RILEY SMITH, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that when a departure sentence is reversed on appeal, resentencing must occur within the original presumptive guidelines range, and cannot be increased based on subsequent convictions obtained after the appeal was taken. The court vacated Smith's life sentence and remanded for resentencing within the original three-and-one-half to four-and-one-half year range.
Yes. When a departure sentence is reversed, resentencing must occur within the original presumptive guidelines range. Subsequent convictions obtained after the appeal was taken cannot be used to increase the sentence, even if they involve prior conduct, as doing so would effectively punish the defendant for the trial court's initial sentencing error.
[1] Upon reversal of a departure sentence, resentencing must generally be within the presumptive guidelines range.
[2] A revised scoresheet reflecting additional convictions obtained after the first appeal and prior to resentencing cannot be used to impose a greater presumptive sentence t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when all of the reasons stated by the trial court in support of departure are found invalid, resentencing following remand must be within the presumptive guidelines sentence”
Establishes the controlling principle that resentencing after a departure is reversed must stay within original guidelines
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRiley Smith was convicted of armed robbery in November 1985 and sentenced to six years, exceeding the three-and-one-half to four-and-one-half year gui…
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McDonald, justice.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE PRINCIPLE THAT GENERALLY, UPON REVERSAL OF A DEPARTURE SENTENCE, RESENTENC-ING MUST BE WITHIN THE PRESUMPTIVE GUIDELINES RANGE, BAR IMPOSITION OF A GREATER PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCE BASED UPON A REVISED SCORESHEET REFLECTING AS “PRIOR RECORD” ADDITIONAL CONVICTIONS OBTAINED AFTER THE FIRST APPEAL WAS TAKEN AND PRIOR TO RESENTENC-ING FOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT COMMITTED PRIOR TO THE INSTANT CRIME?
Smith v. State, 518 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and answer the question in the affirmative.
Riley Smith was convicted, in November 1985, of armed robbery in Marion County. Although the sentencing scoresheet recommended a sentence in the range of three and one-half to four and one-half years, the trial judge imposed a six-year sentence. Smith appealed, and, in October 1986, the Fifth District Court of Appeal invalidated the departure sentence and remanded the case for resentencing within the presumptive guideline range. Smith v. State, 495 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). In September 1986 Smith, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to five counts of armed robbery in Lake County. Under the terms of the agreement Smith was to receive seven and one-half years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in the case at bar. Upon remand of the instant matter, the state prepared a new sentencing guidelines scoresheet which included the five Lake County robberies as “prior offenses.” This resulted in a recommended sentence of life imprisonment which the trial court imposed and the district court affirmed.
Equity compels us to vacate Smith’s life sentence and remand the case for sentencing within the original range of three and one-half to four and one-half years. If Smith had been properly sentenced in the initial proceeding, he would not be facing life imprisonment. To sustain the life sentence would be to punish Smith for the trial court’s mistakes. The more equitable result is to place him in the position he would have been in absent the court’s error. This is consistent with the rule espoused in Shull v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 748, 749 (Fla. 1987), that “when all of the reasons stated by the trial court in support of departure are found invalid, resentencing following remand must be within the presumptive guidelines sentence.” The district court found the reasons for departure to be invalid, and, therefore, Smith should be resen-tenced according to the original scoresheet.
In conclusion, fairness compels us to answer the certified question in the affirma.tive. We therefore quash the district court’s decision and order a remand for resentencing within the original guidelines range.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Doyal Powell Roberts v. State, 547 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1989)…d conflict with the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Harrison v. State, 523 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). We agree with the district court and find our decisions in Shull v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d [*131] 748 (Fla.1987), and Smith v. State, 536 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.1988), do not apply in this instance. Those cases are distinguishable from the instant case because they each involved an original sentence which was a departure sentence. In contrast, Roberts’ original sentence was not a departure sentence so…
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Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…g court [*847] erred in allocating 12 points to this crime in computing Peters’ modified upward departure scoresheet, since the negotiated plea was entered into after Peters’ initial 1991 sentencing. As the Supreme Court clarified in Smith v. State, 536 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.1988), a trial court may not recalculate a defendant’s scoresheet on re-sentencing to include subsequent convictions that were not considered during the original sentencing. As the Court explained: Equity compels us to vacate Smith’s lif…
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Thorp v. State, 555 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1990)…KOGAN, Justice, dissenting. In Smith v. State, 536 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.1988), this Court addressed an issue that differed in only one material respect from that posed by the present case. In Smith, [*364] the subsequent convictions factored into the defendant’s scoresheet occurred during his successful appeal from…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shull v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1987)
- Riley Bernard Smith v. State, 518 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Riley Bernard Smith v. State, 495 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- E.M. Hutton v. Perry, 495 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)