RONALDA SINGLETON, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
DAVID O. RANZ, M.D., ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed a summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice claim brought by a mother who alleged that a physician's negligence caused injury to her unborn fetus. The court held that while an unborn fetus is not a 'person' under Florida's Wrongful Death Act, a mother may recover for negligent injury to the fetus as injury to her own body.
A mother may maintain a cause of action for negligent or intentional tortious injury to her unborn fetus, treating such injury as injury to her own body rather than as a separate wrongful death claim. Although an unborn fetus is not a legal 'person' for purposes of the Wrongful Death Act, it constitutes living tissue of the mother's body for which she may recover damages for negligent injury.
[1] An unborn fetus is not a legal person for the wrongful death of whom a tortfeasor is liable to survivors under the Wrongful Death Act.
[2] An unborn fetus is considered living tissue of the mother's body for the negligent or intentional tortious injury to which the mother has a legal cause of action.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An unborn fetus is either a new and separate human being or "person," temporarily residing within the womb of the host mother, OR it is a part of the mother's body, OR both.”
Establishes the court's framework for analyzing fetal status in tort law
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff Singleton alleged that defendant physician Dr. Ranz's negligence caused injury to her unborn fetus. The defendant sought summary judgmen…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Bodily Injury cases and more on FLexlaw
COWART, Judge.
An unborn fetus is either a new and separate human being or “person,” temporarily residing within the womb of the host mother, OR it is a part of the mother’s body, OR both. The Florida Supreme Court has held that, in legal contemplation, an unborn fetus is not a person for the wrongful death of whom a tortfeasor is liable to its survivors for damages under the Wrongful Death Act (§ 768.19, Fla. Stat.);1 therefore, it is living tissue of the body of the mother for the negligent or intentional tortious injury to which the mother has a legal cause of action the same as she has for a wrongful injury to any other part of her body.2 The complaint in this case alleges that cause of action3 and it cannot be ruled as a matter of law that the injury she alleges is without legal damages.4 There are genuine issues of fact as to whether or not the defendant doctor was guilty of medical negligence, whether any such negligence caused or contributed to bodily injury to the plaintiff woman and the damages, if any, resulting to her and her husband as a result of any such bodily injuries to her. Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of the defendants is reversed.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DANIEL, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla.1980); Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla.1978) and Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla.1977).
. Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 213 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla.1968); Simon v. United States, 438 F.Supp. 759 (S.D.Fla.1977); Occhipinti v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 252 Miss. 172, 172 So. 2d 186 (1965); Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933); Smith v. Overby, 30 Ga. 241 (1860); Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 348 S.E. 2d 233 (1986); Johnson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 123 Cal.App.3d 1002, 177 Cal.Rptr. 63 (1981); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A. 2d 140 (1964); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A. 2d 1085 (1985); Ledford v. Martin, 87 N.C.App. 88, 359 S.E. 2d 505, rev. denied, 321 N.C. 473, 365 S.E. 2d 1 (1988).
. This case is distinguished from Abdelaziz v. A.M.I.S.U.B. of Florida, Inc., 515 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 525 So. 2d 876 (Fla.1988), because in that case the plaintiff mother conceded that she sustained no physical injuries to herself and attempted to allege a claim for the negligent infliction of mental distress resulting from the wrongful death of her fetus which the appellate court there found was, in substance, merely an attempt to circumvent existing case law holding that the Wrongful Death Statute does not provide for recovery of damages for loss of a stillborn fetus. See also Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 213 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla.1968).
. Injuria absque damno.
DAUKSCH, Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree the summary judgment should be reversed because it was sufficiently established that the appellant suffered injury directly to her body and other resultant injuries and damages. There is an issue of fact regarding appellees’ having caused the injuries. No specific ruling was made by the trial court regarding the question whether a mother can seek damages for her physical and emotional injuries suffered as a result of having to carry and deliver a stillborn child. See Abdelaziz v. A.M.I.S.U.B. of Florida, Inc., 515 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Because the order is nonspecific and because various injuries are alleged I am not prepared at this time to say which injuries can form the basis for a legal action, and which cannot.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Tanner v. Ellie M. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1997)…n the meaning of the statute. The basis upon which the district court of appeal had earlier approved Phyllis’s personal injury claim was that the complaint alleged physical injury to her body. The court relied upon the opinion in Singleton v. Ranz, 534 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), which stated: An unborn fetus is either a new and separate human being or “person,” temporarily residing within the womb of the host mother, OR it is a part of the mother’s body, OR both. The Florida Supreme Court has held that…
-
Gracie Waddell v. Shoney's, Inc., 664 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…be said that the jury verdict was excessive or shocking. As to Shoney’s cross-appeal, we hold that the trial court properly admitted evidence that Waddell suffered mental distress related to her concern for the fetus. See [*1137] Singleton v. Ranz, 534 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), review denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla.1989); R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 652 So. 2d 360 (Fla.1995). We quash the order granting remittitur or a new trial for damages only and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury ve…
-
Carmen and George Bombalier v. Lifemark Hosp. OF Fla., 661 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…that of Christian’s estate for his wrongful death. Carmen has a cause of action for personal injury stemming from the stillborn fetus, as living tissue of her body, McGeehan v. Parke-Davis, 573 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Singleton v. Ranz, 534 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), review denied, 542 So. 2d 1334 (Fla.1989); while, George and Carmen, as personal representatives of Christian’s estate, also have a statutory cause of action for his wrongful death. §§ 768.16-.31, Fla.Stat. (1993). We find…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977)
- Maerine Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968)
- Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980)
- Morace C. Duncan v. John D. Flynn, M.D., 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978)
- Miller v. State, 515 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Fatimeh T. Abdelaziz v. A.M.I.S.U.B. OF Fla., Inc., 515 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)