Report and Recommendation, (“R&R”) (ECF No. 26), recommending that the Motion be GRANTED. No objections to the R&R were filed, and the time to do so has now passed. The matter is now ripe for review. As set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R.
The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). The Court "must consider de novo any objection to the magistrate judge's recommendation.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). A de novo review is therefore required if a party files “a proper, specific objection" to a factual finding contained in the report. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). “It is critical that the objection be sufficiently specific and not a general
objection to the report” to warrant de novo review. Id. Yet when a party has not properly objected to the magistrate judge's findings, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” See Keaton v. United States, No. 14-21230-CIV, 2015 WL 12780912, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2015); see also Lopez v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-24263, 2019 WL 2254704, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019) (stating that a district judge "evaluate[s] portions of the R & R not objected to under a clearly erroneous standard of review" (citing Davis v. Apfel, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2000))).
In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Louis concludes that (1) Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), less the EAJA fees previously awarded, (2) the fee sought by Plaintiffs counsel is reasonable and no reduction to the fee is necessary, and (3) Plaintiff may recover $8,838.75, less the EAJA fees previously awarded, for a net fee of $3,617.79, reflecting 25 percent of past-due benefits awarded to Plaintiff. R&R at 2-4. This Court agrees.
Accordingly, UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the R&R, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the R&R (ECF No. 26) is ADOPTED. Plaintiff's Unopposed Request for Authorization to Charge a Reasonable Fee is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded $3,617.79 pursuant in attorney's fees to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1).
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 7th day of March, 2025.
K. MICHAEL MOORE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
c: All counsel of record