STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
KATHY ANDERSON, APPELLEE
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Florida charged Kathy Anderson with perjury for allegedly lying about seeing the robbery suspect at the police station. The trial court dismissed the charge, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant's motion to dismiss was legally insufficient because it merely asserted a legal conclusion without demonstrating that the alleged false statements were immaterial as a matter of law.
The court reversed the trial court's dismissal, holding that Anderson's motion to dismiss was legally insufficient because it merely asserted a legal conclusion that her statements were immaterial without demonstrating undisputed material facts establishing the lack of materiality. The court held that identification of a perpetrator is inherently material to a criminal prosecution.
[1] A motion to dismiss must demonstrate that undisputed material facts fail to establish a prima facie case of guilt or a valid defense.
[2] A motion to dismiss is legally insufficient if it merely asserts a legal conclusion without alleging a factual basis for the court to rule in the movant's favor.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A motion to dismiss must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts fail to establish a prima facia case of guilt or a valid defense.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating motions to dismiss; Anderson's motion merely asserted a legal conclusion rather than demonstrating facts supporting dismissal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnderson worked as a night clerk at a convenience store where a robbery occurred on December 30, 1986. She was taken to the police station and placed …
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SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.
The state filed an information charging Kathy Anderson with perjury in an official proceeding under section 832.02, Florida Statutes (1985). Ms. Anderson filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). The trial court granted the motion, and the state appeals. We reverse.
Ms. Anderson was working as the night' clerk at a convenience store on December 30, 1986, when a robbery occurred. The night of the robbery, she was taken by police to the stationhouse where she was escorted into a room with the suspect. When asked if the suspect committed the robbery, she told a police officer, “That’s not him.” The next day, however, she chose the same suspect’s picture out of a photopack.
In preparation for the suspect’s prosecution for robbery, Ms. Anderson was deposed by the defense. When asked, “Isn’t that [the suspect] the same person who was in the police station the night before when you went in to finish filing your complaint?”, she replied, “I didn’t see anybody in the police station the night before, I wasn’t paying attention.” In fact, of course, she was taken into the same room with the suspect.
Ms. Anderson filed a motion to dismiss, contending that her alleged false statement was not material to the official proceeding. In its demurrer, the state did not traverse the motion’s factual allegations but argued that the motion was improper as a matter of law. The court granted the motion without explanation. We think the trial court erred.
We think Ms. Anderson’s motion to dismiss was legally insufficient because it merely asserted a legal conclusion that Ms. Anderson's alleged false statement was not material. A motion to dismiss must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts fail to establish a prima facia case of guilt or a valid defense. Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Ms. Anderson’s motion did not.
We agree with the state that State v. Sedlmayer, 375 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), is analogous to the facts in the instant case. In Sedlmayer, the defendant’s sworn motion to dismiss simply alleged that the false statements made during a bond hearing and a deposition were immaterial. The court held that the motion failed in that it did not indicate testimony was given which demonstrated that the statements were not materiai.
Ms. Anderson argues that her situation is different from Sedlymayer because Sed-lymayer “failed to allege any factual basis upon which the court could have ruled in the defendant’s favor,” whereas the court in the instant case “had sufficient facts to reach its ruling.” We do not see that distinction. It seems irrefutable that identification of a perpetrator is material to his prosecution.
Ms. Anderson argues that she was intimidated and hesitant to identify the perpetrator because she was apprehensive that the suspect would kill her. Moreover, Ms. Anderson argues that her statements were equivocal. We are not unmindful of the understandable fear which may have led Ms. Anderson to vacillate on her identification of the suspect, but at this point, we do not consider the merits of her contentions. We reach only the technical point that misidentification is material in a criminal prosecution. Under the circumstances, therefore, we are compelled to reverse.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
THREADGILL and PARKER, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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State v. Baldwin, 709 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…not have observed any telltale bulges in his clothing. When moving to dismiss under rule 3.190(c)(4), a defendant has the burden to demonstrate that the undisputed material facts fail to establish a prima facie case of guilt. See State v. Anderson, 536 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). When deciding such a motion, the court must refrain from resolving fact disputes, and it must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. See State v. Diaz, 627 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Section 812.13(1), Florid…
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State v. Parrish, 567 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…trate that the undisputed facts fail to establish a prima facie case, or that the facts establish a valid defense. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4); Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla.1977); State v. Anderson, 536 So. 2d 1166 (Fla.2d DCA 1988). In reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, the appellate court [*465] is required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla.1971); State v. Mattox, 441 So. 2d 648, 650…
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State v. Russell, 611 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…unt and the RICO count. The state filed a timely notice of appeal. A motion to dismiss in a criminal proceeding must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts fail to establish a prima facie case of guilt or a valid defense. State v. Anderson, 536 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). We affirm the dismissal of the RICO charge because the state failed to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a criminal enterprise. Boyd v. State, 578 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 581 So. 2d 1310 (Fla.1991).…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- State v. Sedlmayer, 375 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)