INDEX, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
MARION E. MOON, ETC., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1988-12-06
No. 88-1530
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and JORGENSON, JJ.
534 So. 2d 879 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1988)

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Synopsis

INDEX, INC. sought to establish an easement by necessity across Moon's land to access a small oceanfront portion of its property. The court affirmed the trial court's denial, holding that an easement by necessity cannot be granted when reasonable alternative access exists, even if less convenient.


Holding

INDEX was not entitled to an easement by necessity because it had reasonable alternative access to the property via the narrow strip of land already conveyed to it, and an easement by necessity cannot be implied when other reasonable means of access exist to enable beneficial use and enjoyment of the property.


Headnotes

[1] An easement by way of necessity cannot be implied or granted if there is other reasonable access to the property that enables the owner to achieve the beneficial use and…

[2] A claimant is not entitled to an option or election between several adequate means of access, even if one means is more convenient than another.

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Key Quotes

“an easement by way of necessity cannot be implied or granted if there is other reasonable access to the property which will enable the owner to achieve the beneficial use and enjoyment of the property; a claimant is not entitled to an option or an election as between several adequate means of access even though one means of access may be more convenient than another.”

Establishes the controlling legal standard that reasonable alternative access defeats a claim for easement by necessity, regardless of convenience considerations.

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Facts & Procedural History

INDEX owned property with a small strip extending into the Atlantic Ocean that was usable only for water activities like swimming or scuba diving. The…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff-appellant sued for the establishment of an easement by way of necessity across the land of its grantor, the appellee, Moon, so as to reach a tiny piece of its property extending into the Atlantic Ocean. The evidence showed, however, that the area in question, which was usable only by individuals gazing over or entering the water to swim or scuba dive, was also accessible by foot from the main body of the appellant’s property via a narrow but adequate-for-the-purpose strip of land which had likewise been conveyed to the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court’s ruling after trial that the plaintiff was not entitled to its claimed easement.

It is the rule that

an easement by way of necessity cannot be implied or granted if there is other reasonable access to the property which will enable the owner to achieve the beneficial use and enjoyment of the property; a claimant is not entitled to an option or an election as between several adequate means of access even though one means of access may be more convenient than another. Matthews v. Quarles, 504 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (citing Roy v. Euro-Holland, Vastgoed, B.V., 404 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). The statute upon which the plaintiff relies, section 704.01(1), Florida Statutes (1987), similarly and specifically provides that an implied easement exists only “where there is no other reasonable and practicable way of egress or ingress and same is reasonably necessary for the beneficial use or enjoyment of the part granted or reserved.” Roy v. Eruo-Holland, 404 So. 2d at 411. See also Tortoise Island Communities, Inc. v. Moorings Ass’n, Inc., 489 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1986); Picciolo v. Jones, 534 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The condition expressed in these authorities was not satisfied in this case.

AFFIRMED.


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