FISCHER

v.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION

and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendants. _________________________________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [ECF No. 13], and Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, [ECF No. 22], (collectively, the “Motions”). The Court has reviewed the Motions and the record and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and their Motion for Sanctions is denied.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants, alleging that Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) falsely reported to credit bureaus that Plaintiff was late and in default on his mortgage. [ECF No. 8]. In December 2003, Plaintiff obtained funding from Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”)2 to finance the purchase of an investment property through the security of a mortgage on a promissory note. Id., ¶ 12. While Chase was servicing Plaintiff’s loan, it collected and escrowed funds and was required to remit payment for taxes and

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Indeed, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To meet this “plausibility standard,” a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (alteration added) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because they are preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). “The FCRA is a comprehensive statutory scheme designed to regulate the consumer reporting industry.” Ross v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 625 F. 3d 808, 812 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)). In 1996, Congress added to the FCRA “a strong preemption provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b),” id., at 813, which, in pertinent part, provides that: “[n]o requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State . . . (1) with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . (F) [§] 1681s-23 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies [(“CRAs”).]”

§ 1681t(b)(1)(F) (alterations added). Here, the crux of Plaintiff’s claims––that Defendants falsely reported Plaintiff late and in default on his loan payments––clearly “runs into the teeth of [§ 1681t(b)(1)(F),]” Ross, 625 F. 3d at 813, because it directly relates to Defendants’ credit reporting responsibilities. Accordingly, the FCRA governs and preempts Plaintiff’s state-law claims. See e.g., Celestine v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:17-CV-20915-KMM, 2018 WL 2316665, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2018) (citing Ross and holding claims preempted by FCRA), appeal dismissed sub nom. Celestine v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 18-12384-EE, 2018 WL 6524368 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2018).

§ 1681t(b)(1)(F) and § 1681h(e) and held that the “total-preemption approach” rightly holds that the FCRA preempts all state-law claims “against a furnisher arising from a requirement or prohibition imposed by state law[.]” Id. at 1255–58. The Court agrees and finds that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) is “broad enough” to preclude Plaintiff’s claims. Lofton-Taylor v. Verizon Wireless, 262 F. App’x 999, 1003 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to address whether § 1681t(b)(1)(F) also precluded claims that were preempted by § 1681h(e)). Even so, Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to infer that his claims fall under the scope of § 1681h(e). To qualify for § 1681h(e)’s preemption exception, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that his claims are either (1) “based on information disclosed pursuant to [§] 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m[,]” or (2) “based on information disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or in part on the report.” Ross, 625 F. 3d at 814. Then, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant furnisher reported false information with “malice or willful intent to injure” the consumer. Id. (citing § 1681h(e)). Plaintiff’s claims are not “based on information disclosed pursuant to [§] 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m because these apply only to CRAs and users of consumer reports,” and Plaintiff neither alleges that Defendants are CRAs nor that they are “user[s] of consumer reports vis-à-vis” Plaintiff. Davidson v. Capital One, N.A., No. 14-20478-CIV, 2014 WL 3767677, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 31,

2014) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Ross, 625 F. 3d at 814). Furthermore, Plaintiff neither alleges that Defendants “used [Plaintiff’s] consumer report nor took adverse action based on information in [his] report or information disclosed by a user.” Ross, 625 F. 3d at 814 (citing § 1681h(e)). As such, § 1681h(e) is inapplicable here. Additionally, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions because Plaintiff's claims are not “objectively frivolous” under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in view of the facts and the law. Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F. 3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 13] shall be GRANTED; 2. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [ECF No. 22] shall be DENIED; and 3. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 8] shall be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 27th day of February, 2020.

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DARRIN P. GAYLES

UNITED STATES DIST JUDGE