CAPITAL BANK, A FLORIDA BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE FRANCIS X. KNUCK, AS JUDGE OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Capital Bank sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a trial court from entertaining further post-judgment motions by defendant Bulas after the court had already disposed of his motion for rehearing and to alter or amend judgment. The court granted the writ, holding that once a trial court properly disposes of the single authorized post-judgment motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, it loses jurisdiction over the cause and cannot entertain additional motions or extend filing deadlines.
The trial court loses jurisdiction over the cause once it properly disposes of the single authorized post-judgment motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530. The court has no authority to permit filing of further motions for rehearing beyond the one authorized by rule or to extend the time for filing that motion. Therefore, prohibition is granted to preclude the trial court's ongoing attempt to entertain further proceedings.
[1] A trial court's unqualified denial of a timely filed post-judgment motion constitutes a final disposition of that motion.
[2] A trial court lacks the authority to permit the filing of further motions for rehearing beyond those authorized by rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is apparent that the unqualified denial of Bulas's appropriate post-judgment motion constituted a final disposition of that motion.”
Establishes that the trial court's denial of the motion for rehearing was final and conclusive
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA final money judgment was entered in favor of Capital Bank against Luis Bulas and another defendant. Within the time required by Florida Rule of Civi…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
A final money judgment was entered in favor of the petitioner, Capital Bank, against Luis Bulas and another defendant. Within the time provided by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 Bulas moved for rehearing and to alter or amend the judgment against him. The trial judge disposed of this motion in the following order:
1. Defendant, LUIS BULAS’S, Motion for Rehearing and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is denied without prejudice.
2. The Defendant, LUIS BULAS, is given an additional ten (10) days from the date of the hearing within which to file an additional Motion for Rehearing based upon additional information.
3. The Court takes under advisement, pending further Order of Court, the remaining Motions filed by the Defendant.
When, notwithstanding this disposition, the lower court purported to entertain further proceedings concerning Bulas’s additional motions, the bank brought this prohibition proceeding to prevent it from doing so on the ground that the order had divested it of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. We agree and grant the writ.
It is apparent that the unqualified denial of Bulas’s appropriate post-judgment motion constituted a final disposition of that motion.1 Because, notwithstanding that the order undertook to do so, the trial court has no authority either to permit the filing of any further motion for rehearing beyond the one authorized by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, Markevitch v. Van Harren, 429 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), appeal after remand, 447 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), pet. for review denied, 456 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1984), or to extend the time for filing that motion, Clara P. Diamond, Inc. v. Tam-Bay Realty, Inc., 462 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), the quoted order therefore terminated the trial court’s jurisdiction over the cause. Markevitch v. Van Harren, 429 So. 2d at 1255.
In sum, the lower court could do nothing after the appropriate disposition of the single authorized post-trial motion.2 Prohibition will therefore be granted to preclude its ongoing attempt to go further. Estate of Godley, 508 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Florida Nat’l Bank v. Domanska, 486 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
PROHIBITION GRANTED.3
.The fact that the order was purportedly "without prejudice" does not affect this conclusion. Derma Lift Salon, Inc. v. Swanko, 419 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Gries Investment Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
. Short of, perhaps, a motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, which was not filed in this case.
. We are sure it will be unnecessary to issue a formal rule absolute.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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The Balmoral Condo. Ass'n v. Grimaldi, 107 So. 3d 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…id., “the trial court has no authority either to [*1152] permit the filing of any further motion for rehearing beyond the one authorized by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, or to extend the time for filing that motion.” Capital Bank v. Knuck, 537 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citations omitted), cited with approval in Wilson v. Ford, 949 So. 2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090(b). As a result, “once a judgment becomes final—as where (a) a final judgment has been enter…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Eduardo Cantera v. Dist. Court OF Appeal, 555 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1990)…4 So. 2d 341. The case turns on whether the trial judge had the authority to vacate the order denying rehearing. Ironically, a recent decision of the same Third District Court of Appeal suggests the lack of such authority. In Capital Bank v. Knuck, 537 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the trial judge entered an order denying a motion for rehearing but gave the movant an additional ten days to file a new motion for rehearing. In prohibiting the trial court from entertaining further proceedings with respect to t…
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O.A.G. Corp. v. Britamco Underwriters, Inc., 707 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…he plaintiffs case unquestionably means that the defendant has “won” that piece of litigation. See Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)(judgment is “final” even if without prejudice to another action); Capital Bank v. Knuck, 537 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)(same); Derma Lift Salon, Inc. v. Swanko, 419 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)(same); Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Rueben H. Donnelley Corp., 415 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)(same). In my opinion, when the plaintiff in thi…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Derma Lift Salon, Inc. v. Honorable Edward Swanko, 419 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Clara P. Diamond, Inc. v. Tam-Bay Realty, Inc., 462 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Fla. Nat'l Bank v. Danuta T. Domanska, 486 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Inaky Markevitch and Serena Markevitch v. van Harren, 429 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- van Harren v. Inaky Markevitch and Serena Markevitch, 447 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Re Estate OF William Michael Godley, 508 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)