JAMES PRENTEST JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Johnson challenges the constitutionality of a traffic stop under Florida law that was pretextual, initiated based on suspected drug activity rather than the cited license plate violation. The court reverses Johnson's conviction, finding the stop unconstitutional because there was no probable cause for either the traffic violation or drug arrest.
The traffic stop was unconstitutional because there was no probable cause for either the traffic violation or the drug arrest. The court reversed the denial of the suppression motion because the information from the confidential informant was not sufficiently specific or particular to supply probable cause under the totality of circumstances test, and the license plate discrepancy was merely a typographical error rather than an actual alteration.
[1] A traffic stop pretextually based on a minor vehicle code violation, when the true motivation is to investigate unrelated criminal activity, is unconstitutional.
[2] Evidence obtained from a search incident to an unlawful arrest must be suppressed.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Traffic stop turned into a drug bust.”
Officer's admission that the stop was originally a traffic stop but was actually motivated by drug investigation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficers received information from a confidential informant that Johnson was a drug seller who would have drugs on him that evening. Based on this tip…
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COBB, Judge.
This appeal challenges the constitutional validity of a traffic stop based on section 320.061, Florida Statutes (1987), which proscribes alteration of a license plate. The ensuing arrest and search produced cocaine and drug paraphernalia, which the arresting officers previously had suspected based on information from a confidential informant. The deposition testimony of one of the arresting officers considered at the suppression hearing revealed that the true basis of the stop was the officers’ suspicion of drug activity: Q. Okay. So if you wanted to find him, you could have found him and you could have made a stop or made inquiry about the tag, correct?
A. Yes, and I did.
Q. Alright. Again I ask you was it a drug bust?
A. Traffic stop turned into a drug bust.
Q. Traffic stop expecting to find drugs that turned into a drug bust?
A. Correct.
Q. Recently acquired information— A. Yes. Q. —of drugs that evening by a phone call from prior source that you told you about this man being a drug seller?
A. Correct.
Q. He would have some drugs on him that evening?
A. Yes.
Q. Knew he did not have the correct tag on car.
A. Correct.
Q. And you knew he couldn’t produce a correct registration.
A. I didn’t know the answer to that question. Unless the registration was altered in someway to match the tag.
Q. You’d have gotten him then for altering registration, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You knew you had him on the tag.
A. Correct.
Q. No ifs, ands or huts.
A. Right. Q. Information on drugs. I'm going to stop him on the tag. I’ll see what happens.
A. Right.
Q. Got lucky.
A. Right.
Q. Drug bust.
A. Right.
In point of fact, the reference to the incorrect tag was merely a typographical error of one letter on Johnson’s registration. It was apparent to the arresting officer at the scene that the license plate itself had not been altered. There was no information imparted to the arresting officers in regard to possession of drugs or paraphernalia which was sufficiently specific or particular to supply probable cause for an arrest for possession based upon consideration of the totality of circumstances. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, rehearing denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983).
Since there was no probable cause for an arrest, either on a traffic or drug charge, the order denying suppression of evidence produced by that arrest was error, and the judgment and sentence below must be REVERSED. SHARP, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Gifford, 558 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…at he has probable cause to arrest, without providing supporting facts, is insufficient to establish probable cause. See Carter v. State, 199 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Urso v. State, 134 So. 2d 810, 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). Cf. Johnson v. State, 537 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); M.J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), reh’g. denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983); Nathanson v. United States, 2…
Authorities Cited
- Illinois v. Gates et ux., 462 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1983)
- Illinois v. Gates et ux., 463 U.S. 1237 (U.S. 1983)
- Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237 (U.S. 1983)