HEAD KANDY LLC
v.
MCNEILL
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court denied the defendant's motion for an extension of time to respond to a motion to enforce a preliminary injunction.
Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce a preliminary injunction. Defendant filed a motion for an extension of time to respond, citing uncertainty about t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Violation Of Preliminary Injunction cases and more on FLexlaw
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Plaintiff's Expedited Motion to Enforce the Preliminary Injunction and for an Order to Show Cause (“Plaintiffs Motion”) [DE 199] and Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response to Plaintiff's Expedited Motion to Enforce the Preliminary Injunction (“Defendant's Motion”), [DE 206]. For the reasons discussed herein, the Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff filed its Motion on March 14, 2024. Under the clear and unambiguous Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida, Defendant's response to Plaintiff's Motion was due on March 28, 2024, as discussed further below. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(c)(1). At 10:48 p.m. on March 28, Defendant filed her Motion. [DE 206]. Defendant moves for an (unspecified) “brief” extension of time in an “abundance of caution and for good cause” because there is “uncertainty surrounding the deadline.” Id. at 2. That uncertainty, Defendant contends, stems from the Court or CM/ECF not docketing a response deadline. Defendant's argument is meritless, approaches bad faith, and must be denied for multiple reasons.
First, Defendant's claim of confusion regarding the response deadline is implausible. The Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida clearly and unambiguously dictate when a response
to a motion is due. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(c)(1) (“For all motions, except motions served with the summons and complaint, each party opposing a motion shall file and serve an opposing memorandum of law no later than fourteen (14) days after service of the motion. Failure to do so may be deemed sufficient cause for granting the motion by default.”) (emphasis added). This background rule clearly governs absent an order of the Court to the contrary. Even if CM/ECF has previously at times automatically indicated a response date, [fn1] the fact that it did not automatically indicate a response date does not relieve a party of its obligation to respond. Moreover, it is hardly reasonable to assume that CM/ECF's failure to automatically generate a response deadline somehow indicates that the background rule established by the Local Rules does not apply in absence of a specific order from the Court.
Nor does the absence of a specific order setting a briefing schedule somehow suggest that Defendant had longer to respond than the Local Rule contemplates. The Court may shorten the time requirement “upon written motion and good cause shown" if a party requests an emergency or expedited motion. S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(d). Here, although Plaintiff styled its motion as an expedited request, the Court, in its discretion, declined to deviate from the standard time requirements and expedite a response. However, it is unreasonable for counsel to assume that the absence of a specific order meant that the Court would deviate from the presumed schedule established by the Local Rules. Additionally, Defendant at the very least suspected a response was necessary considering she filed her Motion with two hours remaining on the day her response was due under the Local Rule.
Second, in contravention of Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), Defendant did not confer with Plaintiff about the relief sought in Defendant's Motion. Defendant states that she did not confer with Plaintiff because “it is unclear whether there is a deadline for [a] specific response." [DE 206] at 3. Even if the deadline was unclear (which it was not), that reasoning does not absolve Defendant of its requirement to confer with Plaintiff about the relief sought. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(a)(3) ("Prior to filing any motion in a civil case . . . counsel for the movant shall confer (orally or in writing), or make reasonable effort to confer (orally or in writing), with all parties or non-parties who may be affected by the relief sought in the motion in a good faith effort to resolve by agreement the issues to be raised in the motion.”). Besides the purported confusion, Defendant does not explain why she did not reach out to Plaintiff about whether Plaintiff opposed Defendant's Motion. In fact, conferral probably would have alleviated any confusion about a response deadline.
Accordingly, Defendant has not shown good cause for an extension of time as Defendant should have had no confusion as to whether a response was necessary and when the response was due. By failing to even attempt to clear up any alleged confusion until 10:48 p.m. on the date the response was due, Defendant has effectively left the Court with little choice but to either grant Plaintiff's Motion by default or (for practical purposes) provide Defendant with the extension she does not merit. Nevertheless, although “[a] motion for extension of time is not self-executing,” Compere v. Nusret Miami, LLC, No. 19-cv-20277, 2020 WL 2844888, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2020), granting Plaintiffs Motion without the benefit of Defendant's response would be unjust.
Therefore, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that: