ROBERT CLINE, M.D. AND JAMES JUDE, M.D., APPELLANTS,
v.
STEPHEN MICHAEL GOUGE, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CATHERINE M. CHRISTMAN, DECEASED, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
On remand from a prior reversal of summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, the trial court improperly entered a final judgment for attorney's fees rather than an interlocutory order. The appellate court clarifies that attorney's fees for successful appellate proceedings are conditional on ultimate prevailing party status, which cannot be determined until the underlying case is finally resolved.
The trial court erred by entering a final judgment rather than an interlocutory order. Attorney's fees for successful interlocutory appellate proceedings are conditional upon the party ultimately prevailing in the final judgment of the underlying case. The court granted appellants' motion for attorney's fees and remanded for entry of an appropriate non-final order setting the amount of fees.
[1] An appellate court's award of attorney's fees for interlocutory appellate proceedings is conditional upon the party ultimately prevailing in the final judgment.
[2] A trial court should not enter a final judgment awarding attorney's fees when the determination of the prevailing party on the merits of the underlying case has not yet b…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a party is determined by the appellate court to be entitled to attorney's fees for interlocutory appellate proceedings in a case involving attorney's fees for the prevailing party, the award of entitlement to attorney's fees for the interlocutory appellate proceeding is conditional upon that party ultimately prevailing in the final judgment.”
Establishes the key principle that appellate attorney's fees are conditional on ultimate success in the underlying case.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA prior panel reversed the trial court's summary final judgment in favor of defendants Cline and Gouge in a medical malpractice case involving the est…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Attorney'S Fees Entitlement cases and more on FLexlaw
GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
Another panel of the court considered the merits of this case and reversed the summary final judgment which the trial court had entered for the defendants. See Gouge v. Cline, 513 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). That panel granted appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees by order, directing the following on remand:
[T]he amount thereof shall be assessed by the trial court upon due notice and hearing subject to review by this court under Rule 9.400(c), Fla.R.App.P. On remand, the trial court entered a final judgment rather than an order for attorney’s fees and expert fees.
In General Accident Insurance Company v. Packal, 512 So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), this court said:
When a party is determined by the appellate court to be entitled to attorney’s fees for interlocutory appellate proceedings in a case involving attorney’s fees for the prevailing party, the award of entitlement to attorney’s fees for the interlocutory appellate proceeding is conditional upon that party ultimately prevailing in the final judgment. This, of course, means that the ultimate prevailing party must be the winner in the interlocutory appellate proceeding and receive the appellate court’s approval for the allowance of fees, but no fee will be payable until and unless that party “prevails” in the end.
(Footnote and citations omitted.) In the instant case, the trial court should not have entered a final judgment because the determination of “the prevailing party” on the merits of the underlying medical malpractice case had not yet been made. See Mainlands Construction Co. v. Wen-Dic Construction Co., 482 So. 2d 1369, 1371 (Fla.1986).
The appellants in the case at hand have filed a notice of appeal as well as a Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400 motion for review of the trial court’s final judgment. We dismiss the appeal, but grant the motion for review, and remand with direction that the trial court vacate its final judgment, and enter an appropriate order which sets the amount of the attorney’s fees and expert fees but does not include language of finality.
We grant the appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees. On remand, the trial court is directed to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion.
LETTS and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Herron, 828 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…unless that party also prevails on the merits of the case in the proceeding on remand. See Allstar Builders Corp., Inc. v. Zimmerman, 706 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Sabina v. Dahlia Corporation, 678 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Cline v. Gouge, 537 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). This rule makes good sense in the context of a contract or a statutory provision that limits entitlement to attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. A litigant does not qualify as the prevailing party merely by succeeding in an…
-
Aksomitas v. Sabitra Maharaj, 771 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…ion to ultimately prevailing in the litigation. Under Packal, a party who ultimately prevails in the litigation, but loses an appeal during the litigation, cannot be reimbursed for fees incurred for that appeal. We followed Packal in Cline v. Gouge, 537 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In Packal we did not give any reasons why we were establishing the rule, but we may have been influenced because of the manner in which appellate costs are assessed.1 Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a) provides that “…
-
Stringer v. Lawrence Katzell, M.D., 695 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…fees where the ultimate outcome of the litigation remains unresolved, this court normally grants the motion conditioned on the mov-ant’s ultimately prevailing in the litigation. See Foley v. Fleet, 652 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Cline v. Gouge, 537 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In Mainlands Construction Co. v. Wen-Dic Construction Co., 482 So. 2d 1369 (Fla.1986), our supreme court held that even where a party was successful in overturning a dismissal of its mechanic’s lien, the potential of an adverse…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mainlands Constr. Co., Inc. v. Wen-Dic Constr. Co., Inc., 482 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1986)
- McMANUS v. State Farm Ins. Co., 512 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Packal, 512 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Vogel v. Judge John G. Ferris & the Seventeenth Jud. Cir. Court of Broward Cnty., 513 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)