GALETTE

v.

GOODELL

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants the Cleveland Browns, Kansas City Chiefs, Seattle Seahawks, Washington Commanders, and Roger Goodell, ECF No. (“First MTD”); the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants the Carolina Panthers, Las Vegas Raiders, and Los Angeles Rams, ECF No. (“Second MTD”); and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”), ECF No. (“Third MTD” or “NFLPA’s MTD”).

As discussed below in Part II.B, the Court deems the Motions to be fully briefed. The Court has considered the Motions, the supporting and opposing filings, the record, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motions are granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint

On August 23, 2022, Plaintiff Junior Galette filed his Complaint against Roger Goodell, the National Football League (“NFL”), the NFLPA, and the seven NFL teams listed above. ECF No. . Therein, he alleges that he was a football player with the team formerly known as the Washington Redskins, currently known as the Washington Commanders. Id. ¶ 10. Galette, who is Black, alleges that he was offered a mere “2 year 4 Million Dollar Contract 500k signing bonus” in 2018, which he deemed insufficient when compared to a “3 year 22.5 Million Dollar Deal” offered to Galette’s former White teammate, who, according to Galette, is a less valuable player. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 12, 16.

On March¹⁷, 2018, Galette posted a complaint on social media complaining about the Washington Commanders’ offer. Id. ¶ 15. He wrote: “I swear to god I’m not playing for no slave deals I’ll die before I play for more slave deals.” Id. at 46. Five days later, the Washington Commanders revoked Galette’s offer. Id. ¶ 16. Galette was then offered a “veteran’s minimum 660k” contract with the Oakland Raiders. Id. ¶ 18. He “continue[d] to search for better offers[.]” Id. ¶ 19. Galette alleges that he eventually decided to sign with the Los Angeles Rams. Id. ¶ 22.

However, the Los Angeles Rams subsequently informed him “there’s been a change of plans,” and the deal was off. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. Galette thereafter discussed playing with the Seattle Seahawks, the Cleveland Browns, the Indianapolis Colts,¹ the Carolina Panthers, and the Kansas City Chiefs, but none of those teams signed him. Id. ¶¶ 28-32. Galette alleges that the reason no team signed him was because he was blacklisted by the NFL owners for speaking out about the Washington Commanders’ discrimination against him. Id. ¶¶ 55-56. Galette asserts violations of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (Count I), his Freedom of Speech rights (Count II), and a provision of the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) (Count III). Id. ¶¶ 62-64. He seeks $300,000,000.00 in damages. Id. ¶ 65.

B. The Motions to Dismiss

On October 18, 2022, the Cleveland Browns, Kansas City Chiefs, Seattle Seahawks, Washington Commanders, and Roger Goodell filed the First MTD. ECF No. . They argue that (a) Galette’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief, (b) this case is estopped by a prior arbitration proceeding, (c) Galette’s claim for breach of the CBA must be arbitrated, and (d) Defendant Roger Goodell was not properly served. Id. They seek dismissal of this action with prejudice. Id. at 15.

On October 28, 2022, the Carolina Panthers, Las Vegas Raiders, and Los Angeles Rams filed the Second MTD, which joined, adopted, and incorporated by reference the First MTD. ECF No. . The Las Vegas Raiders additionally argued that it should be dismissed due to insufficient service of process. Id.

On October 31, 2022, Galette filed a Response to the Second MTD. ECF No. . Therein, Galette reasserts the claims within his Complaint, alleges that he never received the First MTD that was filed on October 18, 2022, contests the Las Vegas Raiders’ assertion that it was not served, id. at 1-5, and accuses the Carolina Panthers, Las Vegas Raiders, and Los Angeles Rams of

“displaying unclean hands and bad faith.” Id. at 6 (capitalization removed).

On November³, 2022, the Defendants who filed the First and Second MTDs jointly filed a Reply to Galette’s Response to the Second MTD. ECF No. . They argue that Galette failed to meaningfully respond to the arguments within the First MTD and incorporated into the Second MTD. Id. at 1. To rebut Galette’s argument that he never received the First MTD, the Reply points out that Galette had consented to receive filings through the Court’s CM/ECF system to his email address. Id. at 2 (citing ECF No. ). Defendants attached to their Reply a Notice of Electronic Filing generated by the Court’s CM/ECF system, which shows that Notice of the First MTD was sent to the email address Galette provided. ECF No. [27-1] at 2.

