GLEFORD GRAY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1988-12-14
No. 87-1888
JOANOS, WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
535 So. 2d 721 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1988) Caution
Cited by 6 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was found guilty by jury of grand theft of the second degree under Section 812.014(2)(b)(l), Florida Statutes (1985), and was sentenced to a split sentence with a condition of the probationary portion of the sentence that he “make restitution as directed by Probation and Parole.” At sentencing on the above case, appellant pled nolo contendere to another charge of grand theft of the second degree for which he was adjudicated guilty and placed on probation for five years consecutive to the first sentence. The same condition of restitution as that mentioned above was imposed with respect to the second case.

We affirm the judgment and sentence as to the first case and the judgment as to the second. However, it was improper for the trial court to delegate to “Probation and Parole” issues regarding restitution. McCaskill v. State, 520 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We, therefore, remand to the trial court for proceedings to determine issues regarding restitution and for appropriate amendment of the probation orders with respect to restitution.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JOANOS, WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Reynolds v. State, 598 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …erly requested the Probation and Parole Commission to determine the amount of restitution due, for that is the statutory responsibility of the trial court. Id. at 1156, citing McClure v. State, 371 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1979); Gray v. State, 535 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). In this instance, the restitution order is invalid because the determination of the amount is a non-dele-gable judicial responsibility. Section 775.-089(7), Florida Statutes (1989); Robinson v. State, 586 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA…
  • Mendaros v. State, 589 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …Florida Statutes, expressly states that the amount of restitution is “to be determined by the court.” In other words, the determination of the amount of restitution to be made in each case may not be delegated to a probation officer. Gray v. State, 535 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); McCaskill v. State, 520 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Masslieno v. State, 498 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the trial court for correction of the probation order to reflect the speci…
  • Weeks v. State, 651 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
    …nstead delegating the probation officer the responsibility of determining the appropriate amount of restitution. The state concedes error. It is well-established that restitution must be established by the sentencing court. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 535 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Therefore, we REVERSE in part and REMAND for proceedings related to the imposition of restitution and for amendment of the probation orders regarding restitution, but appellant’s judgment of conviction and sentence are otherwise…

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