MARY E. LECUYER AND RICHARD P. LECUYER, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellants sued the Florida Department of Transportation for damages arising from a road accident but failed to provide proper notice to the state as required by statute before filing suit. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that an insurance company's notice of subrogation did not constitute sufficient notice by the injured parties themselves.
An insurance company's notice to the DOT on behalf of its insured does not satisfy the statutory notice requirement. The injured parties themselves must provide the notice required by section 768.28(6) before commencing legal action against the state.
[1] A claimant must provide statutory notice to a state agency before filing suit for damages arising from a dangerous condition of a road owned and maintained by the agency.
[2] Notice of a claim provided by an insurer, even if subrogated to the insured's rights, may be insufficient to satisfy the statutory notice requirement for the insured's la…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court held it was insufficient and dismissed the action with prejudice. We agree.”
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the insurance company's notice did not satisfy the statutory requirement.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMary Lecuyer was injured on November 7, 1983, when her automobile went out of control due to an allegedly dangerous road condition owned and maintaine…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Condition Precedent To Suit cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal. We affirm.
Appellants sued the State of Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) for damages allegedly arising from a dangerous condition of a road owned and maintained by the DOT. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to give the notice required by section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes, prior to filing suit.
Appellant Mary Lecuyer was injured on November 7, 1983, when her automobile allegedly went out of control because of a dangerous condition of a road owned and maintained by the DOT. Appellants’ vehicle, which was damaged, was insured by Nationwide. In February of 1984 Nationwide wrote a letter to the DOT informing the DOT that it had paid for the damage to appellants’ vehicle, that it was subrogated to the rights of the appellants, and that it was making a claim against the DOT for the damage. Nationwide enclosed a copy of the seven-page accident report which showed that a person involved in this one-car accident was injured and taken to the hospital. On March 9, 1984, the DOT wrote to Nationwide advising it that the DOT had instituted an inquiry to determine the facts of the accident and the DOT’S liability. On April 25, 1984, the DOT advised Nationwide by letter that it had turned the claim over to the Florida Department of Insurance. On September 17, 1985, Nationwide sent a letter to the Florida Department of Insurance (to which was attached a police report of the accident) stating that the accident was caused by the negligence of the DOT, that Nationwide was subrogated to the rights of its insured, Richard Lecuyer, and that Nationwide’s damages were $5,824.69.
The trial court dealt with the issue of whether Nationwide’s notice to the DOT was sufficient to constitute appellants’ compliance with section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes, a condition precedent to appellants bringing suit against the DOT. The trial court held it was insufficient and dismissed the action with prejudice. We agree. See Levine v. Dade County School Board, 442 So. 2d 210, 212-13 (Fla.1983), Mrowczynski v. Vizenthal, 445 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), and Orange County v. Piper, 523 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.1988).
The present case is factually distinguishable from Franklin v. Palm Beach County, 534 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
GLICKSTEIN and STONE, JJ., and POLEN, MARK E., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
LaRIVIERE v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 889 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…action when there is a claim for damages against a state agency or subdivision. See Levine v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 442 So. 2d 210 (Fla.1983); Broward County Sch. Bd. v. Joseph, 756 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Lecuyer v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 535 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Here, although the failure to notify the department is usually curable, the failure to notify the department before the three-year statute of limitations period expired could not now be cured. In Menendez v. North Broward Hospi…
Authorities Cited
- Levine v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 442 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1983)
- Orange Cnty. v. Piper, 523 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Mrowczynski v. Vizenthal, 445 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Franklin v. Palm Beach Cnty., 534 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)