1155 INVESTMENT COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
TAMARAC CLUB, INC., CARROLL A. ERNST AND LAURA A. CANTILENA ERNST, HIS WIFE, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1989-01-11
No. 88-2162
LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur., ANSTEAD, J., dissents with opinion.
537 So. 2d 154 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A mortgage foreclosure plaintiff obtained a default judgment against a lienholder after attempting substituted service of process through the Florida Secretary of State, but failed to comply with statutory notice requirements or allege jurisdictional grounds for substituted service. The appellate court reversed, finding the service defective.


Holding

The court reversed, holding that the substituted service was defective because the complaint failed to allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by statute justifying substituted service and because the appellee failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement of mailing a copy of the process to the defendant by registered or certified mail.


Headnotes

[1] Substituted service of process is invalid if the complaint lacks jurisdictional allegations justifying its use.

[2] A plaintiff must comply with statutory notice requirements, including mailing process by registered or certified mail, to effectuate valid substituted service.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“[t]o support substituted service of process on a defendant, the complaint must allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by statute. If it fails to do so, then a motion to quash process and service of process should be granted.”

Establishes the requirement that complaints must contain jurisdictional allegations to justify substituted service, and that motions to quash should be granted when such allegations are absent.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellee filed a complaint to foreclose a mortgage on a condominium unit in Broward County, naming the mortgagors, unknown tenants, and appellant (115…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a non-final order. We reverse.

Appellee filed a complaint seeking to foreclose a mortgage on a condominium unit located in Broward County. The complaint named as defendants the mortgagors and owners of the property, unknown tenants of the property, and appellant, which was named by virtue of its previously recorded notice to claim an interest in the subject property and lis pendens.

A summons on the complaint was issued and the return of process shows that a private process server attempted to make service on appellant but “that after diligent search and inquiry [he] failed to find [appellant] in Broward County, Florida.”

An alias summons was then issued and service therof made on the Secretary of State of Florida as agent for appellant, which received no notification that appellee had made substituted service of process.

Appellee moved for the entry of a default against appellant on the ground of appellant’s failure to serve or file any paper in the action and the clerk entered a default against appellant. Appellant then moved to vacate the default and to quash the substituted service of process on which the default was premised, which motion was denied.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the clerk’s entry of a default and to quash the substituted service of process. It points out that the substituted service effectuated in the instant case was defective in that the complaint was devoid of any jurisdictional allegations which would justify such service and in that there was noncompliance with the notice requirement of section 48.-161, Florida Statutes (1985). That section provides, in relevant part:

Notice of service and a copy of the process shall be sent forthwith by registered or certified mail by the plaintiff or his attorney to the defendant, and the defendant’s return receipt and the affidavit of the plaintiff or his attorney of compliance shall be filed on or before the return day of the process or within such time as the court allows, or the notice and copy shall be served on the defendant. ...

Appellant’s arguments are meritorious. This court in Ferguson v. McWilliams, Jr., 483 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), noted that:

[t]o support substituted service of process on a defendant, the complaint must allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by statute. If it fails to do so, then a motion to quash process and service of process should be granted.

(Citations omitted). A review of the complaint served on the Secretary of State in the instant case reveals that it is devoid of the requisite jurisdictional allegations justifying the use of substituted service of process.

Additionally, the notice required by section 48.161, Florida Statutes, was not complied with. In Turcotte v. Graves, 374 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), this court held that substituted service of process was insufficient where the statutory requirement of mailing process to the defendant was not met. In the instant case, it appears that the appellee failed to mail the process by certified or registered mail to the appellant.

We note that although the case was subsequently voluntarily dismissed in the trial court, the appeal was considered on its merits because of the fact that an identical situation is likely to recur. LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., dissents with opinion.

Dissent
ANSTEAD, Judge,

ANSTEAD, Judge,

dissenting.

I would dismiss the appeal as moot in light of the dismissal of the action in the trial court.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Pelycado Onroerend Goed B.V. v. Ruthenberg, 635 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
    …ion or that he failed to perfect substitute service of process on the appellants. When these jurisdictional allegations are not made, it is error for the trial court to fail to vacate its order and quash service. 1155 Inv. Co. v. Tamarac Club. Inc., 537 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). These errors were not slight and the complaint should be dismissed without prejudice. See Chase Manhattan, 343 So. 2d at 937. It is clear that Ruthenberg did not meet the requirements of section 48.161. Ruthenberg did not m…
  • Jennings v. Montenegro, 792 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
    ….” Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass’n v. Fandino, 751 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). When these jurisdictional allegations are not made, it is error for the trial court to fail to vacate its order and quash service. 1155 Inv. Co. v. Tamarac Club. Inc., 537 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Our review of the amended complaint supports that while the Monteneg-ros may have exercised due diligence in attempting to locate the Jennings, they failed to serve the Secretary of State with their latest amended complain…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw