SARA JANE THORNTON, F/K/A SARA JANE W. BYRNES, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN BYRNES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial court erred in denying attorney's fees based solely on the parties' financial circumstances and that unpaid child support arrearages are vested property rights.
[1] A trial court is bound by a general master's factual findings if they are supported by competent evidence.
[2] Unpaid child support arrearages constitute vested property rights that cannot be constitutionally deprived without a motion for modification being filed and favorably act…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a dissolution, the father unilaterally ceased child support payments for one child who moved in with him, and paid no support for the other …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Vested Property Rights cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Sara Jane Thornton appeals from the trial court’s denial of her request for an increase in child support and for attorney’s fees and costs. John Byrnes cross-appeals an award of child support arrearages. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The parties’ marriage was dissolved in September, 1980. Custody of the minor children, John and Michael, was awarded to the mother, Sara. The father, John, was ordered to pay child support of $700 per month, to be divided equally between the children. In January, 1982, the mother remarried. The parties’ older son, John, developed severe emotional problems and, in the spring of 1982, it was agreed that John would live with his father. The father unilaterally ceased paying child support for John. In the winter of 1982, the mother filed a motion for contempt and petitioned for modification of support, but no further proceedings were had for some time. In 1985 and throughout most of 1986, the father paid no support for Michael. In June, 1986, the father filed a motion seeking custody of John.
The motions were consolidated and heard by a general master. At the conclusion of the hearings, the master recommended, inter alia, that the mother receive a judgment for $16,187.00 in support arrearages; that the father receive custody of John; that the mother’s petition for modification of child support for Michael be denied; and that her request for attorney’s fees and costs be denied. The trial court approved and adopted the recommendations.
We find no error in that portion of the trial court’s order awarding support arrearages.
The trial court is bound by the general master’s factual findings if they are supported by competent evidence. Bragassa v. Bragassa, 505 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
The master’s finding that there was no informal, oral agreement to modify the $700 per month amount is supported by competent evidence. The child support payments, therefore, “not only must be made as provided, but become vested property rights of which the recipient cannot constitutionally be deprived until and unless a motion for modification is filed and favorably acted upon.” Adams v. Adams, 423 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see also Shufflebarger v. Shufflebarger, 460 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (unpaid child support is vested right). The trial court correctly approved the master’s findings that the' mother failed to meet her burden of proof to show a substantial, involuntary, and permanent change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an increase in the amount of support for Michael. See Vanden Bosch v. Elkins, 419 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
It was error, however, for the trial court to adopt the master’s recommendation that “in view of the totality of financial disclosure as to the assets of both parties,” the mother was not entitled to any attorney’s fees or costs. While we recognize that an award of attorney’s fees is a matter of discretion with the trial court, Colbath v. Colbath, 268 So. 2d 361 (Fla.1972), it is an abuse of that discretion to look exclusively to the financial circumstances of the parties in determining whether to award fees. Meloan v. Cover-dale, 525 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988).
The trial court must consider other relevant factors, including “whether the modification or enforcement action brought or defended by the party seeking fees was meritorious or was litigated in good faith and whether the actions of one party compelled the other party to resort to the courts for a remedy.” Id. at 937.
See also Dubreuil v. Dubreuil, 489 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Planes v. Planes, 477 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Creel v. Creel, 423 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Broudy v. Broudy, 423 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
There is little indication in the record that the master based his recommendation on anything other than the relative financial positions of the mother and father. Further, the mother’s financial position was overstated in that the master included in the mother’s net worth the amount of support arrearages. We, therefore, reverse that portion of the order denying the mother attorney’s fees and costs. On remand, the trial court is directed to ascertain the amount' of fees incurred by the mother in her enforcement action as well as in defense of the father’s petition for modification.
The trial court should revisit the propriety of an award in light of the relevant factors set forth in our opinion in Meloan.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…d, 545 So. 2d 1370 (Fla.1989). Moreover, unpaid child support is a vested right which cannot be denied unless a motion for modification is filed and favorably ruled upon. Ragan v. Thomas, 515 So. 2d 405, 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Thornton v. Byrnes, 537 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Adams v. Adams, 423 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). See also Friend v. Friend, 543 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Thus, one required by court order to make child support payments may not take matters into his own hands…
-
Sutter v. Sutter, 578 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…spondent has been represented by more than a handful of attorneys and has appeared pro se a number of times. The court has considered this abuse of the judicial process as one factor in deciding the issues of attorney’s fees. See Thornton v. Byrnes, 537 So. 2d 1088 (Pla. 3d DCA 1989). In Mettler v. Mettler, 569 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), we held A party’s financial status should not isolate them from the consequences of their conduct within the judicial system. See generally Steinfeld v. Steinfeld, 565…
-
Arouza v. Goldin C. Arouza, 670 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…hus, the court sidestepped the issue wheth [*72] er she has the ability to pay the award. Although the court must consider numerous factors in determining whether to award fees in cases involving bad faith dissolution litigation, Thornton v. Byrnes, 537 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Meloan v. Coverdale, 525 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988), when the court is determining the amount that the miscreant must pay the sole inquiry is ‘present’ ability to pay. Ugarte v. Ugarte, 608…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Meloan v. Coverdale, 525 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Bragassa v. Bragassa, 505 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Adams v. Adams, 423 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Shufflebarger v. Harry L. Shufflebarger, M.D., 460 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Planes v. Marianthi Planes, 477 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Broudy v. Broudy, 423 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Bosch v. Elkins, 419 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Creel v. Creel, 423 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Arlander Williams v. State, 268 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1972)
- Colbath v. Colbath, 268 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1972)