On November³, 2022, Defendant NFLPA filed the Third MTD. ECF No. . Similar to the prior MTDs, the NFLPA’s MTD argues that Galette’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief, Galette is estopped from relitigating claims that were resolved in arbitration, and the NFLPA was not properly served. Id. at 1-16. The NFLPA seeks dismissal of Galette’s Complaint with prejudice. Id. at 22. The NFLPA’s MTD includes a Declaration from David L. Greenspan, which explains that the NFLPA was attaching the CBA at issue in Count III of Galette’s Complaint, and the arbitrator’s decision in Galette v. Nat’l Football League, et al as Exhibits¹ and 2. See ECF No. [29-1] (Declaration of David L. Greenspan), [29-2] (CBA), [29-3] (Summary Judgment Motion Opinion and Order in Galette v. Nat’l Football League).

On November 7, 2022, Galette filed a document entitled “Responsive Pleading Declaration of David L. Greenspan,” ECF No. , which the Court construes as a Response in opposition to the NFLPA’s MTD. Therein, Galette argues that the CBA created a duty for the NFLPA to protect him from discrimination, but the NFLPA failed to do so. Id. at 2-3. He further argues that the arbitrator’s decision “is not applicable to this matter[.]” Id. at 4-5. Galette reiterates that he never received the First MTD and was therefore deprived of due process. Id. at 6.

On November 14, 2022, the NFLPA filed a 4-page Reply in support of its MTD, arguing that Galette’s Response fails to rebut the NFLPA’s arguments for dismissal. ECF No. . Galette then filed a 31-page response to the NFLPA’s Reply, which generally contests the grounds for dismissal stated in the NFLPA’s MTD. See generally ECF No. . Galette’s 31-page filing is procedurally improper because it is effectively an unauthorized sur-reply and it exceeds the 20- page limit for memoranda of law. See S.D. Fla L.R. 7.1(c)(1) (requiring leave of Court for a memorandum of law in response to a Reply); id. at (c)(2) (setting a 20-page limit for all memoranda of law). The Court had previously advised Galette that his pro se status does not excuse him from compliance with the Local Rules. See Order Providing Instructions to Pro Se Litigant, ECF No. . Despite being procedurally improper, the Court has considered Galette’s filing in rendering its decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).

Additionally, a complaint may not rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If the facts satisfy the elements of the claims asserted, a defendant’s motion to dismiss must be denied. Id. at 556.

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F. 3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“On a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all facts alleged by the non-moving party are accepted as true.”).

A court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits, including documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F. 3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009).

While the court is required to accept as true all allegations contained in the complaint, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court begins with Galette’s assertion that he never received notice of the First MTD,

then addresses Defendants’ collateral estoppel argument, and concludes with a claim-by-claim analysis of Galette’s Complaint.

A. Galette’s Notice of the First MTD Galette alleges that he was denied due process because he never received a copy of the First MTD. See ECF Nos. at 3, at 6.

However, Galette’s allegation is belied by the automatic notification produced by the CM/ECF system, which shows that notice of the First MTD was emailed to Galette on October 18, 2022, the same day it was filed. ECF No. [27-1] at 2. Galette had previously consented to receive notice via the CM/ECF email notification system, and he accepted responsibly for verifying that his computer and network were not filtering emails sent from that system. See ECF No. at 1. In its Order Providing Instructions to Pro Se Litigant, the

