WALTER LAMB, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1988-12-28
No. 87-2117
JOANOS and WIGGINTON, JJ„ concur.
535 So. 2d 698 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1988) Negative Treatment
Cited by 35 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Walter Lamb appeals his conviction for simple battery, challenging whether the trial court erred by failing to renew its offer of counsel before trial when he had been allowed to proceed pro se three weeks earlier. The court holds that no error occurred because the rule requiring renewal of counsel offers at each subsequent stage does not apply when there has been no change in the critical stage of proceedings.


Holding

The trial court did not commit reversible error. Although trial is a critical stage requiring renewal of counsel offers at each subsequent stage where a defendant appears without counsel, the rule does not apply when there has been no change in the critical stage. Here, the pretrial hearing on waiver of counsel addressed Lamb's competence at the trial stage, and the three-week delay does not change this, so no renewal was required.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must renew its offer of counsel at each subsequent stage of proceedings when a defendant appears without counsel, if counsel was waived at a prior stage.

[2] A trial court does not err by failing to renew an offer of counsel before trial if the defendant was previously found competent to represent himself and no change in circ…

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Key Quotes

“if waiver of counsel is accepted at any stage of the proceedings the offer must be renewed at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without counsel”

Establishes the general rule under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d)(5) requiring renewal of counsel offers

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Facts & Procedural History

Lamb was charged with aggravated battery and removing a child beyond state limits. He filed a pretrial motion to withdraw court-appointed counsel and …

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Opinion of the Court
BARFIELD, Judge.

BARFIELD, Judge.

Walter Lamb appeals his conviction for simple battery. The issue is whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to renew offer of counsel before trial when three weeks prior to trial the court granted Lamb’s motion to withdraw court-appointed counsel and allowed Lamb to represent himself. We hold that the lower court did not err, and we affirm Lamb’s conviction.

Lamb was charged with aggravated battery and removing a child beyond state limits in violation of a court order. He filed a pretrial motion to have his court-appointed counsel withdrawn and to allow self-representation. The trial court concluded that Lamb was competent and able to represent himself and allowed the court-appointed attorney to withdraw. Three weeks later Lamb represented himself at trial where the court, sua sponte, granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on the count charging Lamb with removing the child beyond state limits. A jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense of simple battery for the remaining charge. At disposition, the trial judge renewed the offer of counsel which appellant waived orally and later signed an acknowledgment of rights form limited to the disposition stage. The court denied Lamb’s motion for new trial.

Lamb argues that the court committed reversible error by failing to renew the offer of counsel prior to the trial held three weeks later, as mandated by rule 3.111(d)(5) (1987), citing Sampson v. State, 466 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) rev. den. 476 So. 2d 675 (Fla.1985) (failure to renew offer of counsel at trial held one week after counsel was waived amounted to reversible error).1 We disagree.

Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d)(5) provides that “if waiver of counsel is accepted at any stage of the proceedings the offer must be renewed at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without counsel.” Trial in every case is a critical stage. Enrique v. State, 408 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) rev. den. 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.1982); R.V.P. v. State, 395 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Mackwart v. State, 222 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). A trial court commits reversible error if it does not renew at the beginning of a trial its offer of counsel to a defendant who in a prior stage of the proceedings was given permission by the court to represent himself. Felton v. State, 438 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

The trial court satisfied the requirements of rule 3.111(d)(5). The pretrial hearing on the waiver of counsel addressed Lamb’s competence and ability to appear pro se at the trial stage, and the fact that the trial occurred three weeks later is immaterial. The rule does not place a time limitation on an offer and waiver of counsel. Since there was no change in that critical stage, rule 3.111(d)(5) does not come into play and no error occurred.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM Lamb’s conviction for simple battery.

JOANOS and WIGGINTON, JJ„ concur. . In Sampson, the defendant was "functioning intellectually at the borderline of mental defectiveness.” 466 So. 2d at 1182. Faced with obvious incompetence and inability of the defendant to represent himself, it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to allow self-representation. This court did not need to address the issue concerning whether the trial court erred in violation of rule 3.111(d)(5).


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Citator

Cited By (16 total)

  • Kearse v. State, 605 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …used its discretion as to appellant’s motion to discharge his attorney and reverse. Turning to the second issue, the standard of review regarding a trial court’s decision as to self-representation is also that of abuse of discretion. Lamb v. State, 535 So. 2d 698, 698 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). It is well established that an accused has the right to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In most cases the accused’s defense is obviously better with counsel…
  • Monte v. State, 51 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
    …The need to renew an offer of assistance of counsel is not dependent on the time between an initial offer and a subsequent critical stage, but rather is dependent on whether there are any intervening critical stages. For example, in Lamb v. State, 535 So. 2d 698, 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), an offer of counsel three weeks before trial did not require a renewal where there were no intervening proceedings. The court explained that “[t]he pretrial hearing on the waiver of counsel addressed [defendant’s] competenc…
  • Knight v. State, 770 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2000)
    …ed counsel at the beginning of the trial for two reasons. First, the October 31 waiver was in regard to Knight’s trial phase representation. As such, the beginning of the trial was not a subsequent stage of the [*670] proceeding.6 See Lamb v. State, 535 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (stating the pretrial hearing on the waiver of counsel addressed Lamb’s competence and ability to appear pro se at the trial stage, and the fact that the trial occurred three weeks later is immaterial). Second, Knight had Mr. Sos…

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