Court reiterated that, having consented to use of the CM/ECF system, Galette would not receive copies of filings from the Court or opposing counsel. ECF No. at 2. Lastly, the Court notes that Galette indisputably became aware of the First MTD’s existence on October 28, 2022, in time to file a Response to the First MTD or move for an extension of time to do so. See ECF No. at 3. For all these reasons, the Court rejects Galette’s argument that he has been deprived of due process for not having received the First MTD. B. Defendants’ Collateral Estoppel Argument Defendants contend that at least some of Galette’s claims are subject to collateral estoppel due to a prior arbitration decision between Galette and the Defendants. A prior arbitration precludes a party from relitigating factual issues resolved in arbitration when: “(1) the issues in this action are identical to those alleged in the arbitration; (2) these issues were actually litigated in the arbitration; and (3) the arbitration panel’s determination of these issues was a critical and necessary part of the arbitration decision.” Freecharm Ltd. v. Atlas Wealth Holdings Corp., 499 F. App’x 941, 943 (11th Cir. 2012). “Although res judicata is an affirmative defense that is properly raised under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1), a party may raise it in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss where the defense's existence can be judged on the face of the complaint.” Harrell v. Bank of Am., N.A., 813 F. App’x 397, 400 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).

Defendants argue that all of the Freecharm preclusion factors are satisfied here because Galette litigated at least some of the claims within his Complaint in the prior arbitration proceeding, which resulted in a 40-page decision in favor of the NFL and its teams. ECF Nos. at 12, at 17. The problem with Defendants’ estoppel argument is that they have failed to demonstrate that the Court should consider the prior arbitration decision at this stage in the proceeding. In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must limit its “consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.” LaGrasta v.

First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F. 3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004). Unlike the CBA, the prior arbitration decision is not “central to or referenced in the [C]omplaint.” Id. The NFLPA argues that Galette’s prior arbitration is central to Galette’s claims “as it involves the same set of facts and issue Mr. Galette attempts to litigate here.” ECF No. at 10 n.4 (citing Rosen v. J.M. Auto Inc., No. 07-cv-61234, 2008 WL 9901501, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2008)).

However, the issue of “centrality” does not turn on the similarity of the facts and issues between the two proceedings. Rather, “[t]he centrality of a document may be shown where the document is a necessary part of an effort to prove a claim for relief.” Wilson v. GAF, No. 19- cv-01915, 2020 WL 12602222, at *3 (N.D. Ala. June 25, 2020) (citing Day v. Taylor, 400 F. 3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005)). Here, the Complaint does not mention the prior arbitration proceeding, which occurred after the events underlying Galette’s claims, and does not give rise to any of those claims. The fact that the arbitration proceeding addressed some of those events does not render it “central” to Galette’s Complaint. The single case cited by the NFLPA – Rosen – undermines the NFLPA’s position. The Rosen court refused to consider documents that defendants attached to their motion to dismiss, because, among other reasons, those documents were not attached to, cited by, or relied upon by the complaint. 2008 WL 9901501, at *5. Here too, “[n]one of [Galette]’s claims arise in any way out of the arbitration decision,” so that decision is not “central” to Galette’s Complaint. Wilson, 2020 WL 12602222, at *3. Nor would it be appropriate for the Court to consider the arbitration decision under the Court’s ability to “take judicial notice of state and federal court records of prior proceedings, as well as its own records.” See Harrell v. Bank of Am., N.A., 813 F. App'x 397, 400 (11th Cir. 2020).

The First MTD cites one case in which this Court considered a prior arbitration decision at the MTD stage. ECF No. at 13 (citing Vital Pharms. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1301-03 (S.D. Fla. 2021)).

However, in that case, the prior arbitration order had been “confirmed by this Court.” Vital Pharms., 528 F. Supp. 3d at 1299. It was therefore an appropriate exercise of judicial notice. Here, by contrast, the prior arbitration was unknown to this Court and does not constitute a state or federal court record. The prior arbitration decision does not appear to be a public record, since, according to the Defendants, “proceedings before the System Arbitrator are confidential.” ECF No. at 5 n.5. The Court will not take judicial notice under those circumstances.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the Court should consider the arbitration decision at this early stage of the case. The Court therefore defers consideration of Defendants’ collateral estoppel argument.

C. The Counts Within Galette’s Complaint

As noted above, Galette’s Complaint consists of three Counts: the 1866 Civil Rights Act (Count I), Freedom of Speech (Count II), and breach of the CBA (Count III). ECF No. ¶¶ 